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Islam in Dutch Society: Current Developments and Future Prospects

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Contents

Preface

This book is the second of two volumes in which the edited version is published of the proceedings of the workshop on *Religion and Emancipation of Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe*, held in Leiden from the 12th through the 14th of September, 1990. The organization of the workshop was an initiative taken by the Dutch national research-project on "Religion of Ethnic Groups in The Netherlands", sponserd by the Foudation for Research in Theology and Religious Studies (STEGON), in which scholars and research-assistents from the Free University of Amsterdam, the Catholic University of Nijmegen and Leiden University participate. Its aim was to create a platform for Dutch researchers to communicate directly with their colleagues active in the same field of research from other West-European countries and the United States. The workshop took place within the framework of the conference on *The Social Construction of Minorities and their Cultural Rights in Western Europe*, organized and co-sponsored by the Leiden University Foundation (LUF) to celebrate its first centenary. The editors gratefully acknowledge the support received both from STEGON and LUF in organizing the workshop and in publishing the proceedings.

The materials of the workshop have been divided by us into two volumes each dealing with distinct issues. The present volume deals with the issue of *Islam in Dutch society*. To the papers presented in the workshop on this issue some additional articles by Dutch specialists have been added in order to cover the field more extensively. The first volume, published in the summer of 1991, was dedicated to *The Integration of Islam and Hinduism in Western Europe*.

The present book has been divided into three parts. The first part deals with *Islamic Faith and Rituals*. It starts with a historical exposé of ritual slaughtering in The Netherlands in the twentieth century, with special emphasis on the issue of legal adjustments for religious minorities. This is followed by a study of the Sufi orders and their role in the institutionalization of Islam. This part is concluded with a contribution on traditional Muslim healers, their practices and patients.

The second part contains five articles on various aspects of the social and religious life of the *second generation of Muslims*. The first of these deals with various types of religious belief and unbelief among young Turkish Muslims, seen from the perspective of the tension between a dualistic religious worldview and a secular one. Then a study follows of the religious identity as perceived by the same group. Another type of tension is the one manifesting itself in the phenomenon of Moroccan and Turkish runaway girls, discussed in the third article. This part is concluded with two contributions on education, special attention being paid to the so-called Arabic Language and Culture Teaching Programmes and to the current developments and functioning of Islamic primary schools.

The last part deals with Muslim organizations and institutions in The Netherlands. The various stages in the history of Muslim umbrella organizations is dealt in the first article. The following two contributions above all deal with the influence of Muslim organizations on the development of ethnicity and emancipation, among Turks and Moroccans respectively. The religious institutionalization among the Moluccans is dealt in the last article of this part.

In the epilogue the editors reflect upon the factors mentioned in the contributions to the present volume and elsewhere which, in their view, will determine to a large extent the future prospects of Muslim communities in The Netherlands.

Leiden, November, 15, 1991
W.A. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld

PART I

Islamic Faith and Rituals

1

Legal Adjustments for Religious Minorities

The Case of the Ritual Slaughtering of Animals

W.A. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld

In Holland, the constitutional principles of religious freedom, separation of Church and State and the equal treatment of all the inhabitants to a large extent regulate the space available to the adherents of various religions to profess their faith. Examples of the application of these principles are confessional, Christian, Jewish, Hindu and Muslim schools financed by the state, as well as the policy of the Dutch government to appoint *pandits* and *imams* in the army for the spiritual care of Hindu and Muslim soldiers, on a par with the already functioning priests, vicars and rabbis. Absolute equality has, however, not been realized.

A comparative and historical study of non-Christian minorities in Dutch society shows that some important aspects of the position of Muslims in present-day Holland to a large extent has been defined in accordance with the pattern laid down in the past for other religious minority groups, especially for Jews. For a long period the Jews formed the only non-Christian minority in the country. The legal system applied on behalf of their religious life, whether or not insufficiently expressing the above-mentioned constitutional principles, more or less automatically tended to set the pattern for the treatment of the other non-Christian minorities that came to live in Holland from the sixties of this century onwards, viz. Muslims and Hindus. Long before the arrival of the Muslims and Hindus, Jews already had obtained the right of state-financed confessional schools and of rabbis paid by the Government, in the army, in prisons, hospitals etc. They had, however, not acquired the official recognition of their religious feasts and holidays, and the legal status of Muslim and Hindu feasts in Holland was laid down in a verdict of the Dutch Supreme Court in

accordance with that which had factually existed for the Jews, resulting in an unequal treatment of Christian feasts (recognized as official holidays) on the one hand, and the feasts of all minority religions on the other hand (cf. Shadid and Van Koningsveld: 1991).

A specific reason for the treatment of the Muslims in Holland after the model laid down for the Jews in the past is the similarity, at least from an outsider's point of view, of some of the aspects of Judaism and Islam, which have become the subject of special measures and regulations by the Dutch Government. A case in point is ritual slaughtering. As far as the latter point is concerned Jews and Muslims are dealt with in an identical way, not only by the Dutch Government but also by some pressure-groups and political parties protesting against ritual slaughter and campaigning for its abolition.

In Holland stock for slaughtering such as sheep, goats, calves, cows and horses should be stunned before being slaughtered. Slaughtering with prior stunning may be done both at (public) abattoirs and, privately, by a butcher on his own premises. The law makes an exception for Jews and Muslims who are allowed to slaughter animals for their own meat consumption without previously stunning them, but only at a limited number of abattoirs assigned as such by the Government on a special list and under the personal supervision of an inspector. The same holds for the ritual slaughtering of animals for the export of meat to countries like Israel and Saudi-Arabia.

In Holland, just as in some other West-European countries, we observe, however, an ongoing stream of objections and protests against ritual slaughtering, not only from circles arguing the prevention of animal abuse, but also from (right-winged) extremist political circles aiming at the elimination of minorities from society. Apart from antisemitism, as the classical paradigm of racism, the defamation and denunciation of ethnic and cultural minorities forms an intrinsic part of their propaganda. By ascribing all kinds of evil characteristics to these minorities, including the stereotype of cruelty enforced by the stigmatization of ritual slaughtering, they attempt to create fear among the population at large. This feeling of fear and the ensuing hatred towards the minority groups concerned is manipulated in such a way as to serve the underlying central political goal, viz. the elimination of these groups from society.[1]

The aim of the present contribution is to describe some major episodes of the history of these discussions and of the changes that have taken place within the legislation concerning ritual slaughtering in Holland. This may explain the origin of the present-day regulations affecting ritual slaughtering by Jews and Muslims, on the one hand, and the nature and continuity of some processes at

work in Dutch society of rejection of and discrimination against these religious minorities on the other hand. Our historical treatment starts with a survey of the Dutch regulations and discussions on the ritual slaughtering by Jews, prior to the settlement of Muslim communities in Holland. This is followed by a summary of some relevant Islamic prescriptions and discussions on ritual slaughter, a subject which is usually dealt with insufficiently or is completely lacking in recent publications on the position of Muslim minorities in the West (cf. e.g. Abdussalam: 1980/1981 and Charlton and Kaye: 1985).[2] In the third section the Dutch regulations and discussions concerning ritual slaughter since the sixties will be dealt with. These are primarily related to the ritual slaughtering by Muslims.

Discussions and Regulations on Jewish Ritual Slaughtering

The modern European discussion on ritual slaughtering, combining the principles of hygiene and a humane treatment of animals with a secular world view and racism, seems to have had its origins in the second half of the nineteenth century, outside of The Netherlands. Its history remains yet to be written, though materials for some individual countries have already been made available (cf. Lehr: 1974, 123-125 for Germany in the period of 1870-1914, and Charlton and Kaye: 1985 for England from 1927 up till the present time). An early characteristic product of this polemic is Dembo's book, published in Leipzig in 1894, defending Jewish ritual slaughtering as compared to other methods "from the viewpoint of humaneness and hygiene". Dembo had been a member on a special committee appointed by the Congress of Russian organizations for the protection of animals set up to make a comparative scientific study to discover the best way of slaughtering animals. His book, consisting of 116 pages, contains a highly technical physiological discussion of the problem corroborated by the statements of many German and Russian scholars dating back as far as the early eighties of the nineteenth century (Dembo:1894).

As a result of the efforts made by the Society for the Protection of Animals many municipal Dutch abattoirs introduced the obligation to stun the animals prior to their being slaughtered, at the beginning of the present century. At that time the regulation of all matters related to slaughter were still left to the municipalities, which resulted in a variety of systems and methods, and also of local conflicts. Usually, exceptions were made for the animals slaughtered in accordance with the Jewish religious prescriptions for the consumption of meat by Jews. The stunning method applied most often was that of the

shooting-mask by which a bullet was introduced through the skull of the animal into its brains causing, according to the defendants of this method, immediate loss of consciousness. This method was not without risks, as the bullet, if not shot correctly, could leave the head of the animal, incidentally even killing the butcher himself. The doubts existing with respect to the shooting-mask were expressed by a Dutch major-general, E. van Gendt, who in a booklet on hygienic and economic grounds explicitly defended the Jewish method which, as we shall see below, had been introduced, in the Dutch army in 1896. A refutation of the major-general's brochure was published in Leiden in 1902, by a local veterinary surgeon, D. van Gruting (Van Gruting: 1902). In condemnation of the cruelty of ritual slaughtering the author quoted the director of the municipal abattoir of the City of Nijmegen, E.A.L. Quadekker, an authority on the subject who was to become the chief protagonist of those opposing ritual slaughtering in their debate against the Chief Rabbi of the province of Gelderland, L. Wagenaar, published about 1910 (*Antwoord*: ca. 1910). The immediate cause of this debate was the publication, by the local branch of the *Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals*, of a list containing the names of local butchers who administered previous stunning and of those (viz. the Jewish butchers) who did not, because they slaughtered ritually. Obviously, the goal of the publication of this list was to incite the public not to buy their meat from the Jewish butchers any longer.

The Reverend Wagenaar argued that if the attacks on the Jewish method of ritual slaughtering had been inspired "by scientific judgement and objective, impartial purposes, they would have been silenced long ago by the overwhelming testimonies of a world of experts and famous authorities, who repeatedly demonstrated the bright sides and advantages of the ritual method in a most convincing manner" (p.7). It was a sad task to continue an endless battle against such prejudices which had already been refuted long ago. "Yet we should not loose our patience in this matter, activated by the hope that the truth will prevail in the end" (*ib.*). He then quoted verbatim the opinions in favour of the Jewish and Muslim method of slaughtering of experts from Germany, France, Russia, Sweden, Holland etc. The opinions of many of these medical experts and physiologists dated back to the nineteenth century. Wagenaar also quoted a decision by the Dutch Minister of War, dating back to 1896, prescribing the Jewish method of slaughter to be applied in the Dutch military slaughter houses (p.20). According to many Dutch specialists this method was to be prefered to that of previous stunning or killing by means of a pistol or a so-called "shooting-mask", which rather hindered the complete bleeding of the animal, resulting in an inferior quality of the meat. Moreover,

the Jewish method, consisting of throat-cutting with a sharp knife, caused an almost immediate loss of consciousness in the animal and should therefore, also on humane grounds, be preferred. There were no grounds at all for the repeated accusations stigmatizing the Jewish method of slaughtering as being *cruel*. The list of (Jewish) butchers applying this method, published by the Society for the Protection of Animals in Nijmegen, should in fact be considered as a form of extensive publicity in favour of the Jewish butchers. The Jews only used this method because of its excellence, and not - as was sometimes suggested - for profit. "Because, in reality, the fat, as well as the less current pieces (of the slaughtered animal) are sold by us at a very low price" (p.29).

The director of the Nijmegen abattoir, E. Quadekker, on the other hand, stressed the *vexation* of the animals involved in the Jewish method of slaughtering (p.31). According to Quadekker, a rabbi like Wagenaar could not be considered to be unprejudiced and impartial in these matters (p.33). The rabbi had quoted obsolete opinions and did not know the results of more recent scientific investigations (*ib.*). It was not true that ritual slaughtering caused an immediate lack of consciousness on the part of the animal; therefore, the atrocious suffering of the animal was not merely a matter of semblance but a reality. He qualified the bottling and the laying-down of the animal prior to cutting its throat as a form of *torture* (p.38). After having refuted the experts quoted by Wagenaar, the director of the Nijmegen abattoir went on quoting the opinions of some 500 authorities opposing the Jewish ritual slaughter, mainly from Germany, basing himself on a series of articles published in the German *Schlacht- und Viehhofzeitung* in 1908, under the title "Fünf Jahre Kampf um humanes Schlachten der Tiere". In all the public abattoirs and in many states of Germany stunning prior to the bleeding of animals had already been introduced, as it was thought to be the most "*humane*" method. Unfortunately, however, a method of slaughtering was still tolerated "which possesses all the characteristics of barbarian cruelty and vexation and which mocks the humanity of our time". This objectionable method could only be maintained because the Jews had also implicated religion in the matter. "However, to the Government of the Kingdom of Sachsen, the people of Switzerland and many municipal authorities, this had been no obstacle in forbidding the ritual slaughtering of animals without first stunning them some years ago, because they were of the opinion that 'the practicing of religious acts is only permitted within the limits of morality and ritual slaughter is contradictory to ethics, which also encompasses the interests of animals'" (p.44).

In summarizing the opinions of the experts Quadekker concludes: "The ritual slaughtering by Jews is in all its phases to torture animals. Both during its lengthy preparatory phase, its execution and its final act, it forms one long chain of animal abuses, slowly coming about" (51-2). According to a German lawyer, Prof.Dr. Von Kippel, in the first edition of his book (quoted by Quadekker) on the *Torture of Animals according to the Penal Law*, "All attempts to forbid the Jewish method of ritual slaughter are nothing but the results of religious and racial hatred, as long as it has not been established that this method is a form of animal abuse. Once this should be proved, ritual slaughter would disappear". Fifteen years later, in 1906, Von Kippel stated to be now inclined to the opinion that ritual slaughter was animal abuse, because of the recent drastic improvements in modern slaughter techniques. Quadekker also quoted some Jewish opinions in favour of the abolition of ritual slaughtering, like the one from a certain Rabbi Dr.Stein in 1880 (but without quoting his source). The views ascribed to this rabbi, together with all the other opinions summarized here were to be quoted time and again in the course of future discussions for and against Jewish and Muslim ritual slaughtering.

Notwithstanding such discussions, art. 7 of the Royal Decree of June 5, 1920, which prescribed stunning prior to the actual slaughtering, made an exception for "*those animals destined to be slaughtered by means of a throat-cut according to the Israelite rites*". According to the explanation included in the same decree: "Humanity demands an obligatory stunning of the animals before actually killing them (...). The exception of art. 7 has been made on the basis of considerations of a religious nature. However, in order to prevent *animal abuse as much as possible*, these prescriptions have been given". We are clearly dealing here with no more than a concession of the Dutch Government to the Jewish religion. The Government itself did not take a neutral stand on the matter but gave in to the opponents of ritual slaughtering by implicitly stigmatizing this practice as inhumane. This point should be stressed because it explains the climate within which ritual slaughtering was actually permitted in The Netherlands before the Second World War, viz. as an inhumane issue connected with a non-Christian religion.

In an undated pamphlet, which can be dated back to the late thirties (some years before the occupation of Holland by the Nazis), it was stressed that slaughtering ritually was in fact equal to the torturing of an animal to death (Boomgaard: ca.1937). The pamphlet stressed the point that the legislator, by using the words *as much as possible,* in fact had also recognised and underlined the objectionable nature of the Jewish ritual slaughter. Christians

had to stun an animal before slaughtering it, whereas Jews were allowed to torture it to death, basing themselves on a religious precept which in reality, however, did not exist, as had been acknowledged by some rabbis like Dr. Stein as early as 1913. The author provided a detailed description of the atrocities which, according to him, were involved in ritual slaughter qualified by him as a "*murderous*" method. The author, W.H.Boomgaard from the village of Velp, who permitted just any journal to republish or quote from his pamphlet free of charge, also accused the Jews of trading in pigs on a large scale, also for the export of bacon, involving the murder of thousands of pigs in slaughterhouses owned by Jews, whereas Jews were not allowed to eat pork themselves. Ritual slaughter should be forbidden, prior stunning should be generally prescribed. It was not necessary for this purpose to consult scholars, religious people or races. Candidates for the parliamentary elections should speak out openly against ritual slaughter and not be elected if they refused to do so.[3]

During the occupation of Holland by the Nazis slaughtering ritually was forbidden. In accordance with the chronology of the anti-Jewish legislative pattern of Germany where ritual slaughtering had been forbidden in the spring of 1933 (Blau: 1954,22), this was one of the first measures aimed at a complete segregation (leading towards the ultimate elimination and extermination) of the Dutch Jews. The order was proclaimed on July 31, 1940, Nr 80, under the heading: *Zur Vermeidung von Tierquälerei beim Viehschlachten.* This order was to be followed in the years to come by the closing down of all Jewish butcheries. Although no explicit reference was made to the Jews in the order, Dutch newspapers stressed the fact that "an end had been made by the great animal-lover Adolf Hitler to the inhuman torturing of animals by the Jews" (Herzberg: 1985,56). Prior to the proclamation of the order by the Germans the Secretary-General of the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs, Scholtens, had "come to an agreement with the chief rabbis concerning ritual slaughtering", perhaps to prevent the actual proclamation of the order by the Germans (Presser: 1965, vol.1,23). In the "agreement" the Dutch chief rabbis had made the remarkable step of permitting prior stunning by electric shocks.

In a post-war pamphlet of September 1949 chief rabbi Tal from Amsterdam explained why this step had been taken: "Anyone, if only he wishes to do so, can understand the considerations (already elucidated so often before) which counted at the time. The position of constraint due to the imminent shortage of food for the Jews: they were soon to be deprived of meat and fruit, only them; their decreasing health; their imminent deportation, of which it was still

expected that people would eventually return, if their bodies only proved strong enough; a general shortage of proteins; the impossibility to make contact with the great (religious) authorities abroad, etc. - All this made [us] decide: in such a situation of need, in which life is at stake, we are entitled to say: yes. *But who wants to adopt the way the Germans acted - based on so-called humanity and on so-called compassion for animals?"* (Tal: 1950,12). The last sentence of this quotation, printed in italics, of course referred to the discussions in 1949, when new protests had been leveled against the practice of ritual slaughter.

After the war the ritual slaughtering by Jews was again permitted in its original pre-war form, though not for long. In view of the limited number of Jews now living in The Netherlands, article 10A of a Royal Decree of February 9, 1948 aimed at limiting the facilities offered to ritual slaughtering dating back to 1920 and restricting them to the smallest number of animals needed by the Jewish community. It stipulated that ritual slaughtering in accordance with the Jewish faith could henceforth only take place "in public abattoirs, to be assigned by the Minister of Social Affairs at the request of the local Chief Rabbi or, in his absence, of a vice chief rabbi of an officially recognized Jewish community, if and inasfar as in that request it has been proved, to the satisfaction of the Minister, that in a certain part of the country situated within the district of the said rabbi, which is usually served by the abattoir to be assigned, there exists a need for ritually slaughtered animals". The kind and the number of the animals to be slaughtered in these abattoirs had to be registered in advance and it was on this basis that the permission was to be granted. This resulted in a drastic restriction both of the number of animals to be slaughtered ritually and of the places where ritual slaughter could take place. From now on, ritual slaughtering on the private premises of a butcher was forbidden, a situation which has prevailed until the present day, even though the influx of more than 400,000 Muslims has changed the situation drastically. An appeal to the Queen by a Jewish butcher's wife to obtain permission to continue her butchery where both before and after the war animals had been slaughtered ritually was refused, the internal advisors of the Government stressing the limited number of Jews living in the place concerned, as well as the interests of animal protection which did not allow for permission to slaughter ritually outside of the officially assigned public abattoirs.[4]

The post-war reintroduction of a restricted possibility for ritual slaughter for Jews in Holland led to a new discussion, initiated in February 1949, by the Municipality of Winterswijk which, from an early date, had become a

stronghold of the Dutch National Socialist Movement (N.S.B.).[5] In this municipality the local public abattoir was one of the eleven Dutch abattoirs assigned for Jewish ritual slaughtering after the Second World War. According to an official letter of the mayor and the secretary the Jewish ritual slaughtering implied "a very serious form of animal abuse". During the war the Jews had applied prior stunning by means of electric shocks.[6] Admitting the "possibility" that this change during the German occupation had not been introduced on a voluntary basis, the letter stressed the fact that this situation should not be changed, because it was an established fact that the meat of the animals that had been slaughtered this way was considered "kosher".[7]

Another factor causing the reopening of the discussions was the possibility to export meat to Israel. The just-quoted royal decree of February 1948 had not taken the possibility of ritual slaughter for the export of meat into consideration, but had restricted the ritual slaughtering of animals destined for meat consumption within Holland only. However, the Cattle Law of 1922 explicitly allowed the export of ritually slaughtered meat, without any limitation. Protests like the one from Winterswijk and the issue of a possible export of ritually slaughtered meat caused new irritations in the Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals and stimulated it to take the initiative for launching new public protests in which, as it wrote to the Government, the majority of the Dutch population would join.[8]

The idea arose in government circles that if the chief-rabbinate could be persuaded to accept prior stunning by electric shocks as reasonable many difficult discussions could be avoided. An invitation to talk about the objections of the different parties against ritual slaughtering without prior stunning was sent to the chief-rabbi in Amsterdam, the already-mentioned Reverend Tal, who, however, refused to reopen the discussion with the veterinary chief-inspector of public health: "If the Government of The Netherlands, where the Constitution does not tolerate tyranny, wants to curtail the Jews in their constitutional rights, then they are entitled to expect the Government itself to discuss the restriction of their rights with them. We hope and trust that you will understand our point of view in this matter".[9] This led to a meeting of the Minister of Social Affairs with the Chief-Rabbi of Amsterdam, the Reverend Tal, soon resulting in the already-quoted "Report concerning Ritual Slaughtering on Behalf of the Chief-Rabbinate for The Netherlands", dated September 1, 1949, and published in January 1950. In this pamphlet Tal refuted once more the old stereotypes on ritual slaughter and explained why the Dutch chief rabbis had permitted prior stunning by electric shocks during the Second World War.

In the meantime the Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals requested the appointment of a committee to investigate the electro shock method and its applicability in ritual slaughtering. This request was supported by publications in the press.[10] In stead of appointing a special committee as requested by the said Society Rabbi Tal's pamphlet, along with some separate questions on ritual slaughter, were submitted to three Dutch professors by the Veterinary Chief-inspector of Public Health. The reactions of the experts were, however, partly contradictory and thus thought to be insufficient a basis for a change in legislation.[11] Consequently, ritual slaughter for the export of meat was allowed and to this end public abattoirs were officially assigned. Even though this decision was not to be the end of the discussion on ritual slaughter in Holland, it marked the end of a period. In the next period ritual slaughter by the Muslims was to become the central issue.

Islamic Prescriptions and Discussions

The slaughtering of animals, both for the daily consumption of meat and for sacrificial purposes has, according to Islam, to take place, in accordance with certain rules. Slaughtering in accordance with these rules became known in Europe as Islamic ritual slaughtering (without any further distinction). Islamic ritual slaughtering may take place, first of all, within the context of a *sacrificial ceremony*, such as the sacrifice recommended by Islam on the seventh day after the birth of a child. More important is the sacrifice, mandatory for every Muslim who can afford to buy a sacrificial animal to take place among all Muslims, wherever they are living, during the yearly Feast of Sacrifices, on the 10th day of the Islamic month of Dhû 'l-Hijja. This is the day on which the pilgrims on the yearly pilgrimage make sacrifices in the valley of Mina, near the City of Mecca. These sacrificial ceremonies, of which ritual slaughtering forms an intrinsical part, have a religious meaning and value all of their own, even though the victim destined for immolation is usually eaten after having been sacrificed.

Apart from these specifically sacrificial functions ritual slaughter mainly serves as a religiously prescribed strict ritual to be applied in order for the slaughtered animal to be put to death in a valid way and to be permissible as food. Otherwise the animal should be regarded as carrion and therefore legally unfit for consumption except in the case of absolute necessity. At the moment of slaughter it is mandatory to have the right intentions and to invoke the name of God.[12] The throat of the animal is slit, including the carotid arteries, trachea and oesophagus. It is this act the resulting bleeding of which should bring

about the animal's death. Preferably, the animal should be laid upon its left side facing the direction of Mecca. It should be spared any unnecessary suffering. The knife, in particular, should be well sharpened.[13]

Many aspects of ritual slaughtering have been the subject of discussions by religious Muslim scholars. Two aspects of these discussions are of special relevance for the position of Muslims as a minority in a country like Holland. The first is the problem of the permissibility of meat slaughtered by Christian and Jewish butchers for consumption by Muslims. The second aspect is the discussion concerning the stunning of animals prior to their being slaughtered, for example, by administering electric shocks. When taking notice of these discussions one should always keep in mind, however, their relative importance. Islam lacks an institution invested with the religious authority to formulate new religiously sanctioned rules incumbent upon all Muslims. This function is fulfilled by a *consensus* of opinion of all Muslims, which implies that changes affecting their religion can only be fully accepted after they have actually been generally approved by the Muslim community as a whole. As long as discussions on certain points continue such a consensus apparently has not been reached. It is important to realize that according to the doctrine of Islam, in the absence of such a consensus every Muslim should follow his own conscience and abide by what he believes to be the genuine religious rule. This implies that certain opinions held by some Muslims cannot be forced on all of the Muslims without infringing on the principle of religious freedom, even though these opinions might be congruous with those of influential pressure groups or of the majority of society at large.

In the fifth verse of the *Sûra of the Food* the Qoran states: "And the food of those who have been given the Book (viz. Jews and Christians) is lawful for you and your food is lawful for them". In discussing this passage Muslim scholars agreed that this holds true for food which has not been explicitly forbidden elsewhere in the Qoran, as is the case with pork. Their discussions focussed on the other animals slaughtered by Jews or Christians. There is general agreement on the lawfulness of the animals which are really "slaughtered", viz. in accordance with the rules described above, in the name of God. This explains why there is also no disagreement on the lawfulness of animals slaughtered by Jewish butchers applying their own religious rules. Apart from this, two other cases should be distinghuished. When an animal is duly slaughtered but without the name of God being invoked, it is prohibited according to some scholars while others allow it. Finally, some modernist scholars, following the viewpoint of the Egyptian reformist scholar Muhammad Abduh, allow the consumption of the meat of animals even when

their slaughtering by Christians (e.g. Europeans) has not taken place in accordance with the Islamic rules and God's name has not been invoked during the act of slaughtering. They therefore permit the consumption of meat imported from the West, only stipulating that God's name should be invoked prior to its consumption.

Obviously, those adhering to a stricter interpretation of the rules demand proof that the imported meat has indeed been slaughtered in accordance with the religious rules and may therefore be considered to be lawful (*halâl*). Here lies the origin of the "halâl-certificates" provided by various Islamic bodies in the West for meat to be exported to the Muslim world.[14]

The different viewpoints summarized above are of course reflected by the various Muslim communities in the world, also in Holland, resulting in various attitudes. Some Muslims may strictly abstain from the consumption of any meat not slaughtered or not believed to have been slaughtered according the religious rules, while others adopt a more lenient attitude and may see no harm in consuming products (apart from pork) bought from non-Muslim butchers. This does not mean at all, however, that the latter group would attach no value to or indeed not believe in the necessity of administering the procedure of ritual slaughtering within the context of the sacrificial ceremonies described earlier. This is essentially a different matter, because these sacrifices have a specifically religious meaning of their own and do not serve primarily as rituals guaranteeing the lawfulness of food. Against this background one may understand why the initiatives by Muslim groups to obtain permission for ritual slaughtering from the Dutch Government commenced within the context of the yearly Feast of Sacrifices: here ritual slaughtering exceeds the necessities of daily food consumption and is intrinsically connected with a religious obligation incumbent upon all Muslims in general.

