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Public Debates over Islam and the Awareness of Muslim Identity in the Netherlands

Immigration and integration, especially in terms of Muslim people in the Netherlands, has become one of the most critical issues in the Dutch political arena. Issues related to Islam and the position of its adherents in the country are discussed daily in parliament, school administrations, the corporate world, and the media. In the wake of various national and international developments in the last decade, the Dutch government has shifted its multicultural perspective on Dutch society, with far-reaching consequences for educational policy. Moreover, the government has tightened its regulations for entering the country and for subsidizing activities designed to preserve the native cultures of immigrants in general.

To understand fully the reasons for the drastic changes in Dutch immigration and integration policies and to be able to put current developments into perspective, it is important to survey the course of Muslim immigration in recent history and consider the awareness in Dutch society of these groups and their religion.

Muslims and Islam in the Netherlands

Due to extensive economic growth after World War II, the Netherlands soon experienced a labor shortage, especially in economic sectors that required unskilled labor. For a number of reasons, both employers and the national government sought to resolve this shortage by recruiting laborers from abroad. Although recruitment was cheaper in the short run and helped to satisfy the demand for unskilled labor, it dramatically altered the cultural map of Dutch society. In the 1960s, after a period of open, unregulated immigration from various countries, the Dutch government signed recruitment agreements with a number of Mediterranean coun-

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tries (e.g., Turkey in 1964; Morocco in 1969) in order to streamline the process. The immigrants (workers and their families) who arrived over these years brought with them their native languages, cultural norms, values, and social customs to local Dutch neighborhoods. Though official government policy was directed toward the fostering an inclusive, multicultural society, from the outset the phenomenon of labor immigration created tensions and fissures throughout Dutch society. These would eventually lead to the contemporary debates over Islam and Muslim culture, not only at the political level but at every level of Dutch society.

Today, the largest group of immigrants comprises some 3 million members. This group is categorized as "allochthonous"—that is, originating from outside the country. However, caution is imperative in considering this figure, as the Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) bases its classification on the non-native place of birth of an individual or either of the parents. Using this method, nearly 18 percent of the 16 million Dutch citizens, including members of the Dutch royal family—even the queen herself—belong to this category. Furthermore, CBS differentiates between Western and non-Western "allochthons," each subgroup responsible for nearly 50 percent of the total group. The latter comprises immigrants from Africa, Latin America, and Asia, excluding Japan and Indonesia.

In 2004 more than 1.6 million non-Western immigrants resided in the Netherlands, almost half of Muslim background and originating from Turkey and Morocco. Moreover, 137,000 people with this religious background entered the country as asylum seekers from Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iran. Between 60 and 70 percent of the non-Western immigrants reside in the western, most densely populated, and industrialized part of the country, mainly in the largest urban centers. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam they constitute nearly 33 percent of the population, and in The Hague and Utrecht 30 percent and 20 percent, respectively (see Dagevos, Gijsberts, and Van Praag 2003).

Although Muslims have resided in the country for over four decades, the continuous public debates about their integration indicate that their position in society is uneasy. The society's attitude toward them, as expressed by politicians and opinion leaders, is predominantly negative, indicating that the goal of the Dutch multicultural society, including Muslims, is still a utopia. Although the necessary juridical conditions for its realization are widely present, the equally indispensable social basis is lacking or declining extensively. In short, the Netherlands is becoming an ethnically stratified society. Informally, and from an anthropological point of view, there is hardly any fundamental difference between the ethnic stratification of the apartheid system in South Africa (whites, Asians, and blacks) and the increasing differentiation between native Dutch, Western non-natives, and non-Western non-natives in the Netherlands. Moreover, the socioeconomic disadvantage of these groups in particular and the arguments used to explain the causes of this disadvantage as well as the ethnic residential segregation are comparable to the situation in South Africa under apartheid.

In order to present an adequate analysis of developments in public and political
discourses on Islam in the Netherlands, the last four decades will be divided into three periods: (1) the period of negligence; (2) the period of awareness and ethnicization of Islam; and (3) the period of stigmatization and exclusion.