A specific point discussed by Muslims scholars as well, is the permissibility of stunning the animal prior to its being slaughtered. The decisive point here is whether or not the animal is actually killed by the stunning or has only lost consciousness. The doubts existing as to the real effects of electrical stunning is expressed in various ways by the religious scholars of Islam. The Deobandi mufti from Delhi, Mawlânâ Kifâyat Allâh (died in 1953), published a fatwa in 1935 in which he states that it is "lawful in ritual slaughtering to use an instrument to stun the animal, as long as the animal does not pass away (as a consequence of this stunning) and one is dealing, therefore, with stunning only".[15]

An identical opinion was expressed by the Shaykh of Al-Azhar University of Cairo, Muhammad al-Tayyib Al-Najjâr, in a fatwa of February 25, 1982

provided at the request of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. In his fatwa this scholar states explicitly that if the animal's death is caused by the electrical shock before having been duly slaughtered one is in fact dealing with carrion the meat of which is banned for consumption. This seemingly small but essential point was, however, omitted in several contemporary publications concerning the opinion expressed by Al-Najjâr. In its statement to the Bundestag of 10 December 1982 the West-German Government stated that "die in dieser Stellungnahme geäusserte Auffassung, nach religiösen Vorschriften sei das Verzehren des Fleisches des vor dem Schlachten durch Electroshock betäubten Tieres gestattet". In omitting the most important proviso of the Egyptian Rector, this was essentially a false report. The same holds true for "News of Muslims in Europe", published by Selly Oak's in Birmingham, which in its issue of January 1983 brought the news that "the West German Government had approached the Rector of Cairo's Azhar University in February 1982, asking him whether the practice of stunning by electric shock prior to slaughter was permissible. The Rector of the Azhar had responded that the meat of animals slaughtered in this manner was permissible".[16] In the absence of an absolute certainty that the animals are not actually killed by the electrical shock administered to stun them, it is easy to understand the attitude of rejection of this procedure by the groups who want to stick to the prescriptions of their religion. This attitude can in fact be considered as being in accordance with the two fatwas quoted, and especially with the provisos contained therein. The false reports quoted before have caused unnecessary conflicts between opponents and defenders of ritual slaughter and have even become instruments in the hands of political extremists, also in Holland, as will be shown below. Fortunately, the German Government realized that even the (distorted) opinion of the Rector of Cairo's Azhar was incumbent upon only those Muslims, "who follow the religious teaching of this spiritual centre of Islam", while realizing that there were "other law schools in Islam" as well. Consequently, it did not enforce prior stunning upon the Muslims of the Federal Republic.

Muslim Communities in Holland: New Discussions and Regulations

An important new dimension was of course added by the influx of Muslims in Holland after the war. The first signs of the need of the Muslims to slaughter their animals ritually reached the Government in 1965, when some problems arose in two abattoirs where Muslims had in vain asked permission to slaughter animals on the occasion of the Feast of Sacrifices. Taking into

account the loud protests from animal protection circles, the Government initially took no steps. Moreover, in the beginning of 1966 a Dutch Muslim had informed the public health authorities that an Imam in The Hague, on the basis of personal investigations, had reached the conclusion that it was possible and acceptable for Muslims to slaughter their animals stunning them first, and therefore within the existing legal framework. This was a welcome piece of information confirming the Government's idea that there was no need to take further steps. A request of a Dutch (non-Muslim) butcher in Utrecht for permission to slaughter ritually for the consumption of meat by Muslim workers in Holland was refused, on the argument that "from consultations with representatives of the Muhammadans it has become evident that the Qoran nowhere prescribes that animals should not be stunned prior to their being slaughtered. It is therefore not necessary to create a special regulation like the one for slaughtering in accordance with Jewish rites". In the same letter it was added, however, that "the representatives of the Muhammadans should be given every opportunity to perform their rites whenever they would want to slaughter animals for the consumption of meat by Muhammadans living in Holland". With the term "rites" the Government was perhaps thinking of some kind of prayers or invocation not involving the performance of ritual slaughter itself. On the same grounds the request of a Muslim butcher to obtain permission to slaughter ritually was rejected by the Government in 1968.[17]

This rejection of the possibility for Muslims to slaughter ritually, which became the official policy of the Dutch Government for several years to come, occurred exactly at a time when a new public debate had flared up. There were press publications about cases of clandestine slaughtering by Muslims in the areas of Utrecht and Rotterdam.[18] Instead of defending the right of Muslims to slaughter ritually, questions were asked in the Lower Chamber concerning the ritual slaughtering permitted to the Jews, by MP Van Dis, member of the right-winged Calvinist party SGP. The New Israelite Weekly (NIW) protested with an article of May 13, 1966, in which Van Dis's opposition against ritual slaughtering was qualified as an "infringement on freedom". This was followed by a republication, in stenciled form, of the already-mentioned pamphlet from the late thirties against ritual slaughter, by a "Committee to Protect the Defenceless Animal".[19] In a postscript dated 1966 the pamphlet was "updated" by adding some outspokenly anti-Muslim passages, with reference to some cases of clandestine ritual slaughtering for Muslim workers. The new edition also contained criticism on the role played by the Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals. According to it, the Society for many years had not fulfilled its real task. "We (...) do not want to breed hatred for the

Jews; Christ never taught us that; but we only ask to oblige Jews to stun animals before slaughtering them, just like this is done in the case of animals to be consumed by Christians, and we shall continue to insist on this until the law is there. Nowadyas, Israelites in Western countries do not burn living animals as an expiatory sacrifice either, as it was done in the temple of Jerusalem in the days of Moses".[20]

The situation of the Muslims was, however, going to change. The Association of Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands, presenting itself as an umbrella for Muslims of all nationalities in The Netherlands which had taken upon itself the promotion of Islam and the performance of its prescriptions in The Netherlands, requested permission for ritual slaughtering by Muslims on the occasion of the Feast of Sacrifices falling on January 4, 1974. This special permission was asked "in anticipation of a permanent dispensation for Muslim professional butchers". A similar request was made by the Moroccan Consulate General in Amsterdam.[21] Abdulwahid van Bommel, who signed the letter of the Association, added a separate explanatory note about the prescriptions of Islam regarding ritual slaughter. The special permission was refused, but the association was invited to discuss the possibility of a permanent dispensation with the Director-General of Public Health.[22]

Nevertheless, there was a growing awareness in government circles of the necessity to reconsider the possibility of ritual slaughtering by Muslims. On March 4, 1975, a lecturer of Islamic studies from Leiden University was invited to address a national meeting of the inspectors from the Veterinary Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery on the subject of ritual slaughtering in Islam. First of all, he explained that the Imam on whose authority ritual slaughtering by Muslims had been forbidden so far in fact belonged to the Ahmadiyyah movement considered to be heterodox by probably more than 95 percent of the Muslims in Holland. Secondly, he drew attention to the differences in religious competence of Muslim organizations as compared to the Christian churches: "In the Christian West we have become familiar with the idea that political problems connected with religion can be discussed with leaders of the top level religious groups concerned. This top level protects the pure doctrine of its group and can modify it if necessary. It should be kept in mind also that the various Christian groups of our country can, through the existing confessional political parties, exert their influence on government policies. However, within orthodox Islam there exists no institution endowed with a binding authority in doctrinal matters comparable to e.g. the Pope of Rome or the Synod of Reformed Churches in The

Netherlands. Therefore, it is impossible in Islam to point out any person(s) invested with the task to speak up on behalf of *the* Muslims about *the* (only) valid Islamic view on ritual slaughtering, leave alone in Holland where Muslims are living who once came from different countries and who, even within one national group, may interpret and practice their religion in different ways". Referring to differences of opinion among Muslims in Holland concerning the permissibility of (electrical) stunning prior to the act of slaughtering, he added: "All this does not alter the fact that, according to a good Dutch tradition, every religious group should be given the right to understand its religious traditions in its own way and live accordingly.(...) In neighbouring countries, such as Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and Germany, a dispensation from the obligatory previous stunning is given to Muslims and Jews alike. Personally, I see no valid reason at all for Holland to permit Jews to do that which is withheld from Muslims. Therefore, I express the wish that in the near future the Muslims living in Holland, with regard to ritual slaughtering, will be treated by the law in the same as the Dutch Jews are".[23] The ensuing discussion showed that the majority of the inspectors present shared these views. One of them, who had been working in Surinam, underlined the hypocrisy of Holland, which had never made any problem of Islamic ritual slaughtering in its colonies, including the Dutch East-Indies, where in view of the existing overwhelming majority of Muslims any discussion of the subject would have appeared ridiculous.

After the Association of Muslim Organizations had been replaced by the Federation of Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands, a new request was filed in October, two months before the coming Feast of Sacrifices. In this request it was explicitly stated that the Dutch Government, so far, had been wrongly informed about ritual slaughter "by people who unjustly [claim to] represent Islam (the Ahmadiyya Mission)".[24]

Gradually, the Government became convinced of the permanent character of the Muslims staying in Holland, and also of the inevitability of a regulation regarding Muslims slaughtering ritually. Consequently, during the Feast of Sacrifices of December 1975, ritual slaughtering by Muslims was allowed in Holland for the first time. The necessary legislation followed per February 1, 1977, permitting Muslims to slaughter animals ritually, though only in public slaughterhouses assigned by the Government for this purpose.

Right away the Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals vehemently protested against the new measures. On behalf of its 100,000 members it again asked the attention of the Government for the problem of ritual slaughter in 1976, a.o. quoting a press-article in which the director of an abattoir had

described the ritual slaughtering by Muslims during the Feast of Sacrifices of 1975 as "a sawing off of necks as if they were trunks of trees". In a second protest the Society a.o. stressed the fact that the Qoran permits Muslims to eat the food of Christians. This implied that the Muslims living in Holland were permitted to eat the food of the Christians here, including the meat of animals not slaughtered ritually. Therefore, there was no need to grant the Muslims in Holland the same permission as its Jews. In his answer the State Secretary of Public Health emphasized the constitutional principle of religious freedom, as well as article 9 of the European Treaty of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties, which had been ratified by The Netherlands. He explicitly wished to refrain from passing judgment on the prescriptions in the Qoran related to ritual slaughter.[25]

Some protests were also levelled by municipalities where abattoirs had to be opened for Muslim ritual slaughter. The municipality of Warffum asked the Secretary of State whether the "host land (...) has to conform to guests who stay in our country only temporarily, or whether the guests have to conform to the morals and customs of their host land?"[26] The answer following almost a year later was of quite a fundamental importance, because it stressed the point that "the residence of many Muslims in this country is practically of a permanent character, so that one can hardly speak of temporary guests any more. These Muslims consider ritual slaughter as a part of their religious practice. Consequently, it is in accordance with the principle of religious freedom laid down in the Dutch Constitution to grant them permission to do so".[27]

MP "Farmer" Koekoek, leader of the ultra right winged Farmers' Party (BP) (who was to be sentenced by a Dutch court for animal abuse several years later) took up the case in the Lower Chamber and posed the State Secretary of Public Health questions, a.o. asking: "Does the Minister know that ritual slaughter means that animals are murdered by means of axes, hammers and sledge hammers without any form of stunning?" In his answer the State Secretary of Public Health duly drew attention to the constitutional principle of freedom of religion and to the obligations incumbent upon The Netherlands having signed the European Treaty for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties in which the same principle was laid down.[28]

Further pressure, however, was exerted by new letters from animal protection circles, such as the World Federation for the Protection of Animals, which accused the Government for not having consulted specialists in Islamic studies at the Snouck Hurgronje Institute of Leiden University, who undoubtedly would have confirmed the absence of any Qoranic ban on

stunning prior to slaughtering. According to a letter of 23 May, 1977 "slaughtering by Muslims without previously stunning is a custom which can be abolished easily, because of the large number of Muslims that came to The Netherlands, knowing that slaughtering without previously stunning was not permitted". It added that "inasfar as slaughtering according to the Jewish rites is concerned, for this there exist clear prescriptions in the Old Testament, although, in the opinion of many, these are no longer acceptable". In its answer the Government referred to the draft of the new European Convention regarding the Protection of Animals destined for Slaughter, which was being prepared to be approved by the Council of Europe. Article 13 of this draft stipulated: "In the case of the ritual slaughtering of animals of the bovine species, they shall be immobilised before being slaughtered by mechanical means designed to spare them all unnecessary pain, suffering, agitation, injury or contusions". Upon its ratification this prescription was to become incumbent upon Jewish and Muslim ritual slaughter in Holland, as well.[29]

However, in 1979 press publications from Amsterdam in 1979 concerning the circumstances of Islamic ritual slaughtering, the selling of meat in butcheries owned by Muslims, and the processing of the skins of animals that had been slaughtered ritually on the private premises of Muslim families, caused a reconsideration of the situation in government circles. In a letter of February 12, 1981, the Minister of Public Health etc. addressed himself to Baljon, professor of Islamology at Leiden University. He pointed out that grave objections existed against Islamic ritual slaughtering without stunning previously, especially on the part of animal protection circles, which sometimes used the argument that the Islamic religious prescriptions, and particularly the Qoran, did not include a prohibition of slaughtering after stunning. "In this connection I should like to hear from you to what extent one can speak of a religious prescription and on what this is based. I am also interested to know to what extent Muslims are of the opinion that animals being slaughtered should suffer as little as possible, and what prescriptions they know in order to bring this about". In his answer of February 20, 1981, Baljon stated that, "The argument of the organizations for the protection of animals that slaughtering with prior stunning should be acceptable to Muslims because the Qoran does not contain a prohibition to that effect, is as absurd as when e.g. Reagan would state that Christians do not have to foster objections against launching neutron-bombs because the Bible does not contain a prohibition of the same". Drawing the Minister's attention to the importance of the Islamic prophetical traditions as a source of binding religious precepts, he referred to the rule that the knife used in slaughtering should be as sharp as

possible, "for each of you should sharpen his knife and cause the animal as little pain as possible". He added that, according to the same source, the animal should not be shown the knife and the act of slaughtering should take place as quickly as possible. Finally, he said to find it "extraordinarily hypocritical if we should forbid to Muslim migrants what we permit to our own Jewish compatriots". In the same vein the journal "Understanding Muslims Christians" published an article in defence of the legal permission of ritual slaughter for Muslims from the explicit perspective of religious freedom (Bouma:1982). This article was soon to be followed by an anatomical and physiological study of Islamic ritual slaughtering a.o. involving an electro-cardiogram made of the brains of animals in the process of being slaughtered by having their throats cut without being previously stunned. According to the author throat-cutting, if executed correctly, was not painful. He concluded that "ritual slaughter, when executed correctly, implies a reasonable way of slaughtering and certainly should not be qualified as the torturing of animals" (Rinzema:1982, 32-4).

However, all this did not bring the discussions in government circles to an end about a possible prohibition or limitation of the permission to slaughter ritually, and in particular for Muslims. On the one hand, there were several practical problems resulting from this permission, such as the plurality of Muslim organizations, which made it difficult to come to an agreement with them on various matters, e.g. on the date of the Feast of Sacrifices. Up till the present day no uniformity has been reached on this point, with the result that various groups may celebrate this feast on different days, which tends to complicate the preparatory measures to be taken in the slaughterhouses assigned to be available for this purpose. Personnel from abattoirs sent in complaints about the lack of hygiene sometimes accompanying ritual slaughtering and protests were heard from orthodox Christian workers and municipalities who did not want to work or open their slaughterhouses when the Feast of Sacrifices fell on a Sunday, this thus resulting in (local) conflicts between their religious freedom to observe the mandatory rest on Sundays against the right of Muslims to celebrate their Feast of Sacrifices in accordance with the lunar calendar. Another problem the Government would have to face in the near future was the obligatory introduction, after the ratification of the European Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter, of immobilization boxes prescribed to be used in the slaughtering of cows and calves which, moreover, according to the text of the Convention, would have to be put down on their backs before being slaughtered ritually, thus causing a

problem for those Muslim groups insisting on putting the animals on their (left) sides.

The situation was further complicated by a growing protest movement of many animal protection organizations, incidentally infiltrated by right-winged extremists, such as Vierling (spokesman for the *Ecological Movement* and, at the same time, for the extremist *Centrumpartij*) who in articles and public lectures was stigmatizing ritual slaughtering as "an atrocity".[30] A petition of 18 November, 1982, sent by 16 organizations (among them Vierling's Ecological Movement, as well as the Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals patronized by H.M. the Queen) to the Lower Chamber a.o., demanded the legal introduction of electric stunning prior to throat-cutting. It also demanded the prohibition of ritual slaughtering by Muslims (even when preceded by electric stunning) except at the Feast of Sacrifices, and the prohibition of every form of the ritual slaughtering of animals for the export of meat. The petition warned against the maintenance of ritual slaughtering without previous stunning possibly becoming a dangerous precedent in a multicultural society with 400,000 Muslims to be populated by many more Muslims in the near future, because of the ongoing family reunions and the "higher fertility rate" of Muslim families. This petition came some months after a letter in which the Minister of Public Health had written to the "Foundation S.O.S. Domestic Animals" (one of the organizations that had signed the petition): "Far be it from me to doubt the sincerity of the feelings of those sending you declarations of sympathy with respect to the campaign carried on by you against ritual slaughter. But, in view of the letters that have arrived at the Office it is hard not to feel that some letter-writers are suffering from xenophobia".[31] This observation was confirmed by the racist policies defended by the extremist anti-foreigners Centrumpartij, which introduced the prohibition of ritual slaughtering in its political program.

These new polarizing developments were not without effect on the Government and the Dutch Association for the Proction of Animals. The State Secretary of Public Health received a delegation from the organization "Rights for all that lives" on 25 May, 1983, which handed him a petition, with some 500 signatures, against ritual slaughtering without previously stunning. He promised them to aspire after reducing this form of slaughtering outside the Feast of Sacrifices as much as possible. On 12 July of the same year he received a delegation from the new Ritual Slaughter Commission of the Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals. During the meeting he showed a keen interest in the new strategy of this commission which wanted to launch an information campaign aimed at Dutch society, in general, and at the Muslims,

in particular, in order to convince them of the necessity of a legal prohibition of slaughtering without previously stunning. In fact, the strategy of the said Society was changing. In an article published in its journal, in September 1983, the director of its general inspection department pointed out the religious importance for Muslims and Jews to slaughter ritually, which made it permissible as a matter of religious freedom. He accepted the conclusions from experts, such as Rinzema (1982), implying that ritual slaughtering without previous stunning, if executed in an expert way, did not cause more pain than any other slaughtering-method customary in the Western world. However, the massive and rapid character of the ritual slaughtering performed during the Feast of Sacrifices inevitably did cause serious suffering to the animals. It also exerted a coarsening influence on the slaughtering procedures in the abattoirs. For these reasons, and not because of the intrinsic reprehensibility, prior stunning should nevertheless be prescribed by law. But in order to reach this goal one should have to start a dialogue with the various Muslim groups in order to convince them of the reasonableness of this viewpoint. Folders were to be printed in Turkish and Arabic and a demonstration film showing the reversible character of electrical stunning was to be prepared to be used in the publicity campaign. Modern methods of electrical stunning should also be shown on television and be discussed on the radio. The introduction of a legal obligation to previously stun should be preceded by a certain degree of acceptability of such a measure on the part of the Muslims. A long and wearisome way was still ahead, but it should be followed with tenacity in the interest of the animals concerned (Van Oers:1983). In this way the Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals attempted to dissociate itself from the racist campaign of the *Centrumpartij* and other extremist groups, replacing a strategy of direct combat into one of persuasion by dialogue and publicity campaigns. In its report of 1984 the commission followed the same strategy, although the road ahead had become somewhat shorter: it estimated that a period of three years would be "amply sufficient" to improve the required acceptability of previous stunning among Muslims and Jews. After that "transition period" it should be prescribed by law (*Slachten*:1984,41).

The State Secretary of Public Health had taken notice of these plans "with great interest", and had even obtained the means to finance the demonstration film, but was now facing a discussion between various Ministries and departments within the Government. In the *Report on Minorities* of 1983 the Minister of the Interior had paid much attention to ritual slaughtering in a favourable way, without any reference to the necessity of previous stunning in the near future, at all. The ratification of the European Convention on the

Protection of Animals for Slaughter (the Convention of Strassbourg) by the Lower Chamber was expected in the near future. This Convention included the possibility of ritual slaughtering without previous stunning, albeit under certain conditions. In the past the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries had already granted dispensation for the ritual slaughter of animals for the export of meat to Switzerland and Israel. A similar favourable decision on behalf of Arab countries was not inconceivable. Moreover, some countries such as Australia, Argentine and Uruguay, which exported important quantities of meat, allowed ritual slaughtering without previous stunning on a large scale, in view of the export of meat to Arab countries. There was no guarantee that an unknown quantity of the meat imported by Holland from these countries in fact did not originate from animals slaughtered in the same way. Was it possible to continue a policy to reduce the number of animals slaughtered ritually by Muslims outside the Feast of Sacrifices, in view of all these existing contradictions?

Basing himself on the above-mentioned 1984 report of the Ritual Slaughter Commission of the Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals, the State Secretary of Agriculture and Fisheries, in the autumn of 1984, decided to gradually bring to an end the existing practice of slaughtering ritually for the export of meat by not renewing the dispensations that had been given in the past. According to the Ministry of Agriculture this decision did not infringe on the principle of religious freedom because the ritual slaughter for meat consumption within Holland itself was not restricted.[32] Again there was a press discussion on the pros and cons of ritual slaughter. In a letter of 23 November, 1983, sent to the eight (!) cabinet ministers involved in the various aspects of ritual slaughtering and distributed to the press, the Foundation for the Struggle against Anti-Semitism a.o. stressed that such a gesture by the Government would no doubt stimulate antisemitism in Holland.[33] De Klerk, the former secretary to the Board of the Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals, now spoke of the existing "hypocrisy concerning ritual slaughter".[34] Finally, questions were posed in the Lower Chamber resulting in the withdrawal of the contested decision, which in the mean time had been qualified by the Minister of the Interior as being in conflict with the principle of religious freedom enshrined in the constitution.[35]

This event brought the discussion to an end, so far, at least within government circles. As for the Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals, it published another report in 1987, explaining once more its policy towards the ritual slaughtering of animals for meat consumption by Muslims and Jews in Holland. It stated: "The slaughtering of animals without prior stunning by

means of cutting their throats takes place in Holland daily in concurrence with the religious convictions of Jews and Muslims living in this country. The Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals is however of the opinion that previous stunning is not at odds with the precepts of those religions concerning slaughtering and it has argued, already for some years, in favour of a legal obligation to previously stun. However, as the concept of *religious freedom* is an inalienable right, also considered by the Society to be of paramount importance, it understands that such a regulation can only be brought about after much and careful consultation with the groups concerned and certainly cannot be introduced in the short term. Acceptation of such a legal obligation by the religious groups concerned is in this respect a basic condition to be able to lay a claim to a moral and juridical justification". However, inasfar as ritual slaughtering in Holland, on behalf of the export of meat to Israel, Switzerland and the Islamic countries is concerned, the attitude of the Society is completely different. "Here", it states, "the principle of the religious freedom of Muslims or Jews living in this country does not play any part, and the Dutch Government has no moral nor legal obligation with regard to the consumption of meat, slaughtered without previous stunning, abroad".[36]

Notwithstanding all these discussions and conflicts, Islamic ritual slaughtering and butcheries owned by Muslims have gradually become a widespread (though not generally accepted) phenomenon in Dutch society. In granting the necessary licenses it has been assumed that one Muslim butchery would be needed for every 1,000 Muslim bachelors or heads of families. The absence of butchers' certificates has not been an impediment to granting the necessary licenses either. This explains the request from animal protection circles for the introduction of an officially acknowledged certificate for those who slaughter ritually. In 1986 there were 108 abattoirs where the ritual slaughter by Muslims was officially permitted.[37]

Notes

[1]Cf. Wiesenthal: 1985,241.

[2]For a summary of the Jewish rules on ritual slaughter cf. the *Encyclopedia of Judaism*, s.v. "Shekhita".

[3]Another similar pamphlet dating back to the period of the rise of national-socialism is Kattenbusch: 1934.

[4]N.Slager-Levie to H.M. the Queen, Steenwijk 24 January 1949. The Veterinary Chief Inspector to the Minister of Social Affairs, 15/3/1949. Letter of protest by the president of the Chief Rabbinate of Holland, J.Tal, to the Minister of Social Affairs, 25/3/1949. The Veterinary Chief Inspector to the Minister of Social Affairs, 6/4/1949. Cf. the letter from

the Chief of the Department for the Protection of Public Health to the Director General of the same department, 17/2/1955.

[5]See G.A. Kooy, *Het echec van een volkse beweging*. Assen 1964.

[6]A report on the events in Winterswijk during the war, in connection with the abolition of the ritual slaughter by the local Jewish community and the administration of electric shocks prior to throat-cutting is given by F.W. Tervoert a.o: 1949.

[7]B en W Winterswijk d.d. 17/2/1949 to the Minister of Social Affairs, nr. 00396

[8]The Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals to the Minister of Social Affairs, 19 April 1949.

[9]Opperrabbinaat voor Nederland d.d. 12/6/1949 a.d. Vet. Hoofdinsp. v.d. Volkgez.h.

[10]The Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals to the Minister of Social Affairs, 14 October 1949. Cf.e.g. *Algemeen Dagblad* d.d 12 aug. 1949, *Provinciale Overijsselsche en Zwolsche Courant*,d.d. 19/10/'49, *Haagsche Courant* ,d.d. 10/8/1949, *Dordts Dagblad*,d.d. 9/8/1949, *Gooise Klanken*,d.d.10/8/1949, etc.

[11]Report Quaedvlieg, summer of 1950, and the letter from the Vice-Director General of Public Health to the Minister of Public Health d.d. 16 mei 1950.

[12]The presence of an imam is not necessary and he will therefore not "hold the hand or shoulder of the butcher while pronouncing a prayer", as stated by "Regels":1984.

[13]Cf. *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd. ed. s.v. "Dhabîha" and the literature mentioned there.

[14]For a detailed discussion of these problems see Zamzamî: 1976.

[15]*Kifâyat al-muftî*, vol.8, Delhi 1975, p.281. The authors thank Prof. Baljon from Leiden for this reference.

[16]A copy of the original Arabic version of the fatwa is preserved in the archives of the Department of Comparative Religious Studies of Leiden University. See also, *Deutscher Bundestag - 9. Wahlperiode - 137. Sitzung*. Bonn, Freitag, den 10. Dezember 1982, p.8563.

[17]Letter from the State Secretary of Social Affairs and Public Health to G. Vriesinga, Utrecht, of 11 May 1966. Letter of the same to A.M.Tahar, Utrecht, of 4 October 1968.

[18]Elseviers Weekblad d.d. 26/2/1966, p.17: *Vleesprobleem*.

[19]*Tegen en over ritueel slachten*, 9 pp.

[20]See also, Van Diermen: 1966.

[21]Associatie van Moslim Organisaties in Nederland to the Minister of Public Health and the Environment, 6/12/1973. Letter written on behalf of the Foundations, "De Moskee" and "Islamitisch Centrum"; "Young Muslim Association Europe" and "Muslim Associatie Nederland", signed by Abdulwahid van Bommel. See also the letter of the Consulate General of Morocco in Amsterdam to the Ministry of Public Health, 17/12/1973.

[22]Letter from the State Secretary of Public Health etc. d.d. 28/12/1973

[23]P.S. van Koningsveld, *Ritueel slachten in de islam*, 4/3/1975, 7pp. (unpublished).

[24]Letter of 17/10/1975 on the official paper of the *Stichting Islamitisch Centrum*.

[25]Letters of May 19 and November 3, 1976 to the Minister of Public Health etc. Answer from the State Secretary of Public Health etc. of 4/4/1977.

[26]Letter from the Municipality of Warffum to the Secretary of State of Public Health etc. of 22/12/1975.

[27]Letter from the State Secretary of Public Health etc. of 16/11/1976 to the Municipality of Warffum.

[28]*Tweede Kamer*, Zitting 1976-1977, aanhangsel nr. 714.

[29]The State Secretary of Public Health etc. to the World Federation for the Protection of Animals, d.d. 8/8/1977. Cf. the Royal Decree of July 19, 1980 and the emendations thereon published in "De wijzen..." (1984).

[30]Cf. e.g. A.J.C. Vierling: "Ritueel slachten nog altijd een gruweldaad". In:*Bewust* (journal of the Ecological Movement), 1982,295-8.
[31]The Minister of Public Health, Nr 273533, d.d. 21/9/82.
[32]Cf. *Volkskrant* 7/12/84: "Ritueel slachten het meest humaan" (J.Smits).
[33]Cf. *NRC/Handelsblad* 5/1/1985: "Verhitte emoties rond verbod op koosjer slachten voor export" (F.Groeneveld); *Volkskrant* 27/3/1985: "Ploeg stelt strenge voorwaarden aan export ritueel geslacht vee".
[34]*Volkskrant* 23/2/1985: "De hypocrisie rond het ritueel slachten" (Iz.M. de Klerk).
[35]*Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal.* Vergaderjaar 1984-1985, 15 april 1985, vragen. Cf. *Volkskrant* 4/6/1985: "Rietkerk wil slachten respecteren".Cf. also *Volkskrant* 30/4/1987: "Onbedwelmd ritueel slachten voor export blijft toegestaan".
[36]*Onbedwelmd exportslachten*:1987,3.

2

Sufi Orders in The Netherlands

Their Role in the Institutionalization of Islam

N. Landman

One of the effects of the more or less permanent settlement of migrants from countries like Turkey, Morocco and Surinam in the urban centres of The Netherlands, is a process of institutionalization of Islam. Institutionalization of Islam in a non-Islamic country can be defined as the establishment of organizations which aim at the continuation of the experience and practice of the Islamic religion by the immigrants and their descendants within their non-Islamic environment. This implies elements of continuity and discontinuity. The way religious life is organized in the country of origin can not simply be transplanted in the country of immigration, because of the minority position they occupy. On the other hand it is natural that the Muslim migrants, unwilling to assimilate to the dominant culture, try to establish religious institutes which resemble those at home as much as possible.

In The Netherlands the major efforts have so far been directed towards the construction of mosques and mosque-linked organizations, whose main activities are religious and moral instruction, the ritual prayers and the celebration of annual feasts. Other Islamic institutes which emerged recently, are Islamic schools for primary education, an Islamic broadcasting company, and some Islamic publishing companies.

Islam, however, is more than a set of religious beliefs and obligations and a moral code, which can be learned by heart and put into practice, and which require schools for instruction and mosques for public ceremonies. It also includes Sufism, the mysticism of Islam. In the course of the history of Islam, Sufism developed its own institutional framework, consisting of Sufi-orders,

which played an important role in the spread of Islam in several regions. The influence of Sufi Islam among the Muslim immigrants in The Netherlands has not been studied yet.

The question I will try to answer is: are Sufi-orders, too, in a process of institutionalization in The Netherlands, and if so, which are the orders involved and what forms does the institutionalization take? The answer to this question is relevant for the future development of the Islamic communities in this country, not only because Sufism has another connotation among the Dutch autochthones than Islam has, or because Sufi traditions would determine the way the Muslims involved try to maintain their identity within their materialistic surroundings, but also because the membership of the Sufi order would determine their international relations and affiliations.

In order to answer this question I will first discuss the main features of organized Sufi Islam. After that I concentrate on its influence among the Muslim communities in The Netherlands.[1]

Sufi orders

Sufi orders can be defined as hierarchically organized, initiatory associations, based on a mystical conception of Islam.[2]

In the historical development of Sufism three stages can be distinguished.[3] In the first stage it is a elite-movement of seekers of the truth, that lies behind the outer forms of the Islamic religion. Some illuminates attract circles of disciples and form rather loosely organized fraternities, often itinerant. They believe that direct communion with the Real (as they call God), or even the experience of union with God is possible, under guidance of the illuminated master.

In the second stage (twelfth and thirteenth centuries onwards) we see the emergence of schools of mystical thought and practice, *Sufi orders*, in which the specific mystical method of the founder is continued and transmitted. The role of the leader of an order, the shaykh, becomes more important, as he is the one who is linked, by a chain of transmission of knowledge, authority and spiritual power with the founders of the order, and through them - as it is believed - with the prophet himself. Some of his disciples live together with him in the khanqa, a kind of cloister, others spread the order to other regions. The collective and individual methods for reaching an experience of God are standardized in the various Sufi orders.

In the third stage, which begins in the fifteenth century, the orders attained their final form of organization and religious practice. The standardization of the ritual and mechanization of Sufi exercises, which started in the second stage, came to its completion. Worship in the Sufi orders is based on dhikr, remembrance of God, which is put into practice by repeating, mentally or

aloud, some of his 99 beautiful names, or formulas of praise a fixed number of times in a specific succession. Combined with breath-control this can lead to ecstasy. Each order has its own pattern of invocations and praise-formulas, which can be practiced individually or collectively. In some orders the sessions of collective dhikr include music and dance. Thus, the Sufi orders developed devotional practices of a much more emotional type than the obliged prayers five times a day.

As far as the organization is concerned, all the orders became subdivided into many branches, as local departments of them began to act independently, or as distinguished members of them added their own flavour to the transmitted knowledge, and founded a new brotherhood bearing their name. It is possible to distinguish hundreds of orders now, some of only local significance, others spread throughout the Islamic world and beyond.

Another important feature of this third period is the development of Sufism into a mass movement. Popular Sufism emerges. Beside the adepts, who devoted all their time and energy to the order, most orders had lay-members, who were attached to the shaykh by an initiation rite, but had more modest spiritual goals. Along with this process, the orders became more and more associated with saint cult, as the deceased shaykhs of the order were believed to be intermediators between God and men, and their graves became centres of devotional life. Also the style of leadership and the relation between murshid and murîd changed remarkably in this third period. The leader (shaykh, pîr or murshid) attained an absolute authority over his followers. Discipleship became to include surrender to the will of the shaykh. Moreover, leadership became hereditary in most orders, which created Sufi-families, who led the cult of their holy ancestors.

The order is structured hierarchically, which in the first place implies a hierarchy through the ages, in which each shaykh is subordinated to his predecessor, through whom he has contact with the holy men of the past. At the top of the pyramid stands the founder of the order, from whom all present-day shaykhs derive their authority. But this hierarchy also affects the relations between the living members of an order. They are all subordinated to the shaykh of an order, who is the heir of the founder. The initiation rite includes an oath of obedience to the shaykh. The hierarchy goes in most orders not so far as to subordinate the various living shaykhs in it, thus creating a centralized structure. Once a person is accepted by his followers as the legitimate successor of a deceased shaykh, he becomes the autocratic head of his community.

The functions of the Sufi orders go far beyond the satisfaction of religious needs. Many orders were associated with guilds or other social groups and provided their members social security. The heads of the orders could obtain great political power, not only by virtue of their influence on thousands of

followers, but also because many of them became large landowners by the accumulation of donations during the centuries.

By and large, the three stages of development can be summarized as follows: 1. surrender to the Truth, al Haqq, God. 2. surrender to a the discipline of a certain spiritual path, and 3. surrender to the shaykh.

Throughout its history organized Sufism has been criticized for its saint veneration, its heterodox views and the abuse of power by some of its shaykhs. In some ages and areas the attack led to the closure of their centres of worship, like in Saudi Arabia after the Wahhabite reforms. They continued to occupy an officially recognized place in most areas, however, and the authorities had to deal with them. It was not until the twentieth century, that a steady decline of the influence of Sufi orders can be observed, which is usually ascribed to the process of secularization and westernization of the colonial and post-colonial elites, who began to regard the orders as stumbling blocks for progress. In many countries efforts were made to reduce their influence. Most orders saw the number of adepts diminish gradually, some even disappeared when the shaykh died.

Nevertheless, the orders and the forms of religious practice associated with them continue to meet both religious and social needs of large numbers of people. Some survived by finding new organization patterns and strategies for recruitment, and became engaged in the present struggle for re-islamization.

In others words, even though the Sufi orders in Islam lost a good deal of their former influence, we are not looking for fossils if we ask for their role in the religious life of immigrant communities in The Netherlands.

The Netherlands

If we turn our attention to The Netherlands, we must take into account that the Muslim community here is organized along ethnic lines, associations with members from different ethnic groups still being rare. Of the 432,000 Muslims in this country (Jan. 1, 1990) roughly 46% is Turkish, 38% Moroccan and 6% have their origins in the former Dutch colony of Surinam. It is among those three groups that we will look for influence of Sufi orders. In addition, we can point to the attractiveness of Sufism to Dutch converts to Islam, who also introduced some Sufi orders into The Netherlands.

Turks

In Turkey the orders were abolished in 1925 by the new secularist administration, and many of their former activities were outlawed. They survived, however, underground, and since 1950 the gradual "re-islamization" of the Turkish society increased the possibilities of the orders to operate

openly. Today their influence on society, even on political leaders, is often stressed, even though the ban has never been lifted officially. In present-day Turkey distinctions can be made between "mediatory" and "ideology-based" orders.[4] Orders of the first category have spiritual and social functions only. The religious experience of individual members is a central element in these orders. However, shaykh-disciple relations often merge with patron-client relations, so that the order also functions as a form of social security. These orders maintained more or less the classical organization patterns, spiritual methods and religious ideas of Sufi orders. Examples are the Jarrâhiyya, Mawlâwiyya, Rifâ^{c}iyya and Qâdiriyya.

The ideology-based orders aim at social, economical and political changes in society, according to their interpretation of Islam. In order to exercise influence they adopt new organizational patterns and conduct activities which go far beyond the traditional ones of the Sufi orders: qur'an-courses, dormitories for students, publishing companies, distribution of video-cassettes, etc. Especially some branches of the Naqshbandiyya developed themselves in this direction.

Of the many Sufi-orders in Turkey only a few seem to be active among the Turkish immigrants in Western Europe. The one with the largest contribution to the institutionalization of Islam in The Netherlands is called Süleymanci or Süleymanli, after the founder, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (d.1959), a shaykh in the Naqshbandiyya-order, who led an anti-secularist movement aiming at religious education of the masses. His disciples, who can be regarded as a branch of the Naqshbandiyya, built up a strong organization in Turkey. The founder is claimed to be the last and final link in the "chain of gold" (the spiritual genealogy of prominent Naqshbandi shaykhs) and his work is interpreted in eschatological terms.[5]

His followers among the Turkish immigrants in The Netherlands were the first Turks to organize themselves on a religious base in the Stichting Islamitisch Centrum (Islamic Centre Foundation), and to establish mosques and Qur'an schools. For a while they were the only ones who gave Islamic instruction to the Turkish immigrants. Later on they were overruled by other Turkish Islamic organizations, esp. those co-operating with the religious authorities in Turkey, Diyanet I_leri Ba_kanligi. The Süleymanli turned into a rather isolated group, which controls about 12% of the Turkish mosques.

The group does not stress its Sufi-background to outsiders, even hides it. In general, they are highly discreet about their identity, which can be explained by the repeated attempts in Turkey to outlaw their activities and to confiscate their properties, e.g. by placing all the Qur'an-courses under the administration of the authorities. In response to these restrictions, the movement has shown a remarkable capacity of continuing the educational work of the founder within

a network of completely legal institutes, like dormitories, homework classes, and all kinds of non-religious courses.

In The Netherlands, too, the specific religious ceremonies, in which the Sufi dimension of this movement are expressed, constitute only a small part of their activities, a part which is known to insiders only. Their stated goal is the stimulation of contacts between Muslims in The Netherlands and the organization of religious instruction. Their Islamic centres are simply mosques, in which the same religious ceremonies are conducted as in mosques belonging to non-Sufi groups. These ceremonies, like the daily prayers and the Friday prayers, are attended by Süleymanlis and other Muslims alike.

Nevertheless, the backbone of the organization is formed by initiated Sufis, who spend a large part of their time, energy and income to the organization. In addition to the general activities they, and only they, hold sessions of collective dhikr. The features of this dhikr are unknown, as the adherents succeed in maintaining its esoteric character. Leadership is hierarchical, and the head of the "Naqshbandiyya-Süleymaniyya" in Holland could be regarded, in the Sufi vocabulary, as the local "muqaddam" (representative) of the leader in Turkey.[6]

In other Islamic organizations individual members may belong to certain Sufi orders, or informal ties with an order in Turkey may exist. Thus, the Naqshbandiyya order is influential in the Refah Partisi, the political expression of the Milli Görü_ movement, which has a Dutch department, too. Though members of this order participate in the Dutch department, there is no evidence to suggest that the order itself has an organized Dutch branch. Also the present revival of Alevi Islam in Turkey, which has its echo in Western-Europe as well, did not yet lead to the establishment of a Sufi order in Holland. Part of this movement derives its inspiration from the cultural heritage of the Bekta_i order of dervishes.[7] In The Netherlands some Bekta_i associations have been established the past five years. However, though the religious traditions of Alevi Islam and Bekta_ism enjoy renewed attention, it is premature to speak about a revival of the order itself.

As for the Nurculuk movement, which is based on the writings of Said Nursi, they form a separate religious group, which can hardly be called a Sufi order, even though the founder of the movement was influenced by Sufism.[8] The Nurcus in The Netherlands meet regularly to study Nursi's book *Risale-i Nur*. This is essentially an intellectual activity. They do not have distinctive ritual or devotional features, derived from Sufism.

Thus, of the many Sufi orders in Turkey only one established a Dutch branch: the Süleymanlilar. This order, however, belongs to that category of orders in Turkey, which dropped many traditional patterns of the Sufi orders, and adopted new patterns and strategies in order to survive. The establishment of West European departments can be interpreted as an attempt to circumvent

restrictions imposed upon them by the Turkish state, and to strengthen the movement as a whole.

The Turkish orders, which maintained classical organizational patterns, meditation methods and ideas, did not organize themselves in The Netherlands, or if they did, they are very informal and invisible in the official structures. An tentative explanation for this lack of activity is, that some of the main functions of these orders in Turkey, that is, the social security they provide to their members, is not necessary in a society in which many social needs are met by the state.

Moroccans

According to Clifford Geertz' typology, Moroccan Islam has three institutional settings, which have always been in a more or less open opposition to each other, but still have - as he claims - much in common: the cult of saints centred around the tomb of a dead *marabout*, the voluntary religious organizations or brotherhoods (in other words: Sufi orders), and the sharifian government and the cult around it.[9] The French supported the brotherhoods, but after Independence their activities were curtailed by King Muhammad V and his successor Hasan II.

The number of practicing adepts and affiliates of the orders is estimated at four per cent of the population, though the number of people actually linked with one of them is much higher.[10]

Among the Moroccan immigrants in The Netherlands adepts of a Sufi order belonged to the first who held religious meetings and tried to establish a place of worship. Thus, in the city of Utrecht, the first Islamic Centre was a meeting place for Sufis of the ᶜAlawiyya-order. The person responsible, is until today highly respected by the Moroccan Muslims in that city as a very religious man. His personal history is an interesting one. Although he grew up in a family that was linked with the Tijâniyya-order, it was by the *Jamâᶜat al-Tablîgh* (see below), that he was inspired to a deeper religious consciousness. In conformity with the habits of this movement, he travelled with a group of preaching pilgrims to many countries between Spain and India. He came to Holland in 1965 (not as a missionary of the *Jamâᶜat al-Tablîgh*, as some of the records say,[11] but as a labourer). After obtaining a house, he turned part of it into a place of worship. Through the visitors, who were adepts of the ᶜAlawiyya-brotherhood, he became involved in the activities of this Sufi order, too, and travelled to Mostaghanem in Algeria to be initiated.

This order is a branch of the Darqâwiyya-order and was founded by the Algerian Shaykh Ahmad Ibn Mustafâ al-ᶜAlawî, a "Sufi saint of the twentieth century", as his biographer calls him.[12] This shaykh had a radiance and a broadness of mind that attracted many, including western converts. He did not,

however, create a new trend in Sufism, but rather represents a classical type of Sufi order.

In The Netherlands, the Moroccan disciples of his successors played a role in the first initiatives to establish a mosque, but afterwards were moved to the side-line by groups who represented the royalist tradition in Moroccan Islam. The ᶜAlawyya order opened a Sufi lodge (*zâwiya*) in Utrecht, where adepts could meet around a local representative of the shaykh, who lives in France now. The organization holds an annual retreat in Brussels, to which also adherents of other religions are invited. Members of this group are involved in Christian-Muslim dialogue and contribute by their open attitude to an atmosphere of mutual understanding and respect. Their intermediary role facilitates the institutional progress of other Moroccan Muslims, even if they condemn the fact that "the ᶜAlawîs pray with the Christians".

Another religious movement with a Sufi background, which is active among the Moroccan immigrants, is the *Jamâᶜat al-Tablîgh*. This movement, which was founded by Muhammad Ilyâs (1885-1944) from Nizâm al-Dîn Awliyâ', Delhi, India, is characterized by a tremendous missionary activity, for which the movement developed its own strategies: small travelling groups are sent to preach among the Muslims in a certain area and to ask them spend a period of time in the service of God. Out of those who are willing to answer this call, new groups are formed and sent elsewhere.[13] In The Netherlands the movement has a centre in Amsterdam, from where groups are sent to other mosques, especially Moroccan ones. Though the founder was initiated in a branch of the Chishtiyya order, and himself initiated disciples into the Chishtiyya, Naqshbandiyya, Qâdiriyya and Suhrawardiyya, the movement he founded cannot be regarded a Sufi order. The main goal of the movement laid elsewhere. Ilyas put it like this: "My attention drifted away from sufi instruction and guidance also. I decided that the proper way to expend the external and internal forces bestowed upon us by God was to utilize them in the way the Prophet did, namely, to bring the servants of God, particularly the negligent and non-seekers, towards Him and to regard life as of no value apart from spreading God's word."[14] Also the organizational structure of the movement differs from the classical orders. Nevertheless, some Sufi practices, like the reiteration of formulas of praise in individual or collective dhikr, are strongly supported by the *Jamâᶜat al-Tablîgh*.

Some other orders have adherents among the Moroccans in The Netherlands, as well. One hears rumours about Darqâwi groups,[15] Tijâni, Shâdhili, and Qâdiri groups who gather in their homes, rather informal and invisible to the outside world.

The role of Sufi orders in the institutionalization of Moroccan Islam in The Netherlands seems to be very modest indeed. The same can be said about popular Islam, which has a lot of common ground with Sufism. True, many

Moroccans belong to families which are in one way or another linked to a Sufi order. Also the religious outlook of many Moroccans is influenced by popular forms of Sufism. During their holidays in Morocco they will attend the annual memorial days (mawsim) of deceased saints and visit their graves in order to obtain a blessing. Also they will visit living holy men in their country of origin, e.g. when they suffer from illness and have more faith in the baraka of a saint than in the skill of Dutch doctors. A recent study of the religious attitudes of Moroccan women in The Netherlands shows, that they visited marabouts (or sayyids, as they called them) before their migration to Holland, but nowadays adopted a more reserved attitude to them.[16]

The institutional framework, which guarantees the survival of these religious practices in Morocco, cannot, however, easily be transferred to The Netherlands, since it centres around specific holy places.

Hindustani Muslims from Surinam

The most substantial support for Sufi orders seems to come from an ethnic community, which constitutes a minority of the Muslims in The Netherlands: the Hindustani Muslims from Surinam. Most members of this community that has its origins in British India, from where they were recruited as indentured labourers in the former Dutch colony at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, settled in Holland between 1975 and 1980. They showed a considerable activity in establishing Islamic organizations and planning the construction of mosques, and stressed the need for a visible and recognizable presence of Islam in The Netherlands. While their Turkish and Moroccan brothers were satisfied with old factories, converted into mosques, the Surinamese tried to raise funds in the Arabic world for the construction of "real" mosques. After the failure of some very ambitious projects, a modest one succeeded in Amsterdam, and others followed. Apart from an Ahmadi minority, the spiritual outlook of this group is strongly determined by the Brelwi-school in India and Pakistan. They share this spiritual outlook with the majority of the Pakistani in The Netherlands. This affiliation is articulated in the regulations of some of their organizations, but also becomes evident from the eminent position of leading representatives of this movement, visiting The Netherlands regularly. (Because of this outlook I will sometimes use the term "country of orientation" in stead of "country of origin", if certain believes and practices of these Muslims have to be traced back).

The Brelwis constitute a school of religious scholars defending a custom-laden, popular Sufism, which had come under attack of some reformist movements in British India. It derives its name from the city of the founder, Ahmad Riza Khan Brelwi (1856-1921). The customs defended by the movement include the veneration of saints and the cult associated with their

shrines. The authority of pîrs and their role as intermediaries between God and man, is accepted by these religious scholars, who not seldom belong to this class of pîrs themselves. Besides, their religious practice is characterized by a deep devotion towards the last prophet of Islam, Muhammad, whose birthday they celebrate in a way quite unacceptable to their opponents.[17] After the partition many of them migrated to Pakistan, where they built up a large institutional network.[18]

How, and when, Surinamese Muslims became acquainted with these religious scholars and Sufi leaders, is unknown, but at least in the fifties some of them visited the Dutch colony and became to be regarded as the patrons of Islamic organizations in Surinam. The relation between Pakistani pîrs and Surinamese Muslims became even stronger after the migration to The Netherlands, as some of the Brelwi pîrs, living in the United Kingdom, crossed the North Sea and gained disciples on the continent. This process was stimulated by the creation of the World Islamic Mission by Brelwi shaykhs in England, Pakistan and India during the pilgrimage to Mecca of 1973, in order to strengthen the Brelwi-movement internationally.

Most of the Surinamese Islamic organizations in The Netherlands are linked to one of the pîrs of the World Islamic Mission, as prominent members of the organizations became their disciples, and through them, disciples in one of the four main Sufi orders of Pakistan, the Qâdiriyya being the most popular one. Disciples I spoke with described their relation with the pîr as a father-son relation. Others called him their "father confessor". If a large proportion of the members of an organization has such a relation with a pîr, he can also become rather influential, and even be called the soul of the organization. In some cases an official tie between pîr and organization was created, when the first was made a patron or spiritual leader of the organization, also giving him a lot of influence in rather material affairs.

The mystical dimension of these organizations is expressed by the religious ceremonies they conduct. They all celebrate the annual memorial day (ᶜurs) of some saints, often including an ancestor of the present patron. Most of them have a weekly session for collective dhikr and a monthly celebration dedicated to the founder of the Qâdiriyya-order, ᶜAbd al-Qâdir al-Jilânî. Another indication of the impact of the Brelwi-school on the Surinamese Muslims, is the devotion for Muhammad, and the predominant place in the Islamic calendar they give to the birthday of the prophet. In some of the Surinamese Muslim organizations the members distinguish themselves in their outward appearance from other Muslims, e.g. a branch of the Qâdiriyya, called Nawshahiyya-order, prefers the orange colour in their clothes.

However, all these devotional and other characteristics can not rule out the fact, that the organizations involved are in the first place mosque-organizations, founded to establish and maintain a place of worship where the

obliged prayer can be said five times a day, and where a basic knowledge of the Islamic faith can be transmitted to the young. Their centres have more in common with an ordinary mosque than with a *zâwiya*, a centre of a Sufi order. Convents of adepts, living together with a shaykh or his local representative, are absent. The tombs of the founders and deceased leaders cannot play a role as a centre of the organization, as they are too far away (in India or Pakistan). In the publications of these organizations the basic concepts of the Islamic religious Law are explained, and references to Sufism are rare. An imam and teacher explained this to me by saying that Sufism is a higher stage of religious life which supposes that the religious obligations are observed totally. Only a few reach the level of the Sufi, he claimed.

Even so, the spiritual outlook these organizations propagate, and their liturgy is deeply influenced by Sufi, especially Brelwi traditions of India. This includes the overall authority of a relatively small number of shaykhs, whose intercession is firmly believed in. One can hear remarks like: "He is the oil in our lamps". "If it were not for the intercession of His Holiness, we would still be in a deplorable state". This fact is highly relevant for the organization process of the Muslim community in The Netherlands. The common loyalty to one pîr binds together different groups throughout the country and, moreover, throughout the world, as some of the pîrs involved have disciples in several European countries, in Pakistan, in South Africa and in the Caribbean. Several international Muslim organizations, which emerged in the last decade, are in fact institutional networks of the adherents of one popular shaykh. So, the authority of the pîrs brought cohesion in the Hindustani Muslim community in The Netherlands, and the impulses of some of them encouraged the institutionalization of Islam in The Netherlands, e.g. by the establishment of an institute for the training of Imams. On the other hand, rivalry between some of them also caused a good deal of fragmentation and confusion. Thus, conflicts between three leaders led to the emergence of three umbrella organizations, two of whom use the name World Islamic Mission.

The influence of Pakistani shaykhs can also be observed in the deteriorating relations between Surinamese Sunnis and the Ahmadis, since a prominent protagonist of the excommunication of the Ahmadis in Pakistan extended the circle of his disciples towards the Surinamers.

Dutch converts

In several of the just mentioned organizations Dutch converts to Islam participate, and some accept administrational or other functions. Besides, for more than sixty years Dutch citizens have been attracted by Sufi masters of the East and by the mystical path they taught. They travelled to Iran, Pakistan, India, came back as an initiate of a Sufi order, and established a Dutch branch

of it. In other cases the mystical teacher himself settled in the West. Examples are the adherents of the Sufi Movement of Inayat Khan,[19] the order of Idris Shah, the Nimatullahi-order, at present led by Javad Nurbakhsh,[20] and the Gudri Shahi-order from Ajmer (India), in which elements of different Sufi-traditions, but especially the Chishtiyya, are combined.[21]

While some of these orders constitute a new development in Sufism, originated by creative modern thinkers, others go back to Sufism in the first stage of its development and study the writings of early Sufi masters. Especially the representatives of this last group are in contact with the Muslim immigrants, and the publications they issue reach e.g. the Surinamese Muslims. But in spite of the good relations between these Dutch Sufis and the Muslim immigrant communities, they form a different group. They look for inspiration in the first and second stages of Sufi history. The orders among the immigrants, however, by and large represent the third stage, popular Sufism.

Conclusions

In the various ethnic communities into which the Muslims in Holland are divided, Sufism plays different roles. Only among the Surinamese Muslims Sufi orders and their shaykhs obtained a strong institutional position. Among Moroccans they are weak in comparison with the country of origin, since only a few of the many brotherhoods existing there attempted successfully to establish a Dutch branch. As for the Turks, one order set up a network of Islamic centres, which forms a not unimportant minority among the Turks Islamic organizations in Holland. Dutch converts sometimes look for inspiration and spiritual guidance from Sufi shaykhs and the writings of old Sufi masters.