The period of negligence throughout the 1960s and 1970s

From the very beginning of the recruitment of labor migrants in the 1960s, their position has been an important issue in various sectors of Dutch society. Political debates, however, have focused mainly on whether employers and the government would succeed in recruiting sufficient numbers of laborers to fulfill the existing demand for unskilled labor that native Dutch refused to do. Politicians and opinion leaders were obviously unaware of the potential cultural and social problems that the influx of immigrants could pose for society, and of the types of problems faced by newly arrived immigrants. At that time, the government and policy experts approached the subject of immigration in primarily socioeconomic terms. Much attention was paid to the poor housing conditions of immigrants concentrated in inner cities (particularly the issue of overcrowded boardinghouses) as well as the uncertain legal status of many immigrants and the broader economic costs and benefits of migrant labor. Topics such as integration, adjustment, and religion were discussed, but to a lesser degree than nowadays. Research in the 1960s indicated that the adjustment of immigrants was ranked number five in the topics debated, while language proficiency, food and dietary customs, religion, and views on the position of women were mentioned only as factors that may lead to misunderstanding in the communication between immigrants and the Dutch environment (see Wentholt 1967).

At that time, the media as well as scientific and policy reports referred to those immigrants as “guest workers,” or specifically as Moroccans, Turks, or Tunisians, emphasizing their national origin and temporary residence in the country. Until the late 1970s, Islam as a religion did not have significance as a research topic or serve as a label for their identification. The lack of emphasis on the religious aspect can be clearly deduced from the points of interest in the few scientific and policy reports published at that time. Until the end of the 1970s, the attention researchers paid to Islam was simply indirect and superficial (see, for example, Berg-Eldering 1978; Entzinger 1984; Shadid 1979; Theunis 1979; Van Amersfoort 1974; WRR 1979). Initially social scientists were the group that contributed the most to research and publications on this topic, especially later in the 1990s, when the focus on Islam gained prominence in various disciplines, including theology, law, linguistics, and medical sciences (see Van Ooyen et al. 1991).

The prolonged neglect of Islam as a sociocultural phenomenon in the Netherlands can be attributed mainly to the fact that government services and other important social institutions have long considered the presence of Muslims temporary. Until the late 1970s, most Dutch expected that sooner or later, Muslims would return to their countries of origin and, thus, their religion would have no lasting
influence on Dutch society. Initially, migrant workers received residence permits for one or two years, though in practice these permits were extended on a continuous base. The situation was complicated by the fact that the government’s emphasis on the temporary status of immigrants was supported by existing figures on the fluctuating immigration flow. In practice, their average stay did not exceed one year and the immigration surplus was very low as well.

However, at the end of the 1970s and as a result of increased spontaneous immigration and family reunion, the immigration surplus increased considerably. The government tried to stop this largely unregulated process through various measures such as tightening visa requirements and limiting the possibilities of family reunion. Like closing the stable door after the horse has bolted, these measures were not effective enough and merely led to the increase of “illegal immigrants,” a further problem needing to be solved. As an initial step, in 1975 the Dutch government issued a “general pardon” for those who could fulfill specific conditions, such as proving they entered the country prior to November 1973, being legally employed, and paying taxes for a certain period of time. Such measures had already been applied by other Western European countries such as France and Belgium, in 1973 and 1974 respectively.

In reality the Dutch government took the official position that the Netherlands is not an immigration country like the United States, Canada, or Australia and will not be so in the future. This viewpoint would change over time, however. By the time of the 1983 Memorandum on Minorities, the Dutch government had substantially softened its views on ethnic minorities and their position in society. By this time, it was clear that the state was beginning to realize that immigrants were becoming a permanent and integral feature of Dutch society.

For this new perspective on immigration and on the position of immigrants in society, the government was obliged to formulate an official policy on ethnic minorities. Ultimately, this took the form of the “Draft Notes on Minorities,” in which the government qualified its policy on minorities as directed toward the realization of a multicultural society in which immigrants could acquire equal status and opportunities. Concretely, the policy aimed at: (1) facilitating the necessary conditions for emancipation, such as strengthening the self-esteem of immigrants and stimulating their acceptance in society; (2) reducing their socioeconomic disadvantage; and (3) fighting against ethnic discrimination. To reach these goals, the government tightened the regulations for admittance to the country (see Minderhedennota 1983, p. 10).