Generally speaking, however, the role of Sufi orders in the institutionalization of Islam in The Netherlands is rather modest. Most Sufi orders which are active in the countries of origin of Islamic immigrants, did not even try to establish a Dutch branch. Those who did, focused their attention to Islamic worship and instruction in general. They created mosques and organized ceremonies which are attended by Sufis and non-Sufis alike. Thus, they contributed to the institutionalization of Islam in general. Most of them defend and stimulate strict observance of the prescriptions of Islamic law. The mystical dimension of their identity can be seen in the liturgical meetings they organize in addition to the daily ritual prayers, and during which communion with saints, or with the prophet Muhammad, or with God, is experienced - according to the tradition of the order. In some of the orders these meetings have an esoteric character and are attended by initiates only. In others the sessions are open to all Muslims, in order to awaken or strengthen their mystical consciousness. In most cases a convent of Sufis living together

with the shaykh or his local representative is absent and the ties of the adherents with the order vary. Thus, there is no clear distinction between the real adepts and the lay associates.

The second feature of popular Sufism which has been transplanted into The Netherlands is the hierarchical relation between the pîr or shaykh and his followers. Although this relation is often criticized as a hindrance for personal development, the disciples themselves feel that the spiritual guidance offered by the shaykh helps them to develop their own Islamic identity within their overwhelmingly non-religious environment. This applies to both the first and the second generations. Much depends, of course, on the way this guidance is given, and on the kind of authority they will try to exercise. Some of the Sufi leaders do have many disciples younger than thirty years. The role of the pîrs transcends the level of personal relations and extends towards the institutional level, as they are very dominant in certain organizations. This has some serious disadvantages, not only because this implies dependency on a person living abroad, not knowing sufficiently the context in which his followers live, but also because conflicts between two shaykhs who have disciples in the same ethnic group can cause a lot of tension and even schisms. On the other hand the order in general and the authority of the pîr in particular, joins large numbers of people and links them together in international networks, which strengthens their position considerably.

For the relatively weak position of Sufi orders several reasons can be suggested. In the first place the general decline of the influence of Sufi orders as a result of westernization and secularization in many Islamic societies does not put these orders in a favourable position to start fresh initiatives abroad. Only some socially and politically active orders seem to have the vitality to create new branches among Muslim immigrants in Western Europe. Secondly, some important social services the Sufi orders in the country of origin provide are not longer needed in Holland. In the third place, certain features of popular Sufism in the countries of orientation, like the cult associated with the shrines of deceased saints can hardly be transplanted, linked as they are to immoveables. In connection with this it is relevant to notice, that many of these holy places in Islamic countries are the devotional centres for women. Popular Sufism seems to offer women more place than official Islam does, even though Sufi-orders seldom accepted women as their members.[22] Roughly speaking, the mosque is the gathering place for men, while some of the tombs have the same function for women.

While about 300 mosques have been established in The Netherlands so far, it might take quite some time before the first Sufi saint is buried in The Netherlands, whose tomb could become the centre of religious activity. Such a mausoleum would meet fierce opposition of established Islamic organizations. But only then popular Sufism would be institutionalized in The Netherlands.

Notes

[1]The organizations and institutes mentioned in this paper will be discussed in more detail in my dissertation about the institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands.
[2] De Jong, 1989, p.487.
[3]Trimingham, 1971.
[4]Atacan, 1990, p.17-18.
[5]See e.g. Tarhan (a Süleymanli leader in Western Germany), 1981. Compare Çakir, 1990; Binswanger-Sipahioglu, 1988, p.49-60; Kisakürek, 1988, p.271-315; Anonymus, 1983.
[6]Contrary to the classical pattern of thet uruq the present leader does not call himself a shaykh or the khalîfa (successor) of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan. In the Süleymanli ideology, Süleyman cannot be succeeded, as the line of Naqshbandi shaykhs ends with him. For Algar (1989, 182-85) this deviation of the tradition is a reason to call them a sect in stead of a part of the Naqshbandiya.
[7] Dierl, 1985; Haas, 1987.
[8]Mardin, 1989, p.181f; Spuler, 1981, p.427-434; Cakir, 1990, p.103.
[9]Geertz, 1968, p.49-54.
[10]Trimingham, 1971, p.255.
[11]Hâchim, 1979. p.94.
[12]Lings, 1973.
[13]Haq, 1972; Troll, 1985; Kepel, 1987; Dassetto, 1988.
[14]Haq, 1972, p.172.
[15]Abderrahman, 1987, p.61.
[16]Brons, 1990, p.121-25.
[17]Metcalf, 1982, p. 264-314.
[18]Including religious schools, an Association of Shaykhs (Jamᶜîyat al-mashâyikh) and a political party (Jamᶜîyat al-ᶜulamâ'-i Pakistan). See Malik, 1989, passim.
[19]See about the history of this movement in the Netherlands in the period 1924-1946: van Hoorn, 1981, which includes a list of other available relevant publications. See also Youskine, 1985, who defends the movement against the suggestions that this "western sufism" has little in common with Islam and "real sufism".
[20]The *Stichting Nimatullahi Sufi Orde* in The Hague publishes books of the present shaykh in English and Dutch.
[21]Some books of the present shaykh were translated into Dutch by his followers: Z.H.Sharib, s.a. and 1979.
[22]De Jong, 1989, note 1, p.673, states that initiation (as a dervish) is allowed to women in only some of the orders. Initiation as an associate or lay member is more often possible. See also Trimingham, 1971, p.232.

3

The Practice of Islamic Healing[1]

C.B.M. Hoffer

Introduction

As a sociologist from the University of Leiden I did some research on Islamic healers and their clients in The Netherlands from June 1990 till January 1991. I did this at the request of the Dutch Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and Culture. Although the alternative therapies of migrants, such as Winti and Ayurveda[2], have received quite a bit of attention over the years, not much is known about the contents and the meaning of Islamic therapies in The Netherlands. Up till now there have been publications only about the situation of Islamic therapies in the countries of origin of the Muslim migrants, particularly in Morocco and Turkey. Various papers have been published in which attention is paid to the ideas of Islamic migrants with reference to alternative therapies. But the problem with most of them thus far is that they are exclusively concerned with descriptions of the situation in the countries of origin. Subsequently it is implicitly assumed that the ideas described in them were still prevalent in The Netherlands, without this assumption being actually put to the test.[3]

The purpose of my research was to analyse to what extent certain ideas of Muslims in the countries of origin were still adhered to in a Dutch environment. In this paper I will discuss the most important results of my inquiry. First, I will write something about the religious and cultural backgrounds of Islamic therapies. Secondly, I shall give a description of the practices of Islamic healers in The Netherlands. Finally, I will deal with some aspects of the future of Islamic therapies within a Dutch context.

Religious and cultural backgrounds of Islamic therapies

Islamic therapies are those cures which are based on the Qoran and the hadith (i.e. the traditions of the Prophet Muhammed). When we speak about Islamic therapies it is important to make a distinction between official Islam and popular belief. Official Islam imposes restrictions on the religious curing activities of Muslims. In general, religious healers may not go beyond reciting certain verses from the Qoran and making amulets from Qoran texts. Besides, they are not allowed to ask money for their activities: for, ultimately it is God and not the healer who cures (Pierce 1964: 89; Shadid and van Koningsveld 1983: 80; Sachs 1987: 268).

In practice the restrictions imposed by Islam are frequently ignored (Oztürk 1964: 350-352). This is the domain of popular belief.[4] Above all the different methods of treatment that have developed from popular belief is what I will talk about. Those cures are called Islamic because their practitioners base themselves on the Qoran. They are moreover influenced by historical developments, such as the prophetic medicine, Arabic-Islamic medicine, Sufism and by all kinds of local traditions and customs.[5]

Because of this diversity in religious and cultural background it is impossible to speak of a specifically Moroccan or Turkish Islamic vision on illness and healing. Between and within these countries there exist certain cultural differences.[6] It is however possible to discern some elements from popular belief all Islamic countries have in common. According to such popular belief the causes of disease are, generally speaking, to be distinguished into two types: natural causes and supernatural causes.

Natural diseases

Generally speaking, natural diseases are diseases or accidents which are easily diagnosed as being caused in a natural way, for example, skin diseases, fractures, pediatric diseases, cases of poisoning by animal bites. For the treatment of such diseases use is made of natural medicines and of the services of herbalists and bone-healers (Shadid and van Koningsveld 1983: 82-83).

Supernatural diseases

For diseases appearing suddenly or lasting too long people look for super-natural causes. The same applies when a person or a family is struck repeatedly by illness or disaster. Three possible causes of such diseases are to be distinguished: magic, the Evil Eye and evil spirits (Shadid and van Koningsveld 1983: 82-83).

Magic is the attempt to influence events and relationships by supernatural means (Greenwood 1981: 220). When used to cause illnesses or problems it is called black magic or witchcraft. The Arabic word for this is *sihr* and the Turkish word is *büyü*. Black magic can be practised in different ways: by writing down texts, pronouncing incantations and casting spells, performing certain rituals, and so on. Often magical practices are aimed at concrete results: to make someone impotent, infertile, sick or insane, to eliminate someone's will, to break up marriages and relationships. To combat the effects of magic written amulets are often made use of. Usually, those amulets are made of pieces of paper bearing handwritten texts from the Qoran or from other books. Sometimes they also contain sets of numbers or other esoteric symbols. Subsequently, the pieces of paper are put into a small bag made of leather or plastic or in a flat tin box. Besides that, also counter magical rituals may be performed (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 1983: 83; Sachs 1987: 262-271).

The *Evil Eye* (in Arabic: *l'ain*; in Turkish: *nazar*) is a phenomenon which is found in several cultures and religions. Generally speaking, it is associated with the jealousy of the one who casts his Evil Eye upon someone else. Therefore, especially people who are successful, healthy, attractive or rich are believed to be vulnerable. The workings of the Evil Eye require the intervention of a human being and there will therefore be a lot of speculation about whom might be involved. To prevent the Evil Eye from being effective amulets are made use of (Oztürk 1964: 351-353; Pierce 1964: 89; Greenwood 1981: 220; Sachs 1987: 270; Hermans 1986: 3).

In Islamic countries evil spirits are called *djinns*. *Djinns* are intelligent beings which live in a well-structured society. Usually they are invisible, but sometimes they manifest themselves as animals or as human beings. They like to have their abodes close to water and on polluted locations. Although this is not always the case, most *djinns* are fickle, revengeful and vicious. When insulted or hurt they hit back. A human being may do so unwillingly: for example, by splashing water on a *djinn* when throwing it away. Anxiety and fright make people susceptible to the actions of *djinns*. Also people in certain stages of transition are vulnerable: newly circumcised boys, newly weds, pregnant women and travellers.

Djinns can cause diseases in two different ways. First, by hitting someone. The results may be, for example, asymmetric paralysis of the face or sudden blindness, deafness or dumbness. Secondly, by taking possession of someone. The symptoms of diseases caused by demoniacal possession are: loss of consciousness, fainting fits, convulsions, tremors, sudden changes in speech, confusion etc. There are different ways to protect oneself against the attacks of *djinns*; for example, by using amulets or substances *djinns* are vulnerable to,

such as salt, incense, candles, iron, tar or petrol (Crapanzano 1973: 135-168; Bennani 1989: 29; van der Meer 1977: 503-505).

An important concept from popular belief is *baraka*. Literally *baraka* means:, 'salutary power'. *Baraka* manifests itself in three forms. First, there is the so-called *institutionalized or inherited baraka*. The Prophet Muhammed possessed this form of *baraka* to the highest degree. Consequently, the descendants of the Prophet (*shurafâ*) are also invested with this form of *baraka*. The institutionalized *baraka* is also ascribed to the saints (*marabouts*), who are venerated in their tombs. *Personal baraka* is the second form of this positive power. This is *baraka* resulting from personal merits: for example, a pious Islamic life or the gift to cure the sick. The third form of *baraka* is to be found *in Qoran texts and in pious prayers*, in amulets made up of such texts, and also in the water in which the ink a holy text is written in has been dissolved (Crapanzano 1973: 120; Greenwood 1981: 220; Shadid and van Koningsveld 1983: 81).

In countries like Morocco and Turkey a wide range of Islamic therapies and healers can be found. The best known Moroccan concept for Islamic healer is *fqih*. A *fqih* is someone who practises magic. He prepares amulets to protect people, buildings or enterprises against misfortune. He neutralises the harmful effects of the Evil Eye or of black magic. The *fqih* also practises exorcism. Besides the *fqih* Moroccans also speak of the *sharif*. The word *sharif* refers to those men and women who claim to be the descendants of the Prophet Muhammed. As I have described above, in that capacity they posses *baraka* that has healing power (Greenwood 1981: 220-221; Hermans 1986: 6-7; Bennani 1989: 29-30). The Turkish word for an Islamic healer is *hodja*. For healers specialized in curing one specific disease Turks use the concept of *odjak* (Oztürk 1964: 352-356; Pierce 1964: 88-89; Sachs 1987: 262-264).

In addition to the consulting of Islamic healers, the worshipping of saints (*marabouts*) is also very common in the Islamic countries. The tomb of the saint concerned is of central importance. People visit such a tomb for different reasons: to be cured of a disease or of a demoniacal possession, to have a child, to get a job, to have a beloved person return, or simply to acquire wealth (Oztürk 1964; Crapanzano 1973: 115-118; Shadid and van Koningsveld 1983: 81; Sachs 1987).

The practice of Islamic therapies in The Netherlands

Islamic healers

In view of my research on Islamic healers and their clients in The Netherlands I interviewed nine healers, namely two Moroccans, three Turks, three healers

from Surinam and one from British-Guyana. I approached them with the assistance of key-informants from Muslim organizations and of representatives from the public health and social services. This offered me the opportunity to contact the healers in the informal atmosphere in which they operate. In the ensuing paragraph I will successively describe the healing power of these healers, the afflictions they are confronted with, their diagnostics, their therapies, the registration of their clients and their fees.

There are four different sources on which the healers interviewed base their work: hereditary healing power, transmitted healing power, membership of a Sufi-order and study. The two Moroccan healers asserted that their healing powers were inherited. Both claimed to be descendant from the Prophet Muhammed. The second source of healing power is the *transmission by another healer*. In this case we speak above all about the Turkish healers. One of them said that he was a specialist in curing headaches and insomnia in children. He therefore is called *odjak*. He received his healing power from his uncle, in whose service he had been for a long time. The third source of healing power is *membership of a Sufi-order*. Usually this concerns Surinamese or Guyanese healers, who have associated themselves with a Sufi-order in Pakistan. Often they do their work with permission of a Pakistani spiritual teacher: a so-called *pîr or murshid*. Finally, the fourth source of healing force is based on *study*. Usually, this concerns self-study of the Qoran and of the hadith.

About the afflictions Islamic healers in The Netherlands are confronted with I can say the following. In the opinion of Islamic healers, at the root of every physical, psychological or social affliction lies a supernatural cause. Besides that, they also acknowledge the existence of diseases due to natural causes. To exclude the latter category in their diagnostics they usually ask their clients first whether they have been to see a doctor. If there is no obvious medical explanation it is assumed that there must be a supernatural cause. In such a case it is the task of the Islamic healer to determine the precise cause. In practice this means that Islamic healers are confronted with a wide range of afflictions; for example, various types of pain (in particular headaches and backaches), diarrhoea, loss of appetite in children, fever, insomnia, certain anxieties, disturbances in relationships. Sometimes Islamic healers are asked to come and see patients in hospital.

Diagnostical techniques

To diagnose diseases Islamic healers make use of various techniques.

The first rather obvious technique is *an extensive conversation with the client and the people connected with him socially*. One of the healers interviewed said that it is essential to have an insight into the character of a client, because it supplies him with a lot of information about the causes of the client's illness.

The second technique is *the use of texts and recitations from the Qoran, the hadith or some particular instruction manuals*. A Turkish healer said that, after having spoken with a client about his afflictions, he starts to read from the Qoran. As soon as the client starts yawning, laughing or crying there is an indication that a supernatural power is at stake. This healer said: 'If the client starts crying I know that it is a matter of the Evil Eye. But when he is convulsed with laughter he is possessed by an evil spirit'. Other healers make use of certain instruction manuals. A Turkish healer said that when someone consults him about headaches he asks for the names of the client and of certain of his relatives. Subsequently, he is able to look up the causes of the headaches in his manual. Sometimes the client must put his finger on such a book. The healer can then draw certain conclusions from that.

The third diagnostical technique is the so-called '*cupping*'. This technique is practised by a Turkish healer. It consists of inflicting light bleedings. If, for example, someone feels a pain extending from his shoulders to his head, the healer heats a drinking-glass by burning some paper. Subsequently, he makes two little scratches on the shoulder of the client with a razor-blade and puts the glass over them. In the opinion of the healer it may be possible for black blood to flow from the injuries. In that case the pain will disappear immediately.

The fourth technique is *a ritual with lead*. A Moroccan healer uses this technique frequently. He writes a text on a piece of lead and gives that to the client. At home the client has to melt the lead in a pan. After that he must wrap himself into a sheet and put a bucket of water between his legs. He then must throw the lead into the water so that it will harden. After the ritual the client must wash himself with the water. He must take the lead with him when he goes back to the healer. In the coagulated lead the healer will see indications of what power has caused the affliction and what part of the body has been affected.

The fifth technique is *the conjuring up of spirits*. To one of the Moroccan healers this is the most important of the diagnostical techniques, as well as a therapeutical technique. He hypnotizes his clients and by means of them he conjures up spirits. In some cases these spirits are *djinns* and in other cases they are the spirits of living persons. In the course of a hypnotizing-session the healer takes the spirit of the client or the medium to certain locations and situations and allows him or her to communicate with other spirits. That way

he discovers all the facts regarding certain problems or the causes of a particular illness. Then he punishes the guilty *djinn* or the spirit of, for example, a *fqih* who has practised black magic.

There are, furthermore, the techniques based on the *intuition* of the healer and on *the assessment of someone's aura*. One of the Surinamese healers says that, using his intuition, he can discern whether a disease has something to do with spirits or with physical or psychological disorders. The aura is the luminous, subtle emanation enveloping every living being. The composition and the colour of someone's aura may supply the healer with information about the condition of that client.

The last diagnostical technique consists of using the well-known *bloodpressure-gauge and stethoscope*. A Moroccan healer sometimes notes the bloodpressure and the pulse of a client. He does this, he says, because it tells him something about the way a spirit reacts: 'If I touch someone who is possessed by a spirit, then his bloodpressure will rise'.

Therapeutical techniques

Beside these diagnostical techniques Islamic healers make use of several therapeutical techniques to treat diseases and solve problems. Two related, therapeutical techniques are first, *the reciting of prayers and the declaiming of texts from the Qoran* and, *secondly, the reading in each case of a special text which is subsequently blown over the body of a client or over his food or drink.*

Another technique is *the reading of special verses from the Qoran over a rope*. This is the specialty of a Turkish healer. He particularly uses this in curing headaches. Such a rope has a certain length. The client must wear it around his neck.

The fourth technique is *the use of Qoran texts for various purposes*. The precise instructions for this technique healers look up in special manuals. Such books contain texts dealing with particular diseases and problems: for example, with abdominal pains, headaches, impotence etc. For every ailment a healer is told how to act. It says, for example, what a text should be written and what kind of material should be written on. An example of this technique is the amulet, which is made of a piece of paper.

The fifth technique concerns *all kinds of rituals*. These rituals are also derived from manuals. A Turkish healer gave the following example of a ritual directed against demonical possession. The client takes home some water in which a certain text written with saffron has been dissolved. The client himself may increase the amount of water by filling up the bottle. The client must

drink from the water three times a day for twenty-one days. He must also wash himself with it once, without touching his feet. When the client has washed himself he must throw away the dirty water near a tree. After doing so he should not look back nor talk until he is at home.

The sixth therapeutical technique is *the conjuring up of spirits and the co-operation with them*. The Moroccan healer who practises this technique said that he cooperates with sixteen spirits. Among them are seven kings. With the help of these kings the healer can manipulate the *djinns* subordinated to them and he can punish the acts of evil spirits.

Some other techniques are the practise of *magnetism, the laying on of hands and the use of certain oils (to massage muscles and joints) and herbs*.

When we talk about Islamic healers in The Netherlands another topic to be considered is the registration of their clients. Some healers have but a small circle of clients, usually consisting of friends and acquaintances. Other healers work on a larger scale. Some of them even have an automated client file. They have clients of diverse national and religious backgrounds. Most Islamic healers assert that they don't ask any fees of their clients. The argument they use in this respect is that ultimately it is God who cures, and not the healer. They nevertheless admit that clients give them something of their own accord. Thus, one of the Moroccan healers usually gets his payments in kind. From a shopkeeper who sells videos he is allowed to borrow free films, because he has treated his wife. For the same reason he gets meat free from a butcher. And another one of his clients helps him to automate the administration of his clients.

Clients

In the course of my inquiry I also interviewed twenty of the clients. First, I will say something about their motivations. Subsequently, I will go into their afflictions. Most clients I spoke with had visited their family doctor or another representative of the regular health services (for example, a physiotherapist, a specialist or some institution dealing with psychological and social problems) before consulting an Islamic healer. Clients often formulated their reasons for going to an Islamic healer in negative terms. They stated frequently that they were discontented with the treatment offered to them by the regular health and social services. They could not find any relief from their afflictions there and therefore went to see Islamic healers. Another reason for consulting an Islamic healer was the fact that relatives, friends or acquaintances of the client told them that an Islamic healer might be able to help. Curiosity was yet another reason. One has certain afflictions or problems, and hopes for an Islamic

healer to bring them alleviation. One thereby uses the motto even if it will not help, it will not do any harm either. All clients said that the healer in question was known to their family, friends or acquaintances or that he belonged to their own circle of acquaintances. With this the informal status of the atmosphere in which Islamic therapies flourish is confirmed.

The afflictions with which clients come to Islamic healers are usually of great diversity. In medical terms they often consist of a combination of physical, psycho-somatic and psychological problems. It is often not possible to classify a particular affliction under one of these denominators. Besides, all the possible and manifold interpretations of the said terms make it difficult to categorise the different types of problems. Based solely on the information obtained from the clients and therefore ignoring purely medical diagnostics I have made a distinction between the following categories: physical afflictions, physical afflictions without clear causes, psychological problems without clear causes and problems of a social or cultural nature.

Examples of purely *physical afflictions* with which Islamic healers are confronted are: chronic pains (for example of muscles and joints), symptoms of paralysis as a result of car-accidents, and sudden diseases of children accompanied by vomiting and fever.

Examples of *physical afflictions without clear causes* are the following. A Turkish woman said that two years ago she went to her family-doctor with her daughter who was eighteen years old. The girl was suffering from terrible headaches. The doctor told her to take a lot of rest and to sleep well. In addition she was treated with massages by a physiotherapist. However, the treatment did not have any results at all. So they went to see a Turkish healer. His diagnosis was that an evil spirit was involved. The healer read some particular Qoran texts over a rope which the girl had to wear around her neck. Ever since the headaches have disappeared.

Another example concerns a Surinamese woman who has been suffering inexplicable pains throughout her whole body for years. Notwithstanding the fact that she could indicate the painful spots x-ray photographs did not offer any decisive answers. Then one of her acquaintances advised her to go to an Islamic healer. This healer prayed for her and gave her some blessed water. After five weeks the pains had disappeared. According to the woman her family-doctor does not understand how she was released from her pains so suddenly.

I shall now describe some examples from the category of *psychological problems without clear causes*. A Moroccan man said that he went to see his family-doctor a year ago. He had several afflictions: absent-mindedness, forgetfulness, apathy, distress, headaches, restlessness, problems with his eyes

and palpitations. The doctor could not find any physical causes, but gave the patient medicines for his headaches and send him to a hospital to have a cardiogram made. This did not result in any decisive answers and the medicines did not have any positive results. Therefore the man went to a Moroccan healer. This healer prescribed the above mentioned ritual with lead. The healer concluded that black magic was involved. He gave the man four texts: two of them had to be dissolved into water (to be used for drinking and for bathing respectively), one had to be burned and one had to be used to make an amulet.

Another example concerns a Moroccan girl. Shortly after she went to live alone in her new house she got psychological problems: she heard voices everywhere. She was afraid that her house was possessed by spirits. From an acquaintance she got the name and the address of a Moroccan healer. He made several amulets for her, to protect her and to allay the spirits. It did not work. Then, she went back to live with her parents. Meanwhile the healer has sent a letter to the municipal housing agency to get her another house. In his opinion this is the only possible solution.

A last category of *problems* are those *of a social or a cultural nature*. In this respect one can think of problems resulting from or connected with unemployment, bad housing conditions, alcoholism, feelings of guilt in the religious sphere, problems with relationships and problems related to the reunification of the families of migrants. Of the last sort of problems I shall give an example. It concerns a Moroccan family. The man migrated to The Netherlands in 1965, his wife and their eleven children in 1984. They are beset with all kinds of problems. The man is ill, and therefore he cannot work. He has various afflictions. Thus, he suffers from pains in the back and in the arm. He goes to see a physiotherapist. Apart from all that, his communications with all kinds of Dutch official bodies and institutions are cumbersome. As an example he mentions his visits to the so-called Common Administration Office (which is an official body in The Netherlands regulating payments on the strength of the national health insurance act). He had an appointment with the doctor but that went wrong because he did not understand the system of follow-up numbers in the waiting room. The man also has problems with the office regulating student allowances of the government. The reason for that is that, according to him, he suddenly had to pay a large sum of money as a school fee for one of his sons. He did not have the money, after which his son was sent down from school. The man moreover has problems applying for the Dutch nationality for one of his daughters. In addition to this one of his daughters has psychological problems. Consequently she has been seeing all kinds of doctors for years. The man asserts that since his family came to The

Netherlands he has been under enormous pressure. The family has been confronted with all kinds of problems and the children expect their father to resolve them. But that is a heavy burden for him.

To find a solution to his problems the man went to see a Moroccan healer. The healer decided to conjure up some spirits. With the help of these *djinns* he concluded that black magic was involved. Subsequently he had one of the *djinns* punish the man who was practising the magic.

Not only Islamic healers but also representatives from the regular medical professions are confronted with problems as complex as the ones mentioned above. Thus, the psychiatrist Limburg-Okken describes in her dissertation, what she calls, the diagnostical inadequacy of psychiatry with respect to certain syndromes of migrants. She makes a plea for renewal of the traditional therapies in psychiatry. In her opinion psychiatric diagnostics should also include certain socio-economic aspects of mental diseases such as the secondary position of migrants in the sphere of living, work and education. She also asks psychiatrists to display an awareness of the social and psychological effects of certain political decisions (such as those in the field of children's allowances and remigration prospects) (Limburg-Okken 1989: 11-12, 15-16, 163-167).

Future prospects of Islamic therapies

A remarkable aspect of my investigation was that five of the healers interviewed were approached with the help from doctors and other workers from the regular health and social services. This is remarkable because officially neither the Dutch Government nor official representatives from the regular health services acknowledge the work of Islamic healers.

Islamic healers and doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers have and maintain contacts with each other on an informal basis. In some cases psychiatrists and social workers apply for help to Islamic healers. In other cases social workers adopt the role of Islamic healers themselves. For therapeutical reasons they go along with the client in his way of thinking and therefore use particular rituals to conjure up supernatural powers. For these rituals they consult the same manuals healers do.

On the basis of the data I have collected it is not possible to make a conclusive statement about the efficacy of Islamic therapies. Yet, it is possible for me to point out some features of Islamic therapies which can be of importance to the successful treatment of the afflictions of Islamic clients. The analysis of these features is based on a test of and an adaptation to a Dutch

context of Crapanzano's ideas with reference to the presumed success of the *Hamadsha*, a religious brotherhood in Morocco (Crapanzano 1973: 212-217).