Another important factor of the public neglect of Islam in the Netherlands throughout the 1960s and 1970s was the foundational principle of the separation of church and state in Dutch society. Thus research and policy analysis on religion in general, and particularly its financing, had little or no government priority. Even after accepting the notion that the immigrants had become an inextricable part of Dutch society, the government continued to disregard Muslim religious organizations as partners in negotiation. On the other hand, it did acknowledge that religion
plays an important role in the development and reinforcement of the self-esteem and emancipation of individual members of ethnic minority groups.

The growing awareness and ethnicization of Islam during the 1980s

Although in the 1970s the term “Muslims” was rarely used when referring to immigrants of Muslim background, not until the early 1980s did the ethnic designations “Moroccans” and “Turks” become linked to the Muslim religion in public representation and in media coverage. The reason for this relatively late association can be understood in terms of the national and international events in which Islam played a central role at the time. Among the latter, the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the “Rushdie affair” 1989 (see below) may be considered the most important. Events at a national level included the rapid increase in family reunions and immigrants’ desire to preserve their cultural identity. To facilitate the socialization of their children, build community, and pass on ethnic and religious values, Muslims throughout the Netherlands constructed mosques and established various community organizations, including Muslim schools. However, one should not conclude from this local activity that the interest and participation of second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants in these communal institutions has necessarily been high. First-generation immigrants were, and still are, the main initiators of and participants in these organizations.

These local developments made an Muslim cultural infrastructure in the Netherlands clearly visible, which in its turn made immigrants’ religious identification more comprehensible and acceptable to the native Dutch. Parallel to a broadening social acceptance and integration of the Muslim immigrant, there was a growing need for more information about these ethnoreligious groups. Both scientists and policy makers realized that applied research, especially in relation to Islam, was indispensable to the integration of these immigrant groups, particularly in regard to providing adequate social assistance in various sectors such as education and health care. Little attention was devoted to Islam and immigration by social scientists until the 1980s, when the subject began to achieve prominence in such disciplines as linguistics, law, and religious studies (see the bibliography of Shadid and Van Koningsveld 1995; Strijp 1998; Van Ooyen 1991).

The government also responded to the increased public attention to Muslim immigrants with the first ministerial memorandum on minorities and religious facilities and services, issued in the early 1980s (Waardenburg and Goutier 1982). Furthermore, in 1989, the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR 1989) issued its second memorandum on the development of public policy relating to immigrant minorities, taking the permanent residence of immigrants as its basis. In that memorandum, the concept of “ethnic minorities” was replaced by the term *allochtonen*, which by then referred to “foreigners.”

The internal and external factors mentioned above played a central role in identifying these groups by their religion instead of ethnic or national origin. However,
religious identification was not used exclusively by policy makers and the media but also by members of the groups themselves. In this context, some authors (Halliday 1995, p. 115) argue that the ethnicization of “Muslims” was primarily used by those whose aim was to exclude them from society, and by those within the Muslim community who falsely claimed authority in their own interpretation of Islam as the only correct one.

Two objections may be raised about the religious “labeling” of immigrants from Muslim countries. First of all, such a labeling inaccurately suggests that these groups define themselves primarily as Muslims and that they are active in their religious practices. Positioning them as religious groups in a secular society where religion does not play an important role in public life provides fertile soil for stereotyping such groups as religiously zealous and fanatical. Furthermore, religious labeling inaccurately suggests that their behavior, perceptions, and desires can be adequately explained by reference to their religion. In this way, negative forms of behavior such as runaway girls and the disadvantageous position of Muslim women in these communities are attributed by politicians and opinion leaders to a cultural conflict between them and the host society. Such a “cultural fixation” ignores the effect of socioeconomic factors, which can be of greater importance in understanding and explaining these forms of behavior.

Another important factor that has led to a growing awareness of Islam in society, particularly in terms of the media coverage of international events and the response of policy makers domestically, is a broad-based fear of Islam. One event in particular, the “Rushdie affair,” should be mentioned in this context. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s fatwa, which constituted a death sentence for the writer Salman Rushdie for committing what he judged to be sacrilege in his novel Satanic Verses, led to indignant reactions in various West European countries. Such a fatwa contradicts fundamental Western values such as freedom of speech and the separation of church and state. Furthermore, Khomeini was at the time the highest religious leader and the first president of the Muslim Republic of Iran as well. He was widely viewed as a religious zealot and radical by many in the West. In the Netherlands, the ensuing indignation and public debate raised doubts about the concessions made in the context of multiculturalism, and about the applicability and suitability of concepts such as cultural relativism, tolerance, and political correctness. The fatwa was also used by certain politicians and opinion leaders to support serious doubts about the compatibility of Islam with Western culture, leading to a general increase of anti-Muslim sentiments. In this way, the debates have certainly contributed to a negative image of Islam in Dutch society, despite the fact that all Muslim organizations, both national and international, sought to distance themselves from the fatwa.