First, Islamic healers work from a holistic point of view. In their diagnostics and therapies they pay attention to all kinds of physical, psychological, social, religious and spiritual factors, which in their opinion influence the health and illness of a human being. They spend a lot of time and energy on their clients and give them the opportunity to think about the possible causes of their afflictions themselves, and to contribute actively to the treatment. By means of extensive conversations the healer traces the way in which the client functions, what his or her character is like, and how he or she lives. Besides that, he also takes notice of the social environment of the client. He analyses what kind of relationships the client has en what problems there might exist between him and the people around him.

Secondly, in some cases an Islamic healer seems to be able to open up new perspectives for clients who find themselves in an apparently hopeless situation. He creates order out of chaos and gives them the opportunity to take their lives in their own hands. This process takes place on two levels: on a symbolic (religious) level and on a practical-rational level. On a symbolic level the healer translates certain afflictions into cultural concepts the client is familiar with. He explains diseases in terms of supernatural powers, confirms the possible assumptions of his clients and subsequently manipulates these forces as part of the healing process. At the same time the healer offers rational arguments for changes in conduct. In doing so, the Islamic healer in some cases plays the part of a social worker. He accompanies his client to the local bureau for psychological and social assistance or intercedes between clients and institutions (for example, a housing association). In some cases this will result in the ailment decreasing or disappearing, or in a change in attitude of the client where particular problems are concerned; the problems have been made manageable. For the client this will be the basis for regaining confidence in his own abilities and will stimulate him to undertake activities giving his life a new direction.

Thirdly, in Islamic therapies one is able to recognize elements which are considered effective in psychotherapeutic theories. These elements are: solidarity with the group, the participation of the client in the healing process and a close relationship between healer and client.

Group solidarity. Ideally the clients of an Islamic healer will experience a marked solidarity with the group. In most cases of illness the family of the client will be involved in the healing process. Under the supervision of the healer a client will sometimes revitalize his relationships. Moreover, in the healer's circle one will also make the acquaintance of other clients. An attempt

is made at making unsolved problems in Dutch society manageable within one's own circle.

Participation. An active contribution to the healing process is expected from the clients. They will often have to perform certain rituals themselves or with the help of their relatives.

Relationship healer - client. The relationship between the Islamic healer and his client is very important. In some cases the healer manipulates the religious feelings of his clients. In this respect I would like to mention the example of a healer who told me in which way he had treated a man who was an alcoholic. He could convince the man that in future a spirit would keep him from drinking. He moreover advised the man to say his daily prayers again and to go to the mosque regularly.

In other cases the clients is put at ease by the healers. In this respect one can think of certain anxieties (for example regarding the Evil Eye, magic or *djinns*) or of the treatment of acute pains.

Conclusions

In this article I have described the results of a recent inquiry into the therapies of Islamic healers in The Netherlands. Islamic healers base their healing powers on various sources and practise various diagnostical and therapeutical techniques. These techniques consist of a combination of elements derived from various religious and cultural systems, such as prophetic medicine, Arabic-Islamic medicine, Sufism and all kinds of local traditions and customs.

Islamic healers are primarily confronted with physical and psychological afflictions without clear causes (headaches, pains in the back, stress, nightmares, feelings of depression, apathy) and socio-economic problems (unemployment, bad living conditions, alcoholism, feelings of guilt in the religious sphere, problems with relationships, problems connected with the reunification of families).

An important element of Islamic therapies is that the healer in certain cases seems to be able to open up new perspectives for clients who find themselves in an apparently hopeless situation.

Islamic healers as well as their clients claim their therapies to have positive effects. Because of the increase in Muslim clients some doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers are interested in the work of Islamic healers.

They therefore take notice of the contents of Islamic therapies and get in touch with Islamic healers.

For these reasons I have recently started a second inquiry, the aims of which are to investigate to what extent Islamic therapies are effective with respect to the clients and under what conditions, and how much co-operation may be possible between doctors, social workers and Islamic healers.

Notes

[1]This article is an abstract of my book *'Islamitische geneeswijzen in Nederland. Een eerste inventarisatie' (1991).*

[2]*Winti* is an Afro-american religion in which the belief in personified supernatural beings is central. These beings can take possession of a human being and can switch off his will, after which they can reveal the past, the present and the future and can cure supernatural diseases (Wooding 1984:1). Winti is a popular belief among certain groups in the Surinamese community in The Netherlands.

Ayurveda is the traditional medicine of India, which probably originated more than three thousand years ago in the valleys of the rivers of the Nile and the Euphrates. The most essential of the Ayurveda-ideas are: the doctrine to look upon a human being as one whole being, without distinguishing between physical, psychological and emotional qualities ànd the *tridosha*-theory. The three doshas or elements are air, water and fire. The three doshas are the key to the treatment of the patient by the doctor. It is his task to maintain the equilibrium of these powers in the body. In The Netherlands Ayurveda is practised by people from the Surinamese-Hindustani community (Van Dijk 1990: 69; Spijker 1989: 25-28, 51-55).

[3]Examples are: Creyghton 1977; Van der Meer 1977; Busschots 1980; Hermans 1986; Strijp 1990.

[4]The notion 'popular belief' means a theory about the nature and workings of supernational powers and the rituals by which these powers can be controlled and manipulated for the sake of someone's health and well-being (Shadid and Van Koningsveld 1983: 80).

[5]For a detailed description of these historical developments see chapter 2 of my book above mentioned.

[6]Culture here means the totality of standards and values and their meaning, which are transmitted from generation to generation by means of traditions and customs (Van Lingen 1989:11).

PART II

Second Generation Muslims in The Netherlands

4

Types of Religious Belief and Unbelief among Second Generation Turkish Migrants

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Introduction

Throughout the history of religions, migration has always been a main cause of religious change. On the level of the religious symbol system (doctrine, ritual) these changes are much more gradual than on the individual level. Among migrants, radical changes with respect to religious belief and practise may happen from one generation to another. This has been observed, e.g., when in the 19th century thousands of Roman Catholics from the south of Holland migrated to the industrial city of Rotterdam and many Bretons migrated to Paris.

The first generation of migrants often becomes more religiously active than they were in their homeland. Religion provides possibilities to overcome feelings of isolation and disorientation. Religious commitment will protect them against loss of identity and alienation. For the second generation, however, the need to turn to religion, will be less strong. As far as they have migrated themselves as a child, as has been the case for most of the Turkish respondents in our investigation, migration will not be a rupture of life to them. Being still in their formative years, they will experience the host country and its culture differently than their parents do. However, adopting the life-style of their Dutch peers may be refused by their parents, with a reference to its incompatibility with the traditional religious beliefs and obligations. To follow the parental religious model, to adopt an alternative style of Islamic observance or to give up religious identity at all will become a matter of choice for them.

In this paper, we will pay attention to the attitude of second generation migrants towards the Islamic worldview as they have learned it at home and in the mosque school. We will report empirical data concerning the question whether and how adolescents and young adults from Turkish Muslim families stick to Islamic religious beliefs and practises. This question is part of a research project with a broader scope, viz. to investigate the relation between religious attitudes and behavior, socio-cultural integration and psychological well-being. The religious symbol system of the Islam, just like the traditional Christian, involves a dualistic worldview (characterized by a distinction between a natural and a supernatural world, by world-rejection and a prospect of salvation in the hereafter). According to Bellah (1970), who applies an evolutionary model to the history of religious thinking, the dualistic thinking of religions like Christianity and Islam represents an earlier stage in the religious evolution. He argues that in the present stage of religious evolution, religious thinking, at least in NW Europe, has changed under the influence of the *Aufklärung* and the rationalistic depreciation of metaphysical systems. A characteristic aspect of religious change, now observable among religious people in the Western world, is a fading of the traditional dualistic worldview into a new directness to this world. Among some theologians and philosophers this is noticeable in the emphasis they lay on the metaphorical character of religious language. Other theologians and religious authorities on the contrary cling to the literal interpretation of holy scripture and doctrinal statements.

We presume that in modern society, each individual who as a child has been instructed in a dualistic religious doctrine, will be confronted more or less with the incompatibility of the religious construction of reality and the modern secular worldview. In most cases this will not become a manifest cognitive problem for which one will seek a solution. Yet it may be a negative predisposition for religious involvement. Similar to their Dutch peers with a Christian background, this may equally be so among young Turkish migrants. At home and in the mosque school, they will have been initiated into a form of Islam, in which literally taken legends and even magic elements have a prominent place, whereas in the Dutch secondary school and media they are exposed to a materialistic, nonreligious or even anti-religious cultural climate. Objectively, this situation of cultural alternatives confronts young people coming from religious families with the necessity to choose. However, we expect to find more than two types of attitudes toward traditional religious beliefs. Besides acceptance or rejection, an ambivalent attitude is possible. Further, we want to know how many of those who reject literal interpretations, accept a metaphorical interpretation of traditional religious ideas.

After having verified to which degree these types of attitude factually exist, we will explore their relationship with some background variables. We expect

that these attitudes will be related with the intensity of religious education at home and with the number of years one has visisted the mosque school. We further expect that female second generation migrants will stick longer to the traditional ideas than males, because of their fewer contacts with non-Muslims. As mentioned already, we expect that acceptance of the traditional worldview will be negatively related with the level of secular education in Dutch schools. Some members of the second generation intend to remigrate to Turkey in the future, some will settle permanently in the host country. Do religious attitudes vary in proportion to these different prospects? Finally it will be important to explore the relationship between religious belief and practise. Is there a correspondence between accepting or rejecting religious beliefs and commitment to traditional religious obligations? And do members of the second generation, who prefer a metaphorical interpretation of religious ideas, differ in this respect from those who stick to a dualistic worldview?

Procedures of measurement

1. Subjects

The data that will be presented here have been gathered in a still on-going investigation among second generation Turkish migrants in The Netherlands. To classify a Turkish migrant as belonging to the second generation, we used two criteria: 1. born from migrant parents, but not necessarily in the migration-country; 2. participation in the Dutch schoolsystem at least during 5 years. Moreover, in this investigation we have set the minimum age-level at 17 years old, because at an earlier age there is less chance that one will already have made a decision concerning one's religious identity.

2. Method

The second author has interviewed 65 respondents, 30 males (mean age 20.3 year) and 35 females (mean age 19.7 year). The age of both groups varies between 17-25 year. The interview schedule included structured as well as open questions. Compared to mailed questionnaires, the oral interview has several advantages that make it a suitable instrument for research into religiosity. Answers to interview-questions are narratives that make manifest how a respondent apprehends reality. Answers to questions that confront the respondent with the ideas and concepts of the religious tradition, may give insight not only in the degree of his knowledge but also into the way in which he conceives and interprets it.

3. Variables

As said above, this paper will be focused on the subjects' attitude toward traditional religious ideas. Especially four key elements of Islamic faith should

be mentioned here, the traditional description of which may induce a mental conflict with the modern worldview: the belief in angels, the belief in a last judgment, the belief in the hereafter, and the belief in the divine origin of the Qur'an. Although not belonging to the body of religious doctrine, the well-known story of the Miraj (that explains the origin and meaning of the obligation of salat) is also indicative of a dualistic worldview when interpreted as a description of a real journey to Jerusalem and to Heaven. Here, our primary interest is not to know whether these elements of the religious tradition are assented to or rejected, but whether they are conceived as descriptive or as metaphorical language. Further, we want to know whether the way in which respondents conceive religious language, is connected with some background characteristics and with the degree of their religious commitment. For obvious reasons, in typifying the respondent's religious attitude, we have not taken into account whether he or she believes in God and Muhammed, as these beliefs not necessarily implicate a dualistic worldview.

Two methods have been used to measure the attitude toward traditional religious ideas: the LAM-scale and open interview-questions.

The LAM-scale is a method constructed to measure the way in which a subject interprets religious linguistical expressions. The respondent is confronted with a number of expressions, referring to elements of the religious tradition. Each statement is followed by three answer categories from which the respondent has to choose one. In one of these categories, a literal-descriptive interpretation of the creedal statement is formulated. Another one formulates the rejection of the creedal statement with the argument that it sounds primitive and unscientific (anti-literal position). The third answer category affirms the creedal statement, but conceives it metaphorically.

To give an example:

Item 5 *The Qur'an is a sacred book*

a. Agree. Allah has given the Qur'an directly to Muhammed, by the angel Dibril.
b. Agree. Although the Qur'an has not been given to Muhammed by an angel, it is a sacred book because it serves as a guide for life.
c. Disagree. Although the Qur'an has become an important book, it has been written by men.

To probe their attitude toward religious language, the interviewer invited the respondents by open questions to tell their ideas about some key elements of the doctrine that might easily evoke a mental conflict with a modern secular construction of reality, viz. angels, the origin of the Qur'an, the last judgment

and the life hereafter. She also probed the respondents' idea about the story of Muhammed's miraculous nightly journey. While the LAM-scale asks the respondents whether they agree or disagree with pre-formulated attitudes, open questions make manifest their active use of religious concepts.

Results

1. *Attitude toward traditional beliefs implying a dualistic worldview.*

We first have classified the respondents into three groups according to their preferences for the various interpretations of religious statements as presented to them in the LAM-scale. Of course, not all the respondents were consistent in their choice to the same degree. Yet it was possible to classify all on basis of their dominant preference. The majority has a clear preference for a literal interpretation of religious language (N=49 or 75%). Nine respondents (14%) generally rejected the presented belief statements. They represent what Hunt called the anti-literal position. The remaining seven subjects (11%) agree with the belief statements but prefer to understand them as metaphorical expressions.

Next, the answers to the open questions were analyzed and classified into one of four categories. The first category is labelled "naïve acceptance." Here, this label should be taken in a psychological, not in an evaluative sense. It means that the respondent's answer does not give any evidence that he experiences the religious belief as being incompatible with the secular worldview. Some respondents confirmed the orthodox view, but their answer also suggested that they feel embarrassed. Such answers were categorized as "tensed acceptance." An answer that suggests that the respondent doubts the truth of the religious statement, was categorized as "sceptical." Finally, answers in which the respondent considers the orthodox view as nonsense, were classified as "rejection."

After having categorized the respondent's answers separately, we tried to classify the total answer-pattern of the respondent into one of the 4 categories. For 15 respondents this was not possible, as their answers were too heterogeneous: they combined naïve acceptance of some religious statements with scepsis or rejection toward other traditional beliefs. These respondents we typified as "ambivalent."

In the table, the distribution of the 65 respondents into attitude-types on basis of their answers to the open questions is crosstabulated with their distribution over 3 categories of the LAM-scale.

The two methods we have used to examine the attitude of members of the second generation toward traditional religious ideas appear to yield similar results. Nearly all nine respondents, classified as "anti-literal" on basis of their answers to the L.A.M.-scale, in their answers to the open interview-questions showed a rejecting attitude toward traditional religious images. At the other hand, the interviewees who, talking about their beliefs, confirmed the traditional views, generally have preferred the literal alternatives of the LAM-scale.

The number of respondents, who were attracted by the metaphorical interpretations of the LAM-scale, is very small. In the interview, they appeared as sceptical or rejecting with respect to the traditional beliefs.

Further, the table learns that preference for the literal alternatives in the LAM-scale not unmistakeably indicates a nonproblematic acceptance of the traditional religious beliefs. It can go hand in hand in hand with a hesitating or ambivalent attitude. A combination of the results provides a more refined measurement of the diversity of religious attitudes among the second generation.

Figure 1

Figure 1 shows the five types of attitudes we have distinguished:
type A: "naïve acceptance" (N= 37; 56.9%)
type B: "tensed acceptance" (N=5; 7.7%)
type C: "ambivalence" (N=9; 13.8%)
type D: "scepticism toward traditional ideas, and preference for a metaphorical interpretation" (N=6; 9.2%)
type E: 'rejection" (N=8; 12.3%).

Examples

It may be illustrative to quote some respondents here. Respondent 57 is a representative of type B, "tensed acceptance." She is a woman, 22 years old and a university student. About the idea of the Last Judgment, she said: "You do believe in it, but it is sometimes very difficult to form a notion of it.". And about the Miraj-story: "It may be true, I don't know. I have to believe it, but sometimes I wonder whether it has happened in that way. Perhaps some things in the story have been passed to us wrongly."

Respondent 45 is a typical representative of type D. He is a man of 23 years old, also a university-student. About the Miraj-story, he said: "To enter the seven heavens, has to be considered a fiction. It is a kind of spiritual action. Perhaps it has happened in his dream during that night." Neither can he believe the orthodox idea of the origin of the Qur'an: "I don't believe that the Qu'ran has fallen from heaven, as is often suggested. Its divine origin has to be understood more spiritually." Also with respect to angels and the hereafter, he declines the literal interpretation without rejecting the idea as such: "Whether [an angel] is something symbolical or whether they do exist, I don't know." "I doubt the idea of the hereafter. There probably will be something, but whether there is one porch to heaven and one to hell, I doubt."

Respondents, who affirmed as well as rejected traditional viewpoints, were classified as "ambivalent", as we said above. An example of this attitudinal type is respondent 10, a 22 years old man. The Miraj he calls "a ridiculous story." The orthodox idea of the origin of Qur'an however is not problematic at all for him. "The Qur'an has been mailed to us by God," he says.

2. Relation between attitudinal types and background variables

Nearly all respondents reported that their parents consider the Islam as important. To mothers this was attributed even more frequently than to fathers (91% vs 78%). Only the type-E (43%) and some type-C respondents (11%), said that their parents consider religion as unimportant. This regards more their father than their mother. This suggests that the modeling effect of the father is much stronger than of the mother.

Most respondents have a Sunnite background, but an unexpected large number has an Alevi background (20%). Alevi-respondents appear to belong to the types C, D or E. No one of them has the attitude of "naive acceptance" (Type A). Of the type-D respondents, the majority (60%) appears to be Alevi's, while type-A respondents nearly all have a Suni background.

With respect to gender we found attitudinal differences but in an opposite direction as we expected. Tensed acceptance, scepsis and even rejection of the religious tradition is found more among females than among males, while male respondents are over-represented in the category "naive acceptance." There is a strong relation between the Type A-attitude and having visited the mosque school. Nearly all respondents who show a Type A-attitude, have received religious education in the mosque at least during one year, whereas nearly all those who never have followed this religious teaching, have problems with traditional religious beliefs. It is plausible that especially traditional religious families send their children to the mosque school. One may not conclude, however, that religious training at the mosque protects against faith problems, as 25% of the type E-respondents also have visited the mosque school during more than 4 years. Of course, intellectual problems with doctrinal beliefs may result from lack of knowledge, caused by deficient training into the religious tradition. Some questions in the interview gauged the respondent's religious knowledge. How far does he know the six principles of "iman" and the five Pillars or obligations? We counted the number of correct responses of every respondent. Type A-respondents stand out from the rest by an averagely higher religious knowledge. The difference is highly significant.

When we compare the 5 types of attitude with respect to level of education, some things are noticeable. The type A-respondents have the lowest educational level: 75% of them has lower-secondary, lower vocational or only primary school. On the contrary, three of the five respondents with university or higher vocational level show a type D-attitude. This suggests that the more one is trained in rational thinking, the greater the chance that traditional religious ideas are discarded. The relation is not as strong as expected however: 50% of respondents with higher secondary or intermediate vocational education also belong to the type A-category.

The results do not suggest that the prospect of remigration or of settling in The Netherlands is strongly related with type of religious attitude. Among the type A-respondents, those who have decided to remigrate are a little bit

over-represented, while no one of them belongs to the rejecting type. Respondents who intend to settle in The Netherlands, on the contrary are over-represented in type E. A large number of subjects in our sample (18; 28%) has not yet decided whether they will stay or go back.

Finally, how do the various attitudinal types differ from each other with respect to religious commitment? Theoretically, attitude toward the traditional religious worldview and religious commitment are different aspects of religiosity, which are not necessarily correlated.

Figure 2

Figure 2 however shows a strong relation between both variables. As indicator of religious commitment we used information about the respondent's commitment to the Five Pillars. The more one has abandoned the traditional religious ideas, the lower the degree of commitment. That is the general tendency. The pattern of declining commitment appears not to be the same for each of the Five Pillars however. Belief in God stands firm longest, and to a lesser degree also believing in Muhammed. The fracture between belief and disbelief lies between type D at one side and type E at the other side. Yet, as one can see, even some type E-respondents still believe. Rejection of traditional ways of representing religious faith does not always mean a deliberate choice for unbelief.

The practice of daily or weekly prayer is generally low, even for type A-respondents. Observation of Ramadan seems to be a much better indicator of commitment. Here, the pattern suggests that there is a relation between giving up traditional religious beliefs and leaving off fasting. It is the combination of the two that indicates the crossing of a line between a religious and a non-religious life-style. Figure 2 suggests that this line lies between the types C and D. This is in contrast with our expectation. Previously we had presumed that type D-respondents, as they agree with religious statements when interpreted metaphorically, would show a high level of religious practice. However, in this respect they hardly differ from type E-respondents.

Conclusion

As this research project is not yet brought to completion, final conclusions cannot be formulated. Yet, two considerations may be mentioned.

First, undoubtedly religious change is in progress among the second generation Turkish migrants. So far, we notice a striking correspondence with the religious change observable among other religious groups in The Netherlands: the more participation in the secular culture of rationalism and consumerism increases, the more religious belief and practice decreases. A structure of strong social bonds may slow down this process of secularization, as can be observed in the Calvinist churches in The Netherlands, but will not avert it.

Nobody will deny that Islam is a vital resource of the cultural identity of Turkish and Moroccan migrants in our society. Therefore, concern for the quality of religious education of the second generation should be a first requisite for the survival of their cultural identity. It seems necessary to create more provisions for religious instruction of Muslim children, not only in primary schools, as is done already here and there, but also in schools for secondary and vocational education.

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Religious Identity, Integration and Subjective Well-Being among Young Turkish Muslims

M. Rooijackers

Introduction

One of the major tasks young Turkish migrants of the second generation have to face is what Boekestijn (1988) called 'the dilemma between identity maintenance and cultural adaptation'. At home the youngsters are educated according to Turkish-Islamic traditions, outside the home they meet with other norms and values. How do they cope with this dilemma? Because of the intertwinement of religion and culture in Turkey we expect Islam to play an important part with regard to both the socio-cultural integration and the subjective well-being of Turkish Muslims settled abroad. The question that remains is whether religion plays an inhibiting or a stimulating part.

A considerable amount of research has been done concerning the integration of ethnic minorities. Authors frequently presume a negative relationship between religious identity and integration (Gorden 1964; Hastings & Clelland 1982; Risvanoglu-Bilgin, Brouwer & Priester 1986), but few studies have explicitly taken religiosity as the object of research and tested this hypothesis.

Until recently most empirical studies of the relationship between religiosity and well-being have concentrated on Christianity. In general religion appears to relate positively to subjective well-being (Diener 1984). According to Hadaway (1978) it is a consistent finding that religious people tend to be somewhat happier and more satisfied with life than non-religious people. He

found more support for the resource hypothesis, which states that religion contributes to subjective well-being, than for the deprivation interpretation, which states that religion is a compensation for a lack of well-being. However, in contrast to the results among Christian populations Hadaway and Roof (1978) report a negative relationship between the importance of faith and life-satisfaction among Jews. They argue that this is because of the Jewish experience of being a minority group and the close affinity in their heritage between religious commitment and suffering. The nature of the relationship between religiosity and subjective well-being for Muslims, in particular when belonging to a religious minority, has not yet been investigated.

In this paper we will present a description of religious identity, socio-cultural integration and subjective well-being among young Turkish Muslims living in The Netherlands. Furthermore we will study the relationship between religiosity on the one hand and socio-cultural integration and subjective well-being on the other.

Method

Subjects

Preliminary results from a study among second generation Turkish-Islamic migrants will be reported. By second generation we mean: children from first generation migrants who were born in The Netherlands or had migrated to this country for the purpose of family re-unification. The sample consisted of 55 subjects (29 females and 26 males) in the ages of 17 to 26, who were living in two cities in The Netherlands. All subjects had taken part in the Dutch school system for at least five years. With the co-operation of the local authorities and local schools we were able to get a complete list of the names and adresses of all the Turkish youngsters in the above mentioned age group in one city and a partial list in the other. Subjects were taken at random from this list and were approached to participate in this research by mail, telephone and/or by visits to their homes. The response rate was satisfying. In approximately two-thirds of the adresses at which one or more youngster(s) lived who met the criteria for selection, one of them agreed to participate in the research.

The subjects (or their families) came from all over Turkey, with an over-representation of the regions Central-Anatolia and East/South-East Turkey. The average length of the youngsters' stay in The Netherlands was 13 years. Among the subjects there were 12 with an Alevi background and 33 with a Sunni background. About half of the subjects had a low educational level while 15% achieved a high educational level. Half of the youngsters were still engaged in full-time education. Among the others some had a full or

part-time job outside the home, others were unemployed and another group were house-wives.

Materials and procedure

The instrument used was a structured in-depth interview which consisted of open and closed-ended questions combined with a limited number of paper and pen questionnaires. All subjects were interviewed individually. The language used during the interview was Dutch and the interviewer was female.

In this paper we will concentrate on the quantitative results of a number of closed-ended questions and paper and pen questionnaires. In defining religious identity we used a self-report of the subjective importance ascribed to religion. Subjects marked their scores on a continuum from 'religion is very important for me' to 'religion is of no importance to me at all'. We also made limited use of the multi-dimensional model of religion as developed by Glock and Stark (1965). In their view all world religions have five aspects, namely an ideological, intellectual, ritualistic, experiential and consequential aspect. Here we will concentrate on the ritualistic and the consequential aspects. The first dimension 'encompasses the specifically religious practices expected of religious adherents' (p. 20). This aspect was measured by the level of adherence to the rituals of prayer and fasting. The second dimension 'encompasses the secular effects of religious belief, practice, experience and knowledge on the individual'. It includes 'those religious prescriptions which specify what people ought to do and the attitudes they ought to hold as a consequence of their religion' (p. 21). In order to measure this dimension we developed an 'Islamic cultural tradition scale'. This is a five point Likert scale measuring the level of agreement with 11 statements concerning Turkish-Islamic norms and values. The scale taps the subjects' attitude to such things as male-female relationships, parent-child relationships, rules of dress and virginity.

In research on the topic of socio-cultural integration Gordon's assimilation model (1964) is frequently applied. Gordon distinguishes between various types of assimilation. Three major types are structural assimilation, cultural or behavioral assimilation and identificational assimilation. With respect to these sub-processes Gordon speaks of assimilation when the members of the minority-group have entered fully into the societal network of groups and institutions of the majority-group, changed their cultural patterns to those of the majority group and have developed an ethnic identification similar to the ethnic identity of the majority group. One of the major shortcomings of Gordon's theory is the implicit starting-point that the objective of all migrants

is assimilation (Hasting, Clelland & Danielson 1982). In our view migrants will try to orientate themselves to the surrounding society, but this does not imply that they have to adopt the norms and values of the dominant group. For this reason we replaced the cultural aspect by an orientation dimension. Based on De Jong en Van Batenburg's (1985) definition of subjective integration, the concept of orientation was defined as the degree to which the minority group members experience themselves as full members of the surrounding society.

We operationalised socio-cultural integration partly according to Gordon's original assumptions and subdivided the concept into participation in Dutch society, orientation to the surrounding society and ethnic identification. The first dimension was measured by a checklist on voluntary participation in Dutch society, concerning intra- and inter-ethnic interaction, membership of Dutch clubs or organizations, use of the Dutch media and interest in participating in Dutch political elections. With respect to the second dimension, the orientation to Dutch society, we made use of De Jong en Van Batenburg's 'subjective integration-scale' (1985). The scale is a five point Likert scale and measures the degree to which the subject has a positive orientation towards the surrounding society. For instance, the subject is asked whether or not he intends to settle down permanently in the migration-society, whether he considers himself accustomed to the culture of the new society, experiences a bond with this society and feels accepted by Dutch people. The last dimension was assessed by a self-rating for ethnic identity. All subjects expressed in percentages of 100% to what extent they identified themselves as Turkish and to what extent as Dutch.