As a result of these events, other issues assumed a central place in public debates and in numerous scientific publications and policy reports. These issues concerned mainly the extent to which the resurgence of “political Islam” in the immigrants’ countries of origin could negatively affect developments in Muslim
communities in European Union countries. This question could not be addressed adequately, either through politics or science.

As far as the latter is concerned, classical orientalists were unable to provide correct and contemporary images of Muslim normative views about living as a Muslim minority in a non-Muslim setting. This shortcoming was due to their focus on antiquated publications on Muslim theology rather than modern Muslim interpretations and the empirical reality of Muslims living as religious minorities in non-Muslim countries. In this context, only *medieval* Muslim scholars were quoted as authoritative sources and their ideas were presented as the only legitimate Muslim viewpoints. Although contemporary Muslim views on the issue do exist, these are usually left out of consideration.

In contrast, an examination of modern Muslim primary sources reveals that many Muslim theologians focus on matters concerning Muslims living as minorities in non-Muslim countries, such as naturalization, political participation, and military service. They argue that Islam does not forbid such activities, even when participation in the military service would force Muslims to fight against a Muslim army. Recent history has shown that Muslim armies fighting each other is a well-known phenomenon. Those theologians emphasize that every Muslim living in a non-Muslim country is obliged to defend that country from internal and external attacks. These pronouncements clearly show that the views on the *jihad* against the "enemies of Islam" and the frequently cited distinction between the Territory of Islam and the Territory of War to emphasize the relationship between the Muslim world and the Western world is outdated (Shadid and Van Koningsveld 1996). However, due to deficiencies in scientific research on Islam, the views of older, more traditional Muslim theologians were mainly presented to explain current Muslim phenomena. Among these shortcomings was the small scale of research on Islam in the Netherlands and in Europe in general. Unfortunately such research is mainly descriptive and impressionistic, *emic*-oriented;* when questionnaires are used little or no attention is paid to the essential equivalence of meaning. Because of these weaknesses, the role of the media in providing mainly outdated information on Islam took on great importance, as it produced and reproduced stereotypes and prejudices (see Brants et al. 1998; Shadid 1998; Shadid and Van Koningsveld 1994; and Ter Wal 2002).

**Stigmatization and exclusion: we versus they in the 1990s**

After the Iranian revolution, the Rushdie affair, and the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), the reference of "we" versus "they" was frequently used by Dutch politi-

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*The concept *emic* as opposed to *etic*, is introduced by the linguist Kenneth Pike in 1954. He stated that cultural systems can be studied by taking the group members' point of view (*etic*, insiders) or that of the researchers (*emic*, outsiders)*
cians, commentators, and opinion leaders in association with Islam and Muslim communities throughout the Netherlands. Examples of these negative remarks were the statements of Frits Bolkestein, leader of the Dutch Political Liberal Party (VVD) in 1991; Willy Claes, the NATO secretary general in 1995; and Silvio Berlusconi, the-then Italian prime minister, who said in 2001: “We must be aware of the superiority of our civilization, a system that has guaranteed well-being, respect for human rights, and—in contrast with Muslim countries—respect for religious and political rights.”

More recently, reference can be made to Pim Fortuyn, the leader of a new political party in the Netherlands, murdered in 2001 while campaigning for national elections, who said that Islam is a backward religion. The filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered for his attitude toward Islam in 2004. Outside the Netherlands, one can observe the influence of negative attitudes toward Islam, particularly through the influential “clash of civilizations” hypothesis of Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington, also clearly illustrate this negative attitude (Huntington 1993; Shadid and Van Koningsveld 2002). Characteristic of this trend is the emphasis on the incompatibility of Islam with the basic values of Western culture. In the Netherlands, the principal stress has been on the threat, supposedly emanating from Islam, to democracy and to the historical separation of church and state. Various politicians, publicists, scientists, and journalists often point to sporadic excesses committed by extremist Muslims as proof of their thesis on the incompatibility of Islam and Western culture.² By constantly labeling them by their ascribed religious identity, the we versus they distinction is reinforced. Consequently, Muslims are excluded from mainstream society. We agree with Fog, who states that “the use of labels and names can create inclusion or exclusion depending on the sociocultural context and relationships. Labels are one way to communicate a concept for cognitive and/or emotional identification or nonidentification with a real or imagined community of people. When people use labels and names to exclude others, often it is an expression of separation, discrimination or prejudice” (2004, p. 20).