Subjective well-being was registered by two instruments frequently used in research on this topic. The first is the Bradburn Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn 1969). It taps whether positive or negative affect dominates the lives of the subjects. The second instrument used is the Self-Anchoring Striving Scale developed by Cantril (1965). This instrument provides qualitative and quantitative information concerning satisfaction with life. Here we will concentrate on the quantitative data which consists of scores ranging from one to ten, which are awarded by the subjects to their past, present and future lives.

Results

Religious identity

More than three out of four subjects could be characterized as having an Islamic identity. According to their own reports religion plays an important or very important role in the lives of about 60% of the subjects while another

18% have an ambiguous attitude towards it. For the latter group Islam is not of any real importance in their present life, but it is not unimportant either. The rest of the subjects (22%) is of the opinion that Islam is of no importance in their personal lives.

Although many of the subjects with an Islamic self-concept have no profound knowledge of Islam, their religious belief is firm. They have difficulty in motivating why religion is important. For them it is self-evident: their parents are Muslim, they are raised within Muslim traditions and they are proud of being Muslim. A noticeable phenomenon is that the switch to non-religiosity is made more easily by Muslims with an Alevi background than those who are Sunni Muslims. The emphasis on religion seems to be less present in Alevi families than it is in Sunni families.

The majority of the religious subjects place a strong emphasis on the ritual and ethical dimension of Islam. When they think of Islam they mainly think of obligations concerning religious practices and of cultural-religious norms and values which believers have to adhere to. Although the majority of the religious subjects are of the opinion that religious obligations must be strictly practiced, most of them admit that they aren't able to live up to them in their entirety. Of the total sample, 55% of the subjects claim to fast during the whole of the fasting-period. With respect to praying practices no more than 4% say to pray five times a day.

The second aspect mentioned above is the ethical aspect. We classified the subjects into three types on the basis of their score on the Islamic cultural tradition-scale. More than half of the subjects (60%) cling to the Islamic norms and values mentioned in the items, 13% is opposed to them and the rest (27%) has an intermediate point of view. While the attitude towards religion is the same for both sexes, there is a relationship between gender and attitude towards Islamic cultural traditions. Females tend to oppose the traditional norms and values more than men. The explanation for this seems obvious: the subjects whose freedom of movement is most limited by the traditions are the ones most opposed to them.

Socio-cultural integration

We will now discuss the topic of socio-cultural integration. How do the youngsters deal with the dilemma between identity maintenance and cultural adaptation? First we will look at the level of voluntary participation in Dutch society. The subjects were classified in three groups according to their score on the checklist for voluntary participation. The subjects were equally divided over the three categories, low, intermediate and high participation. There is a

significant relationship between gender and level of participation: the female subjects have a substantially lower degree of participation than do the male subjects. This result has occurred in many studies (Brassé, Pels & Pen 1986; Risvanoglu-Bilgin et al. 1985). Females have a lower level of participation in the surrounding society, not simply because they do not want to participate, but because others do not approve of their participation. For this reason participation is a somewhat disputable indicator for the individual level of socio-cultural integration.

As to the level of orientation to Dutch society, men and women do not differ significantly. The results on the subjective integration scale are as follows: 87% have a high or intermediate level of orientation to Dutch society, whereas 13% have a low one. The majority of the subjects feel themselves to be full members of Dutch society: they like living in The Netherlands, are accustomed to Dutch society, have no objection to associating with Dutch people and feel accepted by them. At the same time, however, the feeling of belonging to the Turkish people is very much in evidence.

The results on orientation are underlined by the data on ethnic identity. Three-quarters of all subjects experience a multi-ethnic identity, while a quarter experience an exclusively Turkish identity. Although the majority have a multi-ethnic identity, the Turkish identity dominates the Dutch in more than 70% of the cases. No relationship was found between gender and ethnic identity. Also no relationship was found between participation on the one hand and orientation and ethnic identity on the other.

These results make clear that the majority of the subjects deal at the psychological level with the dilemma between identity maintenance and cultural adaptation by taking a "bi-cultural" stand (Wong-Rieger & Quintana 1987). They distinguish bi-cultural integration as a fourth mode of acculturation, alongside assimilation, ethnic separation and marginality. Bi-culturalism is defined as 'identification with both old and new cultures. It may be achieved by synthesizing the two cultures or by maintaining separate spheres of interaction' (p. 346). On the basis of our results we suggest that bi-culturalism can be more accurately defined as the development of a positive orientation towards the migration-society, in the sense that one feels at home and has the experience of being a full member of the surrounding society, while at the same time preserving one's original ethnic identity.

Subjective well-being

In spite of the extra pressure the migrants are under, the majority of the subjects succeed in establishing a sense of positive subjective well-being. For

three-quarters of the subjects either positive affect in life predominates over negative affect or both are in balance. For one quarter of the subjects the reverse is true. The number of subjects that have experienced problems with the fact of 'living between two cultures' is substantial. That this does not mean that they are negatively marked for life by this experience can be concluded from the scores on life-satisfaction. The average scores given for the three time periods past, present and future, show a rising line. On the whole, as few as two subjects think their future life will be worse than their present life, while the rest of the subjects have an optimistic attitude towards their future. The 'culture-shock hypothesis', which states that migration will be followed by a culture-shock which will in turn produce stress, does not seem to hold true for the majority of our subjects. When asked if they had ever experienced a major life-change, only six youngsters referred to their migration. These results are in line with the criticism directed against current theories of culture conflict among migrants (Soest and Verdonk 1988). One major objection raised against these theories is that they disregard the possibility of a flexible adaptation of the migrant to new cultural circumstances.

Correspondence analysis

For showing the relations between the variables mentioned above we make use of a statistical technique called 'correspondence analysis' (Lammers & Pelzer 1988), which produces a plot in which these relations are visualised. Correspondence analysis is a distance model which implies that variables which are positively related are plotted close to each other at the same side of the origin, while variables which are negatively related are plotted far from each other at opposite sides of the origin. If there is no relationship between two variables, their vectors, as seen from the origin, form an angle of 90 degrees. Because there was no significant relation between religious identity on one side and voluntary participation (as an indicator of one aspect of socio-cultural integration) and the Cantril-scores (as an indicator of one aspect of subjective well-being) on the other side, the last two variables have been left out of the analysis.

Figure 1 (see p. 74) shows that religious identity and non-religious identity are plotted at a clear distance from each other and at opposite sides of the origin. Out of the fact that a strong religious identity is plotted closer to the origin than an ambiguous religious identity or a weak or non-religious identity, it can be concluded that the profile of the youngsters with a strong religious identity is more consistent with the profile of the total sample than is the profile of the subjects with an ambiguous, weak or non-religious identity. As

before it can be stated that the profile of subjects with a predominantly Turkish identity resembles the total sample more than does the profile of the subjects with a mixed or predominant Dutch identity. Furthermore the figure shows that subjects with a strong religious self-concept can be characterized by holding to Islamic cultural traditions, an exclusive or predominant Turkish identity and an intermediate or low level of orientation to Dutch society. A non-religious attitude is, however, linked with general disagreement with respect to the traditions, a more multi-ethnic identity and a positive orientation to Dutch society. Finally the figure shows that the relationship between self-defined religiosity and subjective well-being is somewhat blurred. Although it seems that religious subjects can be characterized by positive well-being as measured by Bradburn's scale, the reverse does not hold for non-religious subjects. As a matter of fact there is some indication that an ambiguous attitude towards religion is related to a negative level of well-being.

Conclusion

The prevailing image of the second generation as a 'generation lost between two cultures' should be adjusted, at least for youngsters who have been at school in The Netherlands for several years. The majority of them are able to deal with the integration dilemma at the psychological level by taking a bi-cultural stand. They generally feel at home in the new society while at the same time preserving their original identity and traditional norms and values. Furthermore three out of every four subjects succeeded in establishing a positive subjective well-being. The majority of the subjects have an optimistic attitude towards their personal future.

The statement that a religious identity hampers integration is not entirely true. It is necessary to separate integration into the various aspects mentioned above. While a religious self-concept is linked with a strong Turkish identity and agreement with Islamic cultural traditions, it does not necessarily interfere with a positive orientation towards the surrounding society.

With regard to the relation between religion and subjective well-being no clear support was found for either the resource or the deprivation interpretation. Further research is needed to test the hypothesis that religious identity and non-religious identity are both positively related to subjective well-being, while an ambiguous attitude towards religion relates negatively to well-being.

6

Binding Religion
Moroccan and Turkish Runaway Girls

L. Brouwer

Every year about 25,000 Dutch adolescents run away from home in Holland. Most of them return home shortly afterwards, and the others seek the help of social workers. Dutch adolescents are not the only ones who run away. In the last five or ten years, quite a few Muslim girls have done the same, but with totally different consequences. By leaving home, they run the risk of cutting themselves off from their family and community, and without any certainty of being accepted by Dutch society. Since Dutch social workers and centres were not adequately equipped to help Muslim runaway girls, special hostels were set up for them. The numbers of Muslim girls who run away from home are expected to rise. This led the Dutch Ministry of Social Welfare to conduct a research project on Muslim girls and the causes and consequences of their running away from home.[1] In this article, I want to discuss the conflicts Muslim girls have with their parents that lead to their running away from home and the role Islam plays here. Before I examine this in greater detail, I will briefly describe the research method, the research population and the general situation of Moroccan and Turkish families in The Netherlands.

From 1987 to 1989, I conducted an explorative study among 45 Muslim girls, 28 of Moroccan and 17 of Turkish descent. In order to establish contact with Muslim runaways, for more than half a year I spent quite a bit of time at two hostels for Muslim women and girls. I regularly met with them, drank tea or ate with them, helped them with their homework or went shopping with them. Some of the girls were quick to return home or went to other crisis centres. I managed to build up a confidential relationship with some of the others and kept in contact with them when they moved to other settings or hostels. I also interviewed quite a few girls who had not stayed in Muslim hostels at all or had run away from home some years ago. In addition, I spoke to twenty Dutch, Moroccan and Turkish social workers and one Moroccan and

one Turkish mother. The social help available to runaway girls will be dealt with in a later section. Given the research method, this study can provide greater insight into internal family problems that often remain concealed from view. These findings are however not easy to generalize.

Most of the runaway girls I interviewed had been between the ages of 15 and 17 when they left home, though the youngest had been 13 and the oldest 23. Almost a third of the Moroccan and Turkish girls ran away from home more than once. Two thirds of the Turkish girls and half the Moroccan ones were born in Holland or had arrived by the age of six. The Turkish girls had lived in The Netherlands longer than the Moroccan ones. A small number of Moroccan girls had come after the age of 13 and spent about two years with their family before they left home (Brouwer, Lalmahomed and Josias 1991).

The small number of Moroccan and Turkish girls who were interviewed made me cautious about drawing conclusions on the differences between the two ethnic groups. One interesting comment can however be made. Although in absolute numbers, there are more Turkish than Moroccan adolescent girls in The Netherlands, more Moroccan girls run away from home (Brouwer c.s. 1991).[2] There was also a difference in literacy and knowledge of Dutch between the Moroccan and the Turkish parents. Most of the Moroccan mothers (especially the 11 of Berber descent) and about half the Turkish mothers were illiterate and could barely express themselves in Dutch. The majority of the Turkish fathers were literate and spoke Dutch rather well, certainly in comparison with the Moroccan fathers.

Moroccan and Turkish families

I would now like to give a short overview of the general situation of Turkish and Moroccan migrants in The Netherlands and show how it influenced their ethnic identity. Turkish and Moroccan men arrived in The Netherlands in the sixties in the hope of quickly earning some money and investing it back home. Instead of their returning home, their wives and children joined them here in the seventies. Nowadays approximately 140,000 Moroccan and 178,000 Turkish migrants live in The Netherlands, mainly in the large cities, and constitute about 2 percent of the total population (WRR 1989:66-67).

The social economic position of Turkish and Moroccan migrants is poor, their labour position is characterized by high rates of unemployment and disability. On the labour market and in daily life, they meet with various kinds of prejudice and discrimination. The younger generations are not likely to have the opportunities their parents wanted for them. In short, most of the first generation Turkish and Moroccan migrants are disappointed. Life in Holland

did not work out for most of them, and they never gave up the idea of returning home someday (Penninx 1989:185).

These migrants constitute an ethnic group, they regard themselves as different from the Dutch, and the Dutch see them as different. A central point in this ethnic identity is their Islamic religion amidst a Christian society. Though Dutch society is called 'multi-cultural', there is not a great deal of tolerance toward Islam, and negative stereotypes are widespread (Haleber 1989). Islam is associated with the oppression of women (Lutz 1990:16). A Moroccan girl I spoke to, who has a modern outlook and speaks fluent Dutch, told me: 'Sometimes Dutch people cannot believe I am Moroccan. As long as a woman is veiled, it fits the stereotype they have. But when they talk to me, they consider me an exception, so they don't have to change their prejudices.' This perceived anti-Islam attitude is not specific to the situation in Holland, it has also been observed in other Western countries with Muslim migrants. Wilpert (1988:98) referred to the Germans' feelings of superiority to Turkish migrants. Joly (1988:40) noted in her study of Muslim families in Birmingham that they were 'subject to an alien environment.'

How did the first generation of migrants in Holland react to their poor economic situation in an anti-Islam society? From such a subordinate position, we cannot expect an open mind to Western values. Their feelings of disappointment were evident from their tendency to withdraw into their own communities and stress their traditional values. Islam became a central part of their ethnic identity, marking the boundaries between Muslims and Christians. In this perspective, Islam is mainly a moral system guiding people in their social existence and serving as a source of emotional support. Religious meanings and symbols are used in daily life and are reproduced in acts (Tennekes 1990:52) and thus cannot be isolated from the social context. For a great deal of the first generation migrants, Islam became a binding factor with their background and community in Holland, and a symbol of their ethnic identity.

This same reaction has also been noted by Leveau (1989:120) in France, where the first generation of immigrants used Islam as a way to express their identity. Leveau (1989:120) remarked that as a reaction, the second generation found other ways of affirming their identity. This has also been confirmed by other studies on youngsters in Turkey or on Turkish parents in The Netherlands, who think the younger generation is no longer very religious (Risvanoglu-Bilgin, Brouwer and Priester 1986:124). Turkish young women living in Holland said in another study (De Vries 1987:67) that they will practice religion 'later,' when they are 'older.' In fact we find here the basis for the different aspirations and expectations of the first and second generations.

When analysing generation conflicts among Turks and Moroccans in The Netherlands, it should be noted that they are a general rather than a unique phenomenon. The resemblance of Moroccan or Turkish adolescents to those in the home countries and to Western youngsters is quite clear. Problems of Moroccan and Turkish girls in The Netherlands are however often viewed from the perspective of culture, and they are said to live between two cultures. The concept of culture is perceived as a system that is not supposed to change, and in this context it can even be used as a legitimation of the subordinate position of Muslim girls (Lutz 1991:49). This special view of cultural conflict presupposes a strict relation with their being Moroccan and Turkish.

This opinion contradicts the definition adhered to by most anthropologists, who view culture as pertaining to behaviour as well (Tennekes 1990:101). No link is drawn with the broader social context, and it ignores the external influences on Moroccan and Turkish families that I outlined above. Culture is however reproduced daily, so that it is almost automatically transformed. Turkish and Moroccan adolescent girls participate in two different cultures (Tennekes 1990:158). They are socialised at home with Moroccan or Turkish values, but are influenced by what they learn at school and by way of contact with their peer groups.

Family Structure

Although multifarious interpretations are feasible, I shall focus here on the main family structure features based on Islam. The family is the basic social institution in most Muslim countries, whereas in Western Europe it is the individual (Davis and Davis 1989:65). The hierarchical relationships in the family dictate respect for one's elders, especially males. A girl does not have much of a say in the family, her father is the authority and he knows what is best for her. Obedience and respect for one's parents are continuously emphasized in Islamic socialization (Joly 1989:46). A younger person cannot disobey his or her father in public, and in general, people have to yield to anyone who is older (Engelbrekston 1982:162). The issues of honour and shame are crucial for the family as well as the individual, since both can be dishonoured by a shameful act (Shadid and Van Koningsveld: 1990:93). Men are responsible for the honour of the family and the behaviour of girls and women has an effect on the whole family and can bring on shame. Girls have to behave properly, but here there are differences related to the descent or educational level of Moroccan and Turkish groups.

For an adequate understanding of the conflicts between parents and daughters, it could be worthwhile to compare the Muslim conception of adolescence with the Western one. In fact the whole view on adolescence is

primarily a result of changes in industrial and urbanizing societies, changes that have only recently become widespread in Morocco (Davis and Davis 1989:52) and in Turkey (Kandiyoti 1980:5). Davis and Davis (1989:42) noted that there is no Moroccan life stage corresponding to our Western concept of adolescence. Moroccan adults perceive the physical changes of puberty, but do not see it as a separate period distinct from childhood and adulthood (Davis and Davis 1989:52). Increased participation of girls in formal education has affected every aspect of adolescence, which had not been true for their parents.

The rapid increase in educational facilities has created important differences between the experiences of adolescents and those of their parents. The role of education in delaying the age of marriage until long after physical maturity is reached in puberty is a central point (Davis and Davis: 1989:59-60). Extended education and delayed marriage can cause problems. A context is thus provided in which the sexes can mix, and it is precisely this mixing that challenges the Moroccan norms of propriety. Poorly educated adults are raising today's literate generation. This can lead to frequent discrepancies between adult expectations and adult behaviour, but in fact it does not. Davis and Davis (1989:72) explained this striking feature on the grounds of the great respect parents display for education.

In Western societies, adolescence as a distinct developmental stage in the life cycle can be divided into three global phases: pre-, mid-, and late adolescence, which is a lengthy period (Levinson 1989:29). Sexual maturity is quickly reached, but to achieve a good social position a relatively lengthy education is needed. During the pre-adolescence or puberty (between the ages of 12 and 15) the individual detachment from the family begins. The mid-adolescence (between the ages of 16 and 18) there is time for experimentation. The school is pre-eminently the place where adolescents meet and have their own subculture with respect to clothing, music, friendships and dating. During the late-adolescence (between the ages of 18 and 20) they start to get more responsability for their acting (Brouwer c.s. 1991:24-25).

The Moroccan and Turkish parents of the runaway girls I interviewed had a conception of adolescence, however, that was very far from the Western one and was much more restricted. In their view, there is just one stage. As soon as a Muslim girl is sexually mature, she is strictly speaking ready for marriage. Her virginity is a prerequisite for a good marriage.

For Dutch girls, adolescence means greater freedom of movement to meet peer friends, whereas for Moroccan and Turkish girls it implies more protection. Contact between men and women is confined to marriage and motherhood. Girls are not allowed to meet and talk to boys in public, otherwise they get a bad reputation and the family loses face. This means, in practice, strict supervision of their sexuality by their fathers and the communi-

ty (Kandiyoti 1987). The movements of Muslim girls are very restricted. Some of the girls I interviewed are not allowed to attend school or have to stop at the age of 16. Others have to come home immediately after school, and friendships with Dutch girls are often forbidden. Needless to say, this Muslim conception of adolescence does not include an experimental stage for girls. Respect and obedience to the parents is stimulated, rather than independence or self-reliance. The same holds true for communal values of mutual support rather than individualistic achievement (Kagitcibasi 1989). These Muslim values clash with the dominant Dutch ones.

Reasons for Running Away

I will now present the main reasons the Moroccan and Turkish girls I interviewed gave for running away from home. They mentioned a wide range of subjects that had led to conflicts, especially with their fathers. There was not one single reason for running away from home, it was the result of numerous quarrels that escalated in the course of the years.

Table 1: Reasons for running away

Reasons	*Moroccan*	*Turkish girls*	*Total*	
Beating	18	11		29
Maltreatment	4	3	7	
School	13	11	24	
Boys	12	9	21	
Marriage	13	7	20	
Religion	5	8	13	

Two thirds of all the conflicts involved punishment and some of the girls referred to maltreatment. A third of the girls said they were not beaten but intimidated or humiliated. One girl said, 'my father made me mad by calling me names.'

School

More than half the runaways told me they had problems about school. In families where girls' education was not considered important, school-age girls were kept at home or were not allowed to attend school after the age of 16. A 15-year-old Moroccan girl said: 'A girl has to stay home, not go to school, get

married and have children.' A 15-year-old Turkish girl told me how her very religious father felt: 'Girls are not important, education is not necessary. At school I can meet boys and that is forbidden.' In the few families where girls' education was considered more significant, girls often had very little say about their curriculum or choice of school. Many fathers made these decisions and the daughters were expected to obey.

Recognition of the importance of education for girls often correlated with the parents' high educational level. The negative attitude to girls' education on the part of most of the Moroccan and Turkish parents was to some extent related to their rural background and low education level, especially of the mothers. But this is only part of the explanation. Parents were also worried about the vulnerable position of girls in a non-Islamic country. Concern about the virginity of their daughters was in a sense influenced by their Islamic religion, but it cannot legitimize taking girls out of school. Although there is always some margin in the interpretation of the Koran, the education of boys and girls is stressed (Joly 1989:47).

In her study on Muslims in Britain, Joly (1989:46) referred to the same kind of difficulties. She distinguished 'two main areas where a clash of aspirations between parents and daughters is likely to be sharpest: marriage and education.' The main reason for not sending their daughters to school is the co-educational system. Muslim leaders describe girls as 'the mothers of tomorrow' who should transmit a 'proper Muslim way of life' to the future generation. Muslim girls in Britain who Joly studied (1989:46-7) were apt to run away from home for the same reasons as those in Holland.

Boys and marriage

The other problems, e.g. forbidden contacts with boys or arranged marriages, arise from the same set of views on bringing up girls. About half the Muslim runaways said they had quarrels about contact or supposed contact with boys. In the perspective of Muslim parents, contact between boys and girls is confined to marriage. For girls, virginity is a prerequisite for a good marriage. Girls generally agree with this conception, but not with its consequences. The movements of girls are restricted, but in spite of this control, Moroccan and Turkish girls do meet boys and a third of them secretly had a boyfriend.

Almost half the interviewed Moroccan and Turkish girls ran away from home because of the threat of an arranged marriage without their consent. According to the traditional opinion, no longer adhered to by the Muslims at large, Muslim marriages are considered a responsibility of the family, not of the individuals involved (Kandiyoti, 1987). Officially, girls should be consulted as to the choice of the marriage partner and their consent is required

(Van den Berg, 1986). But in the case of the runaways, the father-daughter relations were too disturbed to provide a solid basis for communication and confidence. The parents tried to force their daughters into marriage if they were afraid of losing control over them. The girls didn't want to get married because, for example, they wanted to finish school or to postpone the wedding for some time. In some cases they didn't agree with the particular person or had another boyfriend. Sometimes they were afraid of being sent back to Turkey or Morocco.

In connection with arranged marriages, it is useful to consult other studies on Muslims in Western Europe. The findings of Krieger-Krynichi (1989:125) about protests on the part of young Algerian girls against forced marriages in France led to the same conclusion. The same conflicts made some of these girls run away from home or even commit suicide. The researcher remarked that further education is for girls 'who have nothing but this pursuit, a loophole' (Krieger-Krynichi (1989:125). Some of the girls I spoke to made comments in the same vein: 'I know that getting my diploma was the only way to get out of this situation and be free of the influence of my family.'

Religion

In the above section, I explained Islam as part of the parents' ethnic identity and as a source of inspiration in Western society. I did not find any evidence of this religious meaning in my interviews with the girls, who tended to refer to Islam in terms of prohibitions or imposed restrictions. They had no doubts as to their identity as Muslims, but their interpretation was totally different from that of their parents. A third of the girls cited religion as a specific reason to run away, and in fact it played a background role in most of the problems. Prohibitions pertaining to going to school or meeting boys or restrictions of movement were explained by referring to Islam. Religion and cultural traditions were sometimes difficult to separate.

Some of the girls I interviewed had a very religious father or noted a sudden change in his behaviour. The social situation sometimes made their parents stress their Islamic values even more. One Moroccan girl told me: 'My father always drank alcohol. One day at the market, he met a man dressed in white clothes who wanted to make everybody Muslim. He told my father to throw away his beer and take a shower. After this meeting, I suddenly had to wear a scarf and he became stricter. He supervised me more than ever.'

Another 15-year-old Moroccan girl said: 'My father used to be modern, my sisters and I were allowed to do everything we wanted, like swimming, going out, we did not wear a veil and neither did my mother. He went to Mecca and when he returned he became stricter. We had to learn Arabic writing and read

the Koran. I had to recite from the Koran and if I made a mistake I got beaten on my arm or on my back. When my mother came to help me, she was beaten too.'

I talked to her mother and she confirmed her daughter's story: 'I have no problems with my husband, he loves his children, but he wants them to obey him. I am also scared of my husband, I have to obey him too.'

Other girls told me how their fathers were influenced by the new Muslim leader of the mosque in their provincial town. One Turkish school-age girl was not allowed to go to school and had to attend Koran lessons. These fathers often started to go to mosques, where they met other like-minded people. They stressed their Muslim values more than ever before, which had severe consequences for the socialization of their daughters. In the name of Islam, they wanted to protect their daughters from the Dutch dominant ideology, which clashed with their values.

Wilpert (1988:100) noted the same tendency in her study. Turkish parents want to protect their children from the dangers of German moral values. In Britain, Islam also functions as an ideological movement, and Muslim parents are concerned about their children being lost to Islam (Joly 1988:44). It is argued 'that a good Muslim education can prevent evils such as drug addiction, gambling and drinking, which afflict the young people of this society' (Joly 1988:40).

In the case of The Netherlands, Moroccan and Turkish parents are particularly critical of Dutch male-female relations. All the Islamic values pertaining to sexuality and honour, virginity, marriage, respect and obedience are violated by the dominant Dutch ideology. In order to preserve their Muslim values in a Dutch context, a high level of social control in the Turkish and Moroccan communities in Holland is needed, especially with respect to the conduct of girls. The important point is that, according to the girls, their fathers legitimate the restrictions by referring to Islam.

How can we summarize the meaning of Islam for runaway girls? For their parents, religion implies a binding factor with their community and a source of inspiration. For the girls I interviewed, feelings about religion are characterized by ambiguity. First and foremost, they feel a bond to their ethnic or cultural roots. Apart from their Moroccan or Turkish descent, they all have their identity as Muslims. In addition, they have close ties with their relatives and most of them feel loyal to them. 'Although my father beats me,' a Moroccan girl said, 'he is still my father.' At the same time, Islam can mean 'a binding religion' in the strict sense of the word. Some of the girls associate Islam with the restrictions to their freedom of movement. Although the effect of their Muslim upbringing is significant, they also go to school and have peer groups that confront them with different views.

Different options

How do girls cope with these conflicting demands? They try to deal as best they can with the strict control of their fathers and the community. They have various options: they can try to talk and negotiate with their parents, try to gain support from others or choose the strategy of secret behaviour. Given the existing power relations in families where girls do not have much of a say, most of them don't even try to openly discuss their wishes. They would not dare, some of them told me. Or they said: 'My father still won't listen to me, he will not change.' There are some subjects a girl can discuss, but others are out of question. For example, the school-age girls who were kept at home said: 'I did not accept it, I wanted to go to school.' Some of them succeeded. Girls had the Dutch Compulsory Education Law on their side and their parents were violating it. Matters become more difficult after they passed the compulsory school age. One Moroccan girl told me: 'I don't talk about marriage and things like that with my parents.'