The mainly negative debates on the position of Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands have pushed the government into tightening its immigration and integration measures. In 1998, the government issued the Law on Civic Integration of Newcomers to be applied to immigrants and to those wishing to immigrate to the Netherlands in the context of family reunion or marriage. The “integration” courses (approximately 600 hours) consist of learning the Dutch language and the acquisition of general knowledge of Dutch culture and of how to function in Dutch society. Since 2005, non-European Union immigrants must fulfill their citizenship obligations in their countries of origin. Passing the required basic examination for citizenship is a prerequisite for obtaining a visa to enter the country. U.S., Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, and Japanese nationals are, however, exempted from these prearrival “integration tests.” Furthermore, the government has increased the age and income limits for those wanting to immigrate to the Netherlands in
these contexts respectively to twenty-one years and 120 percent of the basic wage. Simultaneously, it has revised the conditions for asylum applications and expanded the definition of "safe countries" so that asylum seekers have a greater chance of being sent back. Finally, the financing of activities aimed at the preservation of their own cultural identities by members of minority groups has been terminated.

The climax of fear of Islam in Dutch society resulted from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, and later in Indonesia (2002), Morocco (2003), Spain (2004), and London (2005). Dutch and other West European opinion leaders have considered these attacks, especially those in the United States, as attacks against Western civilization as a whole. Exclusion and "disloyalization" of Muslims in society were then implicitly and explicitly verbalized. The discourse of the Fifth Column, already rooted in the previous phase, became widely accepted, and pleas for a prohibition on various Muslim facilities, such as some schools and organizations, were expressed more explicitly and frequently. For example, in this context proposals have been formulated in parliament for prohibiting the foundation of the Arab-European League (AEL) in the Netherlands, an organization founded in Belgium by a Belgian of Arab descent, who has been called an extremist, as well as for the closure of some mosques without any evidence of involvement in illegal actions. The AEL, whose goal, according to its founders, is to defend the creation and growth of "real" European multicultural societies and the rights of Muslims within these societies, was founded in the first half of 2003, and so far there have been no mosque closures. Because of the sharpness of the debates, the qualifications applied, and measures suggested, some scholars in this field characterize the present discourse on Islam in the Netherlands as a cultural racist discourse (van Nieuwkerk 2004).

With the increased suspicion toward Muslim communities in the Netherlands, the National Security Service has intensified the surveillance of these groups and their institutions. At the same time, the public debates on radical Islam in Muslim communities has irrevocably influenced the process of stigmatization and exclusion. For instance, the media have devoted excessive coverage to the negative statements of an imam from Rotterdam who declared that homosexuality is an illness that is infectious and must be cured. These statements did not deviate substantially from the standard views of some conservative Christian religious leaders in various countries of the European Union. The media also spent much time covering several negative statements, recorded by hidden camera, of other imams throughout the country on the position of women in Islam and how female deviancy should be dealt with. This illustrates society’s negative attitude toward the religion and its followers. In the same context, the National Security Service has investigated the teaching practices and materials used in religious education in Muslim schools that have been accused of radicalism and the promotion of texts that incite hatred. In the same vein, various Muslim organizations and individuals have been accused of maintaining ties with terrorist organizations, and people have been arrested and subjected to interrogation. The accusations could not be substantiated in a court of
law, which has not diminished the acerbity of public debates and the increasing suspicion toward these groups.