Some of the girls did attempt to speak to their mothers about certain wishes, since mothers could be an important intermediary between a father and a daughter. But the success of this strategy depended on the subject and on the girl's relation with her mother. One subject that was of course impossible to discuss was meeting boys. A girl could never get permission to see her boyfriend, although one Moroccan girl told me her mother allowed her to meet her fiancé. The reason, however, was that the mother hoped her daughter would come to like her fiancé more.

In Morocco or Turkey, girls have more opportunities to ask other relatives to intervene in difficult situations. A Turkish girl told me about an incident in Turkey, when her aunt helped her out while her mother was beating her. The girls who had other relatives in Holland stated, however, that they didn't even want to ask for help, because they didn't expect to get it. One Moroccan girl said: 'If I tell them my father beats me, they will beat me more.' The father of a 17-year-old Turkish schoolgirl was criticized by his friends for sending his daughters to school and not having them wear a veil. The girls often described an even stricter attitude and more control from their relatives and community than at home. The problem was often that the girls' wishes were interpreted as Dutch, even though in the home countries the same requests were considered modern (Davis and Davis 1989; Kandiyoti 1980).

For these reasons, most of the girls opted for a strategy of secret behaviour. In order to get more freedom of movement, they led a double life and tried to

do what they wanted in secret. They changed their school schedules and told their parents school was over at five instead of three o'clock. Or they wore a scarf when they left home and took it off on the corner. School was an important place to meet peers, and as long as no one found out, this was no problem. But it was in fact a very risky strategy, since social control in the community was extremely strict. It fed the suspicion of fathers who did not trust their daughters and thus became even stricter.

Run away or sent away

Girls got in trouble if their parents found out about their secret behaviour. Most conflicts of this kind ended in heated quarrels with their parents, who often beat the girls. In the end, some girls ran away after these quarrels, scared of further beating. This was particularly true of girls who had never thought of running away, they would not have dared. But the crisis made them decide to do it.

Quite a different story was told by some girls who said they were sent away by their mother or stepmother after a quarrel. It is important to note that some of the girls came from unstable families, e.g. their parents were divorced and they lived with their stepmothers. Morocco has one of the highest rates of divorce in the world (Mernissi 1978:318). Some of the girls had been brought to Holland at the age of 12 to help their stepmother with her children, whom the girls in question didn't necessarily like very much.

The major difference between the girls who ran away and those who were sent away is that the latter did not have good relations with their family and often felt unwanted. One girl said: 'My stepmother is glad I left home.' Most of the girls who had never thought of running away before had a good relationship with their mother, but not with their father.

How did the other girls run away? They prepared their 'escape,' sometimes with the help of others. They had different wishes than their parents as regards education and marriage. The traditional power relations in their families were changing, the children spoke better Dutch than the parents. They knew more than their parents about how to act adequately in Dutch society. Many of the girls had to translate for their mothers or fathers in their contact with official institutions. One Moroccan girl explained: 'I have to organize everything. I have to help my father with all the arrangements with the bureaucracy and I have to accompany my mother when she goes to the doctor. I speak to the teachers of my younger brothers and sisters. But when it comes to my own life, I have nothing to say. They decide what school I have to go to, they arrange my marriage, I could not accept it anymore.'

Besides, they had a cousin or they knew a girl from school who had run away from home. Some ten girls had contact through their school with social workers they spoke to about their problems, without their informing the girls' parents. The girls knew their parents would disapprove of their talking about internal family matters. They told me that according to their parents, 'Dutch social workers try to encourage Moroccan or Turkish children to run away from home.' By discussing their problems, they somehow changed. As one Moroccan girl told me, 'After those talks I began to speak up for myself. Before then I used to keep quiet about everything.' Girls began to ask for information about facilities for runaway youngsters, and the first preparations were made to leave home. Needless to say, almost a third of the girls who had run away once before knew the way to the social service institutions.

Hostels for Muslim women and girls

After leaving home, a third of the Moroccan and Turkish girls sought informal help, for example from an aunt or cousin (3), or from Moroccan, Turkish or Dutch friends or neighbours. Two thirds of the girls went to their school for help or to the police or the social workers they had contacted before. A majority of the girls were well informed about crisis centres for runaway youngsters. They had heard about them from other girls or had got the information at school or from social workers. Very few of them knew about a special hostel for Muslim girls. Social workers informed girls of the existence of these hostels.

The general youth crisis centres were increasingly confronted with Muslim youngsters, but the Western methods did not meet the needs of Muslim girls. Their home situations had been regulated by strict rules, and the freedom at the centres presented too much of a contrast. One 16-year-old Moroccan girl described the following incident at such a centre: 'The next evening I went with some other girls to a club, and this was something my parents had always forbidden.' For a Muslim girl, the consequences of this kind of behaviour can be serious, it can impede her return to her family and her chances of finding a suitable marriage partner. It is sometimes difficult for an adolescent girl to accept it, but in the long run she will need her family.

The specific situation of Muslim girls was the reason why special hostels were set up which respect Muslim traditions and thus keep it feasible for them to return to their families. In practice, this means that at these hostels, contact with boys is forbidden and girls are not allowed to go out at night. Moroccan, Turkish and Dutch social workers are employed at these hostels. Joly (1988:47) noted that in Great Britain, a mosque had founded a women's hostel to ensure runaway women and girls a good Muslim environment. In Holland,

however, mosque leaders are against special hostels for Muslim women and girls. The hostels were a Dutch initiative.

Generally, Moroccan and Turkish girls stay at a runaway hostel for Muslim girls for some time. Only seven of the girls I interviewed had not done so. Most of the girls had a positive attitude to the hostel, they hoped to feel more comfortable there and to find people who would understand them. However, the girls who wanted more autonomy were ambivalent. One Moroccan girl explained: 'I wanted to go to a Dutch hostel because I did not want to stay with other Muslim people just like at home. But a social worker, who knew how important my family was for me, told me a hostel for Muslim girls would make it easier to keep in contact with my parents.'

The hostels for Muslim girls offer safe surroundings where they can calm down. At the beginning, they are scared their father or other relatives will search for them, which is why a hostel with a secret address is needed. Parents have to be informed as soon as possible that their daughter is safe and sound. Otherwise they might be worried that something terrible has happened. For example, if the elopement of a daughter becomes public, they are dishonoured and lose face in the community. It means a father failed in the upbringing of his daughter. According to the girls, there is also a religious factor. One 18-year-old Turkish schoolgirl said: 'My mother was always against more education. I am sure she will now say to my father, I told you so, you should have kept her home. My mother is a sort of prophet, she knows what will happen in the future. My father often said if one of his daughters ran away, he would kill her. My father is a very religious person.'

Several of the Moroccan and Turkish girls I interviewed were also afraid of black magic, as they called it. They knew their parents would go to certain people who knew about black magic and ask for help in finding their daughter. This help often meant using a photograph or a lock of the girl's hair. Their anxiety kept the girls from sleeping well and gave them nightmares. In this situation, they said they were very grateful for the understanding of social workers from their own ethnic group. Girls who wanted to marry a man of their own choice without their parents' permission were also afraid of the cursing power of their parents blessed by Allah. This was also discussed by Mernissi, who described the belief that girls who were cursed by their parents would fail at everything they tried to do and their marriage would end in divorce. While awaiting eternal burning in hell, life on earth would be terrible (Mernissi 1985:94).

Parents are apt to be enraged when they are told their daughter's address is to be kept secret from them. They want her to return home immediately. If she refuses to do so, it feeds their prejudice about Dutch social workers encouraging girls to run away from home. Moroccan or Turkish social workers try to

contact the girls' parents, who put enormous pressure on them to take their side. One Moroccan social worker told me she was telephoned daily by the parents of a girl who refused to see them. In a hostel for Muslim girls, girls have to talk to their parents about why they ran away. Girls usually have a better relationship with their mother, who can play a crucial role as an intermediary between the father and the daughter.

It is difficult to generalize, but rather young girls who had run away from home unprepared often felt guilty towards their mother and homesick. One telephone call from their worried mother could be enough to make them return home immediately without first discussing the problems. However, girls who said they had been sent away from home were more apt to wait for some sign of love or regret on the part of their parents. If the parents only talked about the shame she had brought on the family or the community, she would refuse to return home. The girls who had carefully prepared their leaving home were not apt to believe in changes in their parents' attitude. Their desire for more autonomy was not compatible with the views of their parents.

Nevertheless, about half the girls who stay at the hostels for Muslim girls return home. Of the girls in my study, nine Moroccan and three Turkish girls did so. Some of the girls I interviewed went to live with an older sister to prevent further clashes with their father. In the case of three Moroccan girls, the same problems arose after a while and they ran away again. Girls who do not return home have to be prepared to live independently, which they find very difficult. Given their background and the importance of the family, they are not used to it. In addition, their parents' ideas about independence for girls are diametrically opposed to those of the Dutch social service system. A decent Moroccan or Turkish girl does not live alone, she lives with her parents. Nevertheless, some girls do decide to live alone and still have contact with their mother or even their father.

Concluding remarks

In this article I reviewed the conflicts Moroccan and Turkish girls said they had with their parents, which led to their running away from home. And I showed the role Islam played in these confrontations. Islam has a different effect on the first than on the second generation of Moroccan and Turkish migrants. In the case of the parents, it binds them to their community and gives them dignity in a Dutch context where Islam is not accepted. In a Western context which clashes with their values, they want to give their adolescent daughters an Islamic upbringing. They want to protect their daughters from 'bad' Western influences by exerting severe control and restricting their movements.

The binding element of religion in the case of the girls is evident in their ambiguous relation to it. It binds them to their family and background. But at the same time, Islam is 'a binding religion' for themselves and they hold Islam responsible for the restrictions imposed upon them. Islam cannot explain the whole generation gap between parents and daughters. In part it is a general phenomenon and we have to look at the broader social context. Girls are also influenced by attending school and through contact with their peer groups. The traditional power relations in the family are changing. The fact that the girls function better than their parents in Dutch society leads them to question the Muslim perspective on adolescence. Instead of openly discussing their wishes with their parents, most girls try to act secretly, which, as I outlined above, is a very risky strategy.

Notes

[1]51 Surinamese runaway girls have been also studied. See Brouwer, Lalmahomed and Josias 1991.

[2]In 1989 7455 Turkish and 5850 Moroccan girls between the ages of 15 and 19 live in The Netherlands (Brouwer, Lalmahomed and Josias 1991).

7

The Arabic Language and Culture Teaching Program to Moroccan Children

S. van de Wetering

For some seventeen years, children from about 10 minority groups have been offered mother language teaching at Dutch schools. Mother language teaching or the Teaching of the Native Language and Culture (OETC) as it is officially called in The Netherlands, uses the official language of the native country of these ethnic groups, by teachers who were trained in these countries. In basic education (4-12 years) the Dutch Ministry of Education finances mother language lessons up to five hours per week. However, only 2.5 hours can be organized within the regular timetable of the schools. The other 2.5 hours must be planned outside the regular school hours. Almost all mother language teachers are native speakers who are part of the Dutch educational system. They work under the authority of the administration of the schools where they teach. The school boards have the authority to decide on curricula and on the implementation of mother language teaching, not the countries of origin.

The fundamental right to follow mother language teaching is stipulated in the Law of Basic Education of 1985. However, a child's participation in mother language teaching is voluntary in two ways: the school must decide to offer it and the parents must acknowledge their consent for participation. The school board can appoint a mother language teacher when the foreign parents wish their children to participate in mother language teaching. Since 1974 many schools have appointed mother language teachers and their number is growing.[1]

Mother language teaching was, however, very much a matter of dispute. Supporters and opponents of this kind of program assailed each other in the newspapers. This conflict was the main topic of my research on the mother

language teaching to Moroccan children. My research aimed at describing ALCT as a result of social forces. Students, teachers (Moroccan and Dutch) and parents were interviewed about their goals and expectations with respect to this form of mother language teaching, and policy papers of Dutch local and national administrative bodies were analyzed. The conclusion was reached that the groups involved had different and sometimes opposing goals and expectations for ALCT, based on different perspectives. We (the author of this article and a Moroccan research worker) were able to show that those different goals and perspectives led to an interaction between the groups which definitely had its impact on circumstances, contents and effects of ALCT. In this respect the study has been unique because most educational research in Europe does not occupy itself with the influence of social factors on the process of education.

The majority of Moroccan parents, for example, were seeking to integrate their children into their own ethnic group and keep them at a certain distance from the "Dutch" way of life, while Dutch teachers were seeking to distance the children from their own ethnic group and to integrate them into Dutch society. Hence, ALCT was viewed by these Moroccan parents as an important means to integrate the children within their own community. Many parents stated they wanted to expand ALCT hours. For Dutch teachers, on the other hand ALCT did not have an intrinsic meaning. They wanted to make the students acquainted with the "Dutch" way of life and ALCT was tolerated as long as it did not oppose this goal. They were against its expansion at any rate and sometimes demanded a decrease in hours spent on ALCT. Educational authorities did meet the demands of the Dutch teachers to a certain extent as they diminished ALCT hours during regular school time. Moroccan parents, organized by Moroccan organizations, rose up to defend ALCT hours, but were unsuccessful. The outcome of the interaction was, that Moroccan children seldom have 2.5 hours of ALCT a week.

It appeared that Islam played an important part in the social struggle on ALCT. Islam is a consolidating force for the Moroccan community. It is the foundation on which group solidarity is built. In addition, Arabic is a unifying language of the Muslim world, and has traditionally been taught to all Muslim children, whether native Arabs or not. Moroccan parents tried to use ALCT to support the moral education of their children, in order to integrate them into the Moroccan Muslim community. This brought them into conflict with Dutch educational Law which does not provide for religious education of students within the framework of ALCT.

The study was carried out in The Netherlands in the period of 1983-1987 and had three main themes:

1.The goals and expectations of different groups concerned with ALCT;
2.the functioning of ALCT from the viewpoint of these different groups involved, and
3.the functioning of ALCT in different lesson situations.

Research activities were designed around different lesson situations. A lesson situation is a term for the organized framework in which a Moroccan teacher delivers ALCT to participant students. Other persons involved in the lesson situation are the parents, the Dutch teachers of the children and the local and national policy making bodies that set conditions for ALCT.

Eight lesson situations were involved in the study. About half of them followed an itinerant organization model (ALCT-teachers visiting schools), the remainder followed a sedentary pattern (children who come to teachers). Both models were involved in the study.

A multi-level research was conducted. The groups that were indirectly involved with ALCT, such as Moroccan parents, Dutch classroom teachers and local and national authorities were submitted to a pilot study. More detailed research was carried out in the ALCT-setting among those directly involved, namely the students and the ALCT-teacher.

Research methods were semi-structured interviews, group interviews with students, semi-structured observations in the ALCT lessons and content-analysis of policy texts on mother language teaching issued by local and national bodies. All interviews and observations were done by researchers with a good proficiency in Arabic, Moroccan and Dutch, while one researcher had a passive knowledge of Rif-Berber.[2]

Aims and Objectives

The Moroccan parents

Immigration from Morocco, which started as a flow of mostly male workers in the sixties developed into an influx of women and children in the framework of family-reunion in the seventies. In january 1989 139.749 Moroccans were staying in The Netherlands.[3] During the study it became clear that the parents of the Moroccan students i.e. the first generation of Moroccan immigrants were clinging to their original social and moral values and were interacting mainly within their own social community. Most of them came from rural areas in Morocco. Their children, however, had been attending Dutch schools from their early youth. They spent their days in school and in the street and became immersed in a society where Dutch social and moral values dominate. Sometimes they would judge the customs and behaviours they experienced at home according to the dominating Dutch standards, which would lead to a sense of shame and alienation from their parents. The process of alienation

differed in outcome as individuals and families differ. Yet all families had to deal in one way or another with this problem. One of the parents in the research expressed his feelings on this problem in the following way: 'The Dutch want to make Dutchmen of our children; they want them to go to dances and drink beer,but we want to give them an Islamic education.'

The Moroccan parents hoped that ALCT would explain the viewpoint of the parents to the children. They themselves often took their original values for granted and were not able to clearly explain them to their bicultural offspring. Moroccan parents, moreover, largely agreed among themselves about the reasons they have for wanting ALCT for their children. Two points dominated: the material and economic chances in life for their children and their social and moral future.

For most parents chances in life were related to the expectancy of return to Morocco. Utilitarian, remigration-oriented ideas were not however the only motives parents mentioned for ALCT. In fact, after scoring the interview answers under more general statements, the categories 'Maintaining and experiencing Islam' and 'Maintenance of religion and culture' got higher scores than 'Eventual remigration' and 'Ties with the country of origin'. Apparently, ALCT should help parents to socialize children as valuable members of the Moroccan Islamic community in The Netherlands as well. Standard Arabic, the language taught in ALCT, is the language in which religion and important parts of the cultural heritage are transmitted. There exist unbreakable bonds between Islam and the Arabic language of the Qur'an and this in itself is a sufficient reason for most parents to have their children receive an education in Standard Arabic. Many parents reacted with amazement when, after being questioned about Arabic language teaching, they were asked to give their opinion about Islamic education. Some would say: 'But I did tell you that already, didn't I?

The Moroccan teachers

The social position of the Moroccan teachers differs from that of the parents. They are better educated than the parents, and the Moroccan bicultural/ bilingual educational system has invited them to internalize some Western values. Therefore, they are quite able to communicate with their Dutch colleague-teachers, but their attitude towards the West can be rather ambiguous. Some seem to have adopted the Western norms and values and rejected their traditional values, while at other times in another situation they may suddenly return to the traditional values. This might be due to the uncertainty of the person about his identity, or result from the social context:

the Dutch teachers and colleagues expect a westernized opinion, whereas the Moroccan parents expect the teacher to defend their position. For example:

A Moroccan father forbade his twelve years old daughter to participate in swimming instruction. He judged it unsuitable that his daughter should appear half-naked before men. The Dutch teacher discussed this problem with the Moroccan teacher, who condemned the attitude of the father as old-fashioned, and added that his own sister in Morocco was visiting the swimming pool regularly. When the Dutch teacher reported the answer of the Moroccan teacher to the father, the latter was furious and lost all his faith in the Moroccan teacher.

The aims and objectives of Moroccan ALCT-teachers overlapped only partially with those of the parents. The difference concerned the cultural-ethnic socialization motive, which was not shared by all teachers. Like the parents, all ALTC teachers had economic or utilitarian goals for the students, but not everyone felt that strengthening ethnic-religious identity was a legitimate goal of ALCT.

Teachers who did not stress the development of cultural/ethnic identity as an important teaching goal often mentioned individual identity or self-esteem as a matter of concern in their work with children. For them, informing children about their cultural background and social values was important for the individual well-being of their students. Imparting knowledge of their country of origin and about religious matters was deemed necessary to prevent the development of a personal identity crisis in ethnic minority children. As one teacher put it: "In religious education I take the daily situation of the child as point of reference. I explain to the children why their father and mother pray and fast, so that they know they are not in the wrong but have their own religion they can be proud of."

ALC-teachers often experienced that Moroccan children are ashamed of their background, so they tried to counter this by giving positive information about their culture and religion. These teachers also saw a direct link between school success in Arabic language and Dutch mainstream education. They felt that students who had a positive sense of identity and self-esteem would be more motivated to perform in the regular classes, and the result would be higher academic achievement in general.

Whether or not an ALC-teacher shared the socialization motive of the parents primarily impacted the style in which religious and moral education was given. Teachers with religious identity goals reported to give religious education with an emphasis on faith and practice. Teachers with a non-participatory view on Islamic education stated that they stressed the cognitive elements of religious education. There is a difference between teaching religion by conviction or as any other domain of knowledge of behaviour. As

one teacher said: "Religion takes the first place in my lessons. We are Muslims. At home they don`t learn enough of it. Their parents remained illiterate because they grew up in the colonial period".

The Moroccan students

Moroccan students of ALCT reacted on two levels to questions about their motivation for Arabic language and culture teaching. On the one hand they reacted to the idea and the legitimacy of ALCT-lessons. On this level most answers were positive, especially concerning the role of Standard Arabic. Asked to compare the importance of Dutch mainstream education with the importance of ALCT, more than 60% of the interviewed groups found it impossible to choose, and only 5 of the 35 groups regarded Dutch mainstream education more important than Arabic language and culture education. On another level, children expressed their feelings about the actual ALCT program. These opinions were only positive in 50% of the responses. Complaints were directed against the difficulty of the Arabic language, the circumstances (i.e. having to go to ALCT-lessons on Friday while the rest of the class was doing 'fun' things), the Moroccan teacher who was thought to be too strict (mentioned in four groups) or not strict enough (two groups). The students generally could clearly explain why they thought the lessons were important to them. Communication possibilities with family and friends in Morocco was the most frequently named positive reason, closely followed by another utilitarian motive: being able to function in Morocco after eventual migration. Religious motives were less often mentioned by the children although they expressed a clear Moroccan-Islamic solidarity.

Moroccan youth who had adopted Dutch customs like going out, drinking beer and eating pork were rejected by students who participated in ALCT, as were those who disobeyed their parents and left home. Christianity and atheism were also rejected. As one of the students put it: "The Dutch are rich and they steal, but when they will have gathered a lot of money, they will be dead-- very dead."

I think what the pupil really wanted to say was: The Dutch can be 'rich' (richer than the Moroccans) but their riches will not help them when they are dead. He may have been influenced by Qur'anic thought as e.g. Chapter 104:verse 1-3: "In the name of God the Most Gracious, Most Merciful. Woe to every shameless slanderer who gathers wealth and counts it again and again. Does he think that his possessions will make him eternal?"

Students who seemed to manifest a Dutch loyalty on first sight, reacted furiously when somebody would suggest that they or their parents were not

valuable members of the Moroccan Islamic community. One student remarked: "I am a Muslim, but I eat pork. I just break *that* Islamic rule." When the interviewer suggested that he was not a very good Muslim in that case he responded with indignation: "But I *am* a Muslim. Really I am!"

Many Moroccan children uttered complaints against religious education in Protestant and Roman Catholic schools (such religiously-affiliated schools are fully subsidized by the Dutch government). According to school guidelines the children are supposed to join in with religious activities like singing, praying and Bible reading. Quite a few of them indicated that they have problems with this, although they didn't mention this to their teacher or their parents. "I don't like the Dutch lessons very much, they make you pray there"; "The Christians sing, but I don't join in."

Sometimes Moroccan parents forbade their children to participate in religious activities. The children were not always able to discriminate between religious and other activities, so they were left with a problem they couldn't solve. On the whole, the participating students manifested themselves as 'family children', firmly rooted into the social and moral norms of the Moroccan community.

The Dutch teachers

Most of the Dutch teachers have very little knowledge of the cultural background of their Moroccan students. Dutch social and cultural values are dominant in the schools. The report of the educational inspectorate on the situation of the education of minority children in elementary education gives some examples of this attitude:[4]

"One can conclude that acculturation is not implemented in the schools we visited. There are some manifest reasons for this attitude. Especially for the children from the Islamic world there are some very difficult unbridgeable cultural barriers. The difference in role-patterns between boys and girls is a barrier for mutual understanding. (....).

The problem of religion plays in many schools an important part that is not (yet) recognized by either side. The Muslim children will in most cases attend the school in the neighbourhood that is next to their home, regardless the creed of the school. This school (that is already complaining of a decrease of pupils because the neighbourhood is discredited by the large number of foreigners) will register the child perfunctory and from that moment the majority i.e. the school board will take the attitude of repressive tolerance: the Muslim child can do some drawing during the religious education hours, he can just as well sing our songs, the background of the crusades is clearly explained to the

Muslim child, and the divine promises to and the rights of the land of Kanaan are made clear to him.

Small incidents occur regularly: a father has ripped the page with pictures of crusaders from the history book. Children have some troubles at home because of the Christmas decoration they made at school; their father has forbidden them to join in under the Christmas tree.

Muslim parents' demands for Koranic teaching during the school hours increase. The rare Muslim teacher who can express himself in Dutch, tells us that the imam in the mosque incites the parents to do so. The Dutch teachers are very much concerned about these developments. (....)" (Inspectierapport, 1981, p.38/9).

The responses of the Dutch classroom teachers on ALCT differed markedly from that of the other research groups. For one thing, they found it much more difficult to mention goals or motives for ALCT. Dutch teachers regarded ALCT as something that belonged to the ethnic minority group and to the mother language teachers. For them, ALCT was something outside the curriculum of the school- a grant to an apparent claim of the Moroccan parents. Most Dutch teachers we interviewed saw this as a justified claim, although many of them linked the significance of ALCT to an eventual remigration of the children. A typical statement of a Dutch teacher is: "If I look at it from the position of Dutch education, it is a handicap. But seen from the parents' point of view, the child must maintain something from his culture and background."

Both elements in this statement: acknowledgement of the rights and feelings of the parents linked with a concern about the effects of ALCT on Dutch mainstream school results (although scientific research didn't find that ALCT had any negative effects on the mainstream school results)[5] were found in many of the responses.

Most of the Dutch teachers we interviewed expected and/or hoped that children of Moroccan immigrants will integrate and assimilate in Dutch society, including the Dutch educational system. This fundamental belief coloured their view on ALCT as a matter outside the main business of the school, and so, outside the goal structure of the Dutch educational system. ALCT is the business of "them" - meaning the parents and the ethnic minority community - and therefore of marginal concern to the school.

A few of the teachers who were able to formulate motives for ALCT saw it as a function of integrating Moroccan children into the Dutch school: supporting Dutch language development by developing the first language and encouraging integration in Dutch society by giving the children a firm base in the culture of the parents. Other Dutch teachers were afraid of possible segregative effects of ALCT. Firstly, they thought that ALCT should open up

more for Dutch society. By saying this they expressed their fear for participatory Islamic education. Secondly, they stated that ALCT should cooperate better with Dutch education, by which they ment that ALCT could play a remedial role in teaching difficult points of the Dutch curriculum to the Moroccan students.

The Dutch educational authorities

Like the Dutch teachers, the local and national educational authorities did not formulate clear goals for mother language teaching from the beginning. They limited themselves to an indication of broad functions. In the relevant documents (1974),[6] mother language and culture teaching was originally linked with remigration and reception of recently arrived older migrant children. For children who would return to Morocco, ALCT would have the function of preparing them for a school carreer in their country of origin. For older children coming to The Netherlands, ALCT would provide an opportunity to continue at least a part of their education during a period when participation in the Dutch school system was virtually prohibited by lack of communication possibilities (intensive classes to teach Dutch as a second language had not been developed yet).

When increased immigration led to the formation of a substantial ethnic minority the educational policies changed and focused on the consequences of a permanent presence of these newcomers in Dutch society, which had been relatively homogeneous up until then.[7]

New functions were now stipulated for mother language teaching, all directed at the integration of minority children into the Dutch school (1983).[8] Firstly, a pedagogical function was expressed in terms of the development of a positive self concept in order to promote the child's participation in mainstream instructional processes. Secondly, the guidelines stated that mother language teaching should contribute to intercultural education, defined as educational activities directed towards a process of mutual adaptation of ethnic majority and minority students. Thirdly, mother language teaching should assist in decreasing the gap between home and school. To quote a government publication directed to schools[9]: "Children from cultural minorities often have extra difficulties in feeling at home in the school environment (...). To decrease this difference and to ensure that education fits well to the world of the child, mother language teaching is very important." "Education" in this quotation is meant to be "mainstream" education, and so the implication is that mother language teaching is percieved in an auxiliary function to mainstream education.