Despite the formal division between church and state but prompted by the fear of Muslim fundamentalism, the Dutch government began intervening in religious matters of Muslims and sought to establish a Dutch program for the imam of education. The Dutch parliament even adopted a motion prohibiting the importation of foreign imams by the Muslim groups concerned after 2008. Notably, these actions did not meet with protest in society or within the Muslim communities. Given the ethnic and religious diversity across Muslim communities in the Netherlands and the lack of any representative body to defend Muslim rights and mobilize collection action, there have been few avenues for demonstration and opposition. The historical development of an Muslim cultural infrastructure in the Netherlands is beyond the scope of this article (on this topic, see Rath et al. 1999; Shadid and Van Koningsveld 1997; Sunier 1999). In its effort to create a representative negotiating body for the groups concerned, the government has subsidized a group called Islam en Burgerschap [Islam and Citizenship], which has resulted in the establishment of the Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid [Contact Organization of Muslims and Government] in 2004. Because of the diversity of the groups concerned, the Contact Group Islam, in which Muslim minority streams such as the Ahmaddyah and the Alavies are represented, was also established. Both groups are now recognized by the government as contact partners.

Epilogue

These developments clearly indicate that the Dutch policy on minorities has changed from cultural pluralism to integration with characteristics of assimilation, and from a group-oriented identity approach to emphasizing an individually directed sense of citizenship. As far as Muslims are concerned, these changes indicate a “retreat of multiculturalism,” despite the statement by Joppe that “even at the level of rhetoric, there has been no change to the notion that ‘we are all multiculturalists now’ in the sense that it is generally not considered the business of the state to force identities upon people” (2004, pp. 254–55). With regard to the latter, there has been an enormous increase in direct and indirect Dutch government intervention in Muslim religious affairs, in the creation of a representative body for Muslims, in founding a Dutch center for educating imams, in forbidding Muslims to contract their own religious leaders from the countries of origin, and in controlling the content of their religious lessons and materials. Furthermore, real multiculturalism implies more than recognizing the notion of “we are all multiculturalists now.” Acceptance and respect for the cultural “otherness” of other groups as well as the absence of prejudice against them are also prerequisites for real multiculturalism (see also Entzinger 2003).

For Muslims, these prerequisites are lacking in the contemporary multicultural discourse because the discourse stigmatizes them. Politicians, publicists, and opinion
leaders often associate Muslims with crime, drugs, and general nuisance. They have been accused of fundamentalism, terrorism, radicalism, disloyalty, and orthodoxy as well as of undertaking activities that are “dangerous to democracy” and “harmful to integration” (see BVD 2002; Onderwijsinspectie 2002). Statements made in this context are mainly of a generalizing and disparaging nature, ignoring social, economic, religious, political, and ethnic differentiations. As mentioned before, these groups originated from various countries with different ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. Also with respect to their religious denomination, there is a division between mainstreams and substreams, religious schools, mystical orders, and religio-political movements. Likewise, there is a scale of religious practices ranging from agnostic to fundamentalist.

To the detriment of public dialogue and understanding, the negative tenor of political debates has induced an ethnic dichotomy in society referring to us versus them, and our culture versus their culture, irrespective of the fact that nearly half the members of these groups were born and raised in the Netherlands. Although this differentiation may suggest some elements of multiculturalism, it is meant to exclude them from society instead of recognizing them as legitimate new Dutch ethnic groups and their religion as a new Dutch religion.

Because of this polarizing discourse, politicians and publicists plead for limitations on minorities’ rights, which are even in conflict with international treaties and especially with the Dutch constitution. The shift from a minorities policy to an integration policy has mainly been stimulated by political populism and rhetoric. In practice, the integration debates have proved to be counterproductive to the realization of their aim. Immigrants with an Muslim background feel more alienated than ever before, the attitude of the host society at large has never been more negative than now, and mutual interethnic contacts are continuously decreasing. As a consequence, remigration to the countries of origin is increasingly becoming a more realistic option for many, especially the highly educated.

Notes

1. The “Territory of War” is a concept derived from the classical Muslim division of the world into two territories: the “Territory of Islam” (in Arabic Dâr al-Islâm) and the “Territory of War” (Dâr al-Harb) or the “Territory of Unbelief” (Dâr al-Kafr).

2. See the open letter in the newspaper Trouw, 29 September 2001; “There Is Something Wrong with Islam” in the weekly magazine HP/De Tijd, 5 October 2001; and statements by several politicians during the election campaigns for parliament in 2002.

3. The “Fifth Column” refers to a group considered disloyal to society that seeks to undermine national security.

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