These new functions take ALCT further away from the aims and objectives of parents, students and ALC-teachers. Neither the cultural-ethnic functions, (central to the concern of the parents), nor Arabic proficiency, (the main goal for teachers and students), are mentioned in the official documents. Local and national Dutch administrative bodies operate from a differently inspired rationale than that of the groups directly involved in ALCT. In this way, ALCT threatens to loose its primary motivational base. It is remarkable that the most recent official documents do not mention teaching of the home culture as a goal for ALCT. In the paper on ALCT that was published in 1983 by the Ministry of Education it was stated that specificly cultural subjects should not be taught in ALCT. In the same paper it was stressed that "ALCT is not religious education". In the last paper[10] issued on ALCT from the national government the "C" of culture was deleted all together.

The Dutch authorities now see ALCT not as a goal in itself, namely maintaining and developing the language and culture of an ethnic minority group, but as a means to goals that are outside the direct scope of ALCT. For the administrative bodies, ALCT has instrumental, not intrinsic functions.

The functioning of ALCT

There is no doubt that opposing aims and objectives of the groups concerned with ALCT had a substantial influence on the function of this kind of teaching. The opposing aims of the different groups led to contradictory demands for ALCT. These demands can be classified in three categories. Demands in respect to: (1) teaching hours; (2) implementation of ALCT and (3) Arabic language proficiency.

All Moroccan groups concerned with ALCT demanded a sufficient amount of teaching hours to achieve a minimal level of language proficiency. Most of them fixed the minimal amount of teaching hours at 5 hours a week.

The Dutch groups however wished to restrict ALCT hours because they felt that ALCT troubles the mainstream education, whereas they were not concerned with Arabic language proficiency or cultural education.

The demands in respect to the implementation of ALCT are highly contradictory. The Moroccan groups are interested in maintaining and developing the cultural identity of the children. They demand instruction in culture-oriented subjects such as geography, history and religion. The Dutch groups aim at assimilation or integration of the Moroccan students into the "Dutch way of life". They fear segregation of the Moroccan students and oppose the strenthening of the group solidarity. That is why they want to remove culture-oriented subjects from ALCT and to integrate them into other required intercultural lessons such as the world-orientation course, as part of social

studies. In this way they themselves may control the cultural education of the Moroccan students and do not have to fear segregation of the children.

The Moroccan groups did not mention exact ultimate objectives for language proficiency, but many of them were dissatisfied with the level of Arabic language proficiency the students achieved in the present situation with the ALCT hours fixed at 2,5 hours a week or less. On the contrary, the Dutch groups did not indicate any interest in the Arabic language proficiency of the students. They only saw instrumental functions for ALCT, i.e. the integration of Moroccan students into Dutch mainstream education.

The demands of the different groups have influenced the functioning of ALCT, although the extent of the implications are related to the measure of influence the individual or group involved can exercise. For example:

In a school in Rotterdam the Moroccan students had been recieving ALCT for 5 hours a week. The local educational authorities and the school board then decided to restrict ALCT to 2.5 hours a week from the scholastic year 1984/1985.[11] The Moroccan parents and teachers protested, but their protest was without effect. The Moroccan parents were not able to choose another school for their children with more ALCT hours because the restriction of ALCT was introduced in all the schools of the town at once. The position of the Moroccan teachers was weak, because they claimed they wanted 5 hours a week for ALCT but they were not willing to teach some of the ALCT hours after school hours.

The school attached great importance to the integration of ALCT into the mainstream curriculum and claimed some of the ALCT hours to be used for implementation of a new intercultural program. Thereafter, the Moroccan teacher had to spend some of the time with mixed classes of multi-ethnic composition to teach them about the Moroccan culture. As a result the ALCT hours were further restricted up to about one hour a week. The Moroccan teacher in question lacked the power to oppose to this situation. The Dutch educational authorities agreed with the decision of the school board and in the team of teachers he stood alone against the rest.

The Moroccan students in this situation were not able to achieve an acceptable level of language proficiency in ALCT. The Moroccan teacher tried the seemingly impossible task of achieving something of the original goals of ALCT, but became increasingly frustrated along with the students and their parents.

The above mentioned example shows, that opposing aims can render ALCT completely ineffective as in the case of a number of horses trying to pull a cart in different directions as a result of which the cart will not move from its place.

Islamic education in relation to cultural and language aspects of ALCT

There are opposing opinions on the implementation of culture-oriented subjects within the Moroccan groups as well as between the Dutch groups on the one hand and Moroccan groups on the other hand. We define culture-oriented subjects as those subjects where the emphasis lies on the transfer of social values, common history, traditions etc. This, in contrast to language-oriented subjects where the emphasis lies on the transfer of language to the next generation either by means of culturally defined or neutral texts. The culture-oriented subjects we observed in ALCT were: Islam, geography and history of Morocco (and the Arab world), moral and social education, and music.

We have seen that the Moroccan parents are interested in socialization goals for ALCT. To achieve these goals culture-oriented subjects play an important role. For these subjects to be able to realize the goals of the parents, they should be implemented in a participatory way. The Moroccan parents demand thet ALCT will stimulate the students to maintain their own cultural identity and to stay faithful to their religion, but they lack exact information on the way cultural subjects are implemented in ALCT. They do not attend the ALCT lessons very often, and have very little insight as to the educational processes used in schools. One father mentioned that he was dissatisfied with the implementation of Islamic education in ALCT because he felt that ALCT should be centered around the holy text of the Qur'an. Yet it seemed to us during the classroom observation, that his daughter's teacher was putting his heart and soul into Islamic education and was very interested in the Islamic upbringing of the children.

On the other hand, another father who would walk into the classroom five minutes before the lesson ended would observe the students reading and reciting the Qur'an and was very satisfied although this last five minutes could well be the only religious instruction of the day.

Most parents tended to base their opinion of the program on what they knew about the teacher as a person. When the teacher was known to be a respectable Muslim they trusted him with their children. However, when it was known that the teacher frequently broke Islamic observances such as fasting during Ramadan or the prohibition of alcohol, they would harbour suspicion against his teaching. During the observations in the classroom, we discovered that their suspicions were sometimes well-founded.

One of the Moroccan teachers paid a lot of attention to Islamic education in his lessons. He possessed a comprehensive knowledge of Islam because he had studied at a religious institute (ma'had dini) in Morocco. His lessons had a participatory character and applications were made to the daily life of the

children, as shows from the following example: The teacher built the lesson around a saying of the prophet Mohammed: "Whoever believes in God and the Last Day will not harm his neighbour. "He explained that the expression does not relate to Muslim neighbours only, but to all neighbours without respect to their religion. He added that guests too, should be honoured without respect to their religion and that a Muslim should visit sick friends and family members and bring them a present. A student asked what to do when the guests make a lot of noise so that the neighbours are annoyed by it. The teacher answered that one should ask the guests to lower their voices in that case.

Not every teacher, however, gave religious education from this perspective. Another teacher noticed that one of his pupils wasn't paying attention in a lesson on ritual purification before praying. He said to this pupil: "Whether or not you want to pray when you grow older is your decision, but it is a shame that you shouldn't know anything about it if somebody asks you about it".

This kind of answer is in contrast with the participatory way of teaching, which might confirm the ritual prayer as a duty. Teachers who did not give religious education in a participatory way, often gave moralising social lessons to stimulate the social consciousness of the students. One of the teachers spent a lot of time on discussion of the daily problems of the students like discrimination and racism, life in Holland, their vacations in Morocco etc. He mentioned this in the interview: "They mostly don't understand what I tell them about geography and history for example about the Phoenicians. They don't feel connected with Morocco so I prefer to teach about things that do appeal to them, like migration and (or) current events and life in Morocco."

Other teachers gave Islamic lessons in an obligatory way, without any enthousiasm. They seemed to teach Islam only because of the claim of the parents, and some even declared they did so (which is unusually frank, given the emphasis on politeness in both Moroccan and Dutch society) confirming the parents fear.

As we have stated before, the demands of parents for the culture-oriented subjects collided with the demands of the Dutch teachers and the Dutch authorities. The Dutch teachers wish that culture-oriented subjects should be given in a neutral way or that they should be removed from ALCT alltogether, in which case they could teach these subjects themselves in the framework of social studies. The goal of intercultural teaching in social studies differs substantially from the goal of ALCT. In ALCT the student becomes acquainted with his own culture, whereas intercultural teaching invites him to dissociate oneself from his own cultural background to better understand the cultural background of the others. The local and national educational authorities are supporting the opinion of the Dutch teachers, as they proposed in the recently published official papers (1983 and 1989) to remove culture-

oriented subjects from ALCT and stressed that ALCT is not meant to be religious education.[12]

Although the collision of opinions is clear, we did not find that this led to frequent actions from the Moroccan groups involved. The main reason for this is that there was no common opinion within the Moroccan groups on the implementation of culture-oriented content, especially Islam.

One teacher reported that parents were organizing campaigns against him from the mosque, because they objected against his non-Islamic behaviour. The origin of these kind of actions is that from an Islamic viewpoint as well as the parents' socialization goals, the teacher should be an example to the children in his behaviour.

Another teacher who was visiting the mosque frequently and was engaged in mosque activities mentioned to us that the head of the school where he worked had forbidden him to give Islamic education during the ALCT lessons.

A Dutch teacher reported that the Moroccan teacher in his school claimed not to give religious education in ALCT, but from the interview with the teacher in question as well as classroom observations it became clear that religious education was definitely part of his lessons. He probably was trying to avoid conflicts with the school by denying his engagement in religious education, but the school could not control the content of his Arabic teaching.

So, although the teacher, in theory, can stipulate the specific content of his lessons, the other groups concerned with ALCT (Moroccan parents, Dutch teachers and Dutch educational authorities) try to persuade him to change the implementation of culture-oriented subjects according to their viewpoint.

Moroccan organizations did oppose the removal of culture-oriented subjects from ALCT, but in most cases they did not support the demand of the parents for participatory religious education. Because of the opposing views on this subject, the Moroccan groups were unable to form an effective coalition, and most likely, the groups involved will continue to try to influence the Moroccan teachers until these issues are finally resolved.

Discussion and future prospects

I have come to some conclusions based on my research, the most important of which is the ideological controversy which stems from the conflict of interests between the 'Dutch' groups on the one hand and the Moroccan groups on the other will eventually lead to the stagnation of ALCT. This stagnation in its turn may lead to the expulsion of ALCT from mainstream primary education. In this case the groups involved will have to look for alternatives to reach their goals.

Dutch teachers will search for ways to make the process of integrating Moroccan students into Dutch society as smooth as possible. They can focus on multicultural education. The objective of this education is that students from different ethnic groups will learn to respect and accept each other. Within multicultural studies they can also focus on the religious aspects. Some religious Protestant-Christian or Roman Catholic schools tend to give multi-religious education[13] instead of Christian religious education. In these schools one tries to take the religious background of all the students into account, although the Christian tradition has priority in the curiculum of the school.

There has also been a new development in this field: "the co-operation school". This school has a mixed school board made up of Christians and Muslims. Muslims and Christians in such a school have exactly the same rights: Christian students visit the vicar for religious education while the Muslim students visit the imam. In addition all students attend multi-religious education together. The first co-operation school between Muslims and Christians was established in Ede, March 1990: the effects of such a program as a solution have yet to be seen.

These new developments in Dutch education are occuring in a time when the number of students is decreasing and some schools are struggling for their survival. In spite of the undoubtedly good intentions of many people engaged in these experiments one can hardly escape the conclusion that an additional goal may be to tie Moroccan parents and students to the Dutch school to keep up the enrollment.

Moroccan parents also have some alternatives for ALCT. They can send their children to the mosques to have them educated in Arabic and Islam. They also can demand Islamic religious education in public schools per the Dutch Education Act of 1984. Finally, they can demand their own Islamic schools, which will respect accept and preserve the identity and culture of the children. The Dutch education act gives the right to any group of parents that wishes to establish schools based on a particular religious or educational ideology to do so. These schools supply mainstream education with their own perspective and are financed by the Dutch government. Some Muslim parents did take this legal opportunity to ensure the religious education of their children. In 1988 the first two Islamic schools were established in The Netherlands. At present there are 13 Islamic schools in The Netherlands and their number is growing. Another 7 schools are preparing to open this year.

Even with the realization of this schools one cannot expect that most Muslim students will attend Islamic schools in the near future. Some parents fear that by sending their children to Islamic schools they will become segregated from Dutch society. Others feel uncertain and wait for the results of the first Islamic schools. And the Islamic schools face many problems of their

own. There are very few Muslim teachers qualified to teach in the Dutch educational system. They have therefore been forced to hire non-Muslim teachers for the most part. Islamic didactics and educational materials are lacking. Their students are almost entirely from the lower social classes. So, the development of Islamic schools in The Netherlands is still unpredictable.

Yet another development is imaginable. If expulsion of ALCT from regular primary education becomes a real possibility, some groups involved could try the seemingly impossible task of making it successful by making an attempt to overcome the controverses and agreeing on common goals acceptable to all parties.

After analyzing the results of the research, I found that the overlapping of the motives of most groups has to do with the teaching of Arabic. Most groups involved in ALCT would agree on the importance of language instruction as a central goal for these lessons. ALCT that would focus explicitly on this goal, with a clearly defined and structured curriculum, would be acceptable to most people involved. Secondly, ALCT-teachers should, in words and behaviour, show that they understand the basic tenets of Islam and demonstrate acceptance of Islamic culture and morality. This implies, in any case not offending in public behavioural norms that are grounded in religious belief. Thirdly, the Dutch educational system could show respect for ALCT in structural ways, for instance by printing ALCT-grades of students on official reports or by consulting ALCT-teachers in reference of ALCT-participants to secondary or special education.

Along with the needed improvements in instructional materials and teaching time, the classification of goals is needed to prevent ALCT from sinking yet more deeply into the morass of marginalization.

Notes

[1]The number of ALCT localities increased from about 250 in 1982 up to 700 in 1987. (Inspection of Education, inspection report 27: Niet apart maar samen, Den Haag, 1988, p. 12)

[2]Morocco is a multi-lingual country. In Moroccan society different languages have different functions and many Moroccans are multi-linguals. Standard Arabic is the official language of the country. This language is used in the domain of religion (Islam), culture, education and government. It is also the language used in writing. As a result of colonialism French is the second official language and is used in the domain of traffic and commerce. The Moroccan Arabic dialect is the 'lingua franca' of the country and is used in semi-official settings as well in private settings in certain regions. Besides their are three different Berber languages current in private settings and in the country-side.
Most Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands come from regions where the current language is Rif-Berber.

[3]Source: Centraal Bureau van de Statistiek (CBS) 1989.

[4]Inspection of Education, *Rapport van de Inspectie Kleuter en Lager Onderwijs over de toestand van het onderwijs aan culturele minderheden in Nederlandse scholen voor kleuter- en lager onderwijs.* Den Haag, 20-5-1981.

[5]Scientific research does not give a definite answer to the question whether ALCT has a negative or a positive effect on Dutch mainstream education. Some studies in this field show that their is presumably no negative effect and that their could be a positive effect under certain conditions. See Appel: 1984; Teunissen: 1986; Driessen: 1990.

[6]Ministry of Education, *Beleidsplan voor het onderwijs aan groepen in achterstandssituaties*. Den Haag 1974.

[7]W.R.R. (Scientific Council for Government Policy) ed., *Etnische Minderheden.* Den Haag, 1979. Ministry of Home Affairs (ed.), *Regeringsreactie op het rapport "Etnische Minderheden" van de wetenschappelijke raad voor het regeringsbeleid.* Den Haag, 1979. achterstandssituaties. Den Haag, 1974.

[8]Ministry of Education, *Notitie Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur.* Den Haag,1983.

[9]Ministry of Education, *Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur. Informatie voor onderwijsgevenden.* Den Haag, 1985, p. 4.

[10]Ministry of Education, *Concept- Beleidsnotitie. Onderwijs in de eigen taal*. Zoetermeer, 1989.

[11]Municipality of Rotterdam, *Vervolgnota II. Het eigen taal- en cultuuronderwijs in verandering.* Rotterdam, 1984.

[12]Ministry of Education, *Notitie OETC*. Den Haag 1983. Ministry of Education (ed.), *Concept beleids-notitie. Onderwijs in de eigen taal.* Zoetermeer, 1989.

[13]Aardweg (ed.): 1986. CPS, stuurgroep PC-onderwijs en Culturele minderheden (ed.), *Ontmoetingsonderwijs*. Hoevelaken.

8

Islamic Primary Schools

W.A. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld

The existing constitutional freedom of education allows for the foundation of confessional schools which are fully financed by the State, both Christian and Islamic ones. Islamic schools do not have, as some may think, a different curriculum taught in language other than Dutch. Just like the other confessional schools, they have to comply entirely with the requirements laid down by law, which, among others, implies that teaching should take place in Dutch*.

There have been long discussions on the motives for parents to found these schools. The main motive seems to have been the wish to have their children educated, particularly at a primary school level, in a way contributing to a cultural-religious personality development in an Islamic spirit. The current situation in denominational and non-denominational schools, where children of an Islamic background hardly receive any religious Islamic education at all, is an additional factor stimulating the foundation of these schools. A third factor prompting the parents to opt for the solution of an Islamic school is their dissatisfaction with the poor level of education in the schools available, expressing itself in the low number of allochtonous pupils moving on to secondary and higher education, as illustrated in the following table.

Table 1. Distribution of Pupils and Students in the Educational Sector

Type	Dutch	%	Turks	%	Moroc.	%
Primary[1)]	1.332.580	44.1	34.734	66.0	35.199	65.3
Secondary[1)]	672.252	22.2	6.866	13.1	6.591	12.2
Special[2)]	99.161	3.3	2.200	4.2	3.143	5.8
Lower occ.[1)]	233.927	7.7	6.490	12.3	7.667	14.2
Second. occ.[1)]	290.039	9.6	1.552	3.0	915	1.7
Higher occ.[1)]	219.812	7.3	533	1.0	278	.5
University[3)]	175.854	5.8	239	.5	122	.2
Total	3.023.625	100.0	52.614	100.0	53.915	100.0

Source: CBS
1) 1989/90
2) 1989/90; includes special forms of primary and secondary education for pupils with learning difficulties, mental and physical handicaps.
3) 1987/88.

From this table the arrears of Muslim pupils in the higher forms of education are at once clear. Whereas Muslim pupils are overrepresented in primary schools and at the lower levels of occupational education, they suffer from an outspoken underrepresentation at all secondary and higher levels, including university.

In a letter to the Lower Chamber about the "Foundation of primary schools based on Hindu or Islamic principles" the previous Secretary of State for Education pointed out that there are no reasons to assess the foundation of these schools in an essentially different way from those of other denominations.[1] Apart from possible advantages she also pointed out a number of likely drawbacks of such denominational schools.

A likely gain is considered to be the strenghtening of the pupils' self-confiolence resulting in better social positions and integration into Dutch society. Drawbacks which could arise were an increased sense of isolation, the formation of groups based on separate languages and nationalities, and as a result of this an impeded knowledge of Dutch as a second language and diminished opportunities to develop socially within Dutch society.

At a preliminary discussion by the Central Board of Educational Consultations, on 19 December, 1988, the representatives from various umbrella organisations of the various types of schools found in The Netherlands criticized the first draft of this letter by the Secretary of State. According to these critical remarks the tendency to found such schools was an undesirable development, "a clear sign of the failure of the Dutch educational system at this moment". The philosophy underlying these schools was in a violation of the main goal of the Government's educational policy, entailing the "basic idea of intercultural education: the living and learning together of children of different backgrounds".[2]

This point of view first of all ignores the wish of the parents already referred to above to have their children educated in an Islamic spirit. The reason for the coming into being of the Islamic schools is not primarily to be found in the failure of the schools available to provide an adequate education. Secondly, it should be pointed out that intercultural education is intended for non-denominational as well as denominational schools, and so does not replace denominational education. It could be argued that denominational and intercultural education as such are mutually exclusive. However, within the existing constitutional freedom of education this can be no justification for denying Islamic parents the right to have their own schools, on a par with

Christian parents. It is worth mentioning that the political discussion concerning the Islamic schools has been continuing up till the present day, with recent contributions by the leader of the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) who opposed them, and the Dutch Prime Minister (who belongs to the Christian Democratic Party ,CDA), arguing in favour of denominational education in general, including Islamic schools.

Current Situation

The first Islamic primary school was founded in 1988. In the course of the year 1989-1990 this number was increased to six. At present (1991-1992) there are twenty such schools, mainly concentrated in the larger urban centers with a considerable number of Muslims. Three of them have been founded on the initiative of the ISNO (Islamic Foundation in the Netherlands for Education and Upbringing). The ISNO is linked to the Turkish ISN (Islamic Foundation in the Netherlands), which runs a number of Turkish Islamic mosques and, among others, mediates in the appointment of imams in The Netherlands by the Turkish Government (the Presidium for Religious Affairs in Ankara).
In connection with this the ISNO, just like the schools associated with it, wants to stick deliberately to the interpretation of Islam as it is propagated by the Government in present-day secular Turkey. This also becomes clear in their policy with respect to the contents of the religious education, and their lenience with respect to the observance of an Islamic code of behaviour by staff and pupils within these schools. Consequently, these schools can be considered liberal.

Apart from these there are seventeen more Sunnite primary schools, which were founded on the initiative of various *local* groups or organisations. Among them there are communities affiliated to the umbrella-organization of the *Milli Görüs* (a Turkish Sunnite religious-political movement of an outspoken orthodox character), a local branch of the multi-ethnic Islamic Women's Organization, *Al-Nisâ',* and various Islamic-Moroccan communities.[3] These autonomous schools can all be qualified all as "orthodox Sunnite", although on the basis of their statutes two different types can be distinguished among them.

The first type, represented by seven schools, was founded on the initiative of mainly orthodox Turkish groups. The specific ethnic origin of these schools can still be observed in the current ethnic composition of the pupils and the school boards, where, apart from pupils and governors from various ethnic groups, Turks occupy a predominant position. Apart from minor emendations and variations, the statutes of these seven schools are identical. Most of them speak about education in general, thus keeping the possibility open of taking steps towards the future foundation of secondary Islamic schools (1). As their goal they state the organization of the education for Muslim children (2).

Education should be based on "the equality of all philosophies of life and social tendencies, in the sense that pupils will be able to adopt an attitude to life based on the Qoran and Sunnah by taking these two as points of departure in order to make a contribution of their own. All this, with due respect to the philosophies of life and society of others" (3). Islamic religious education within the broader context is mentioned as obligatory in all statutes (4). The statutes contain no further stipulations as to the composition of the boards (5) and the parents' associations (6), or as to the rules of conduct to be observed by the teaching staff (7). Finally, no mention is made of a religious institution which has the authority to decide in case of disputes of a theological nature (8).

The second type, represented by nine schools, was founded on the initiative of mainly orthodox Moroccan groups. This specific origin of these schools can still be observed in the current ethnic composition of the pupils and the school boards, where, apart from pupils and governors from various other ethnic groups, Moroccans occupy a predominant position. Apart from minor variations, these schools have identical statutes, as well. They explicitly concentrate their activities on the founding of Islamic primary schools (1), without specifying the religious background of the children the schools are primarily meant for (2). Most of the statutes mention that the starting-points, attitudes and goals of the schools, as well as the behavioral rules to be observed in them, are or will be mentioned in a separate appendix a copy of which is or will be attached (3,4,7). As an example the appendix of the statutes of the "Foundation for Islamic Primary Schools in 's-Hertogenbosch and Surroundings" may be mentioned. It states, among other things, that instruction will be given in accordance with the Qoran and Sunnah. There exists no affiliation of the schools with any specific current within Islam. The purpose of the schools is to guide the children in their various phases of development in such a way that a foundation will be laid enabling them to become adults who, in freedom and maturity, will be capable of participating up to the mark in Dutch society, while being loyal to Islam as their rule of conduct. A knowledge and an understanding, e.g. of all aspects of God's creation, will be developed in accordance with the normative views of Islam. Apart from the Qoran and Sunnah, attention will be paid to the history of Islam, to Islamic civilization and the Arabic language. Other philosophies of life will also be dealt with, in a respectful manner. The pupils will be trained to develop proper social behaviour and to develop various motorial skills, a.o. through classes in gymnastics and swimming. The schools will observe the Islamic feasts, prescriptions and customs. Instead of celebrating Christian holidays and anniversaries, they will pay proper attention to the two annual Islamic feasts. During these feasts the schools will be closed for two and three days. During the week of Carnaval the schools will, however, continue their

lessons. Instead of the custumary Wednesday afternoon, the schools will give Friday afternoons off. There will be no smoking in the schools, female teachers will wear headscarfs and wide clothes. In addition to these points the statutes stipulate that the governors of the schools must be practising Muslims, while the boards should be composed of as many nationalities as possible. Members of the boards or parents' councils should not be involved in any political or nationalistic activities on behalf of their countries of origin (5,6). Finally, in case of any dispute concerning the correct interpretation of Islam, a binding decision will have to be asked for from the theological committee of the Islamic Centre, "El Ouakf", (affiliated to the Muslim World League) which has its headquarters in Paris. Before the dispute is submitted to the centre in Paris, the matter should, however, be discussed with the Dutch member of the said committee.

Both types of schools aim at following the Qoran and Sunnah and at educating their pupils for a full participation in Dutch society. Nevertheless, the point of gravity in the orientation of the second type seems to be leaning rather towards the Islamic world, whereas the first type of school seems to orientate itself primarily towards Dutch society. It remains to be seen, however, in what way these different ways of orientation will be worked out in the future activities of these schools in a practical way. In contrast to the ISNO-schools mentioned before, the later seventeen schools can be chacterised as conservative. This appears, among others, from the contents of their religious education and the observation of the Islamic rules of behaviour by staff and pupils within these schools.

Ethnic Backgrounds of the Pupils

In the table below one finds an overview of the numbers and ethnic backgrounds of the pupils in these schools in the autumn of 1991.

*Table 2. Numbers of Pupils and their Ethnic Origin**

	Tur.	Mar.	Sur.	Tun.	Pak.	Oth.	Tot.
Alphen - An Noer	-	81	-	-	-	-	81
Amersfoort - Bilal	93	46	-	-	-	6	145
Amsterdam - As-Siddiqschool	211	188	-	-	-	71	470
Amsterdam - Mimar Sinan*	68	27	-	-	-	-	95
Amsterdam - El F.O.	61	33	-	-	-	19	113
Arnhem - Ibn-I Sina	53	15	-	-	-	1	69
Bergen op Zoom - El Feth	-	61	-	-	-	-	61
Ede - El Inkade	19	66	-	-	-	-	85
Eindhoven - Tariq I. Ziyad	39	90	9	-	-	9	147
Enschede - El Ummah	53	8	-	-	-	-	61
Helmond - S. Ayoubi	-	90	-	-	-	12	102
Leiden - Er Riseleh	2	106	-	5	-	9	122
Roosendaal - Assalaam	2	69	-	-	-	5	76
Rotterdam - Al Ghazali	139	86	5	2	19	2	253
Rotterdam - Ibni Sinaschool	90	9	-	-	4	-	103
The Hague - Y. Emre1)	20	99	-	7	6	-	132

* No data available for the following schools: Almere - Al Imam, 's-Hertogenbosch - Imam Elbogari, Nijmegen - Abibakar, Schiedam - El Furkan.

Tun. in this table stands for Tunisian, Pak. for Pakistani and Oth. for remaining ethnic groups (Egyptian, Somalian, Sudanese, Lybian, Dutch, Indonesian, etc.).
1) Data for 1988/1989

From these data it may be deduced that in one of the three ISNO-schools (the Yunus Emreschool in The Hague) the Moroccan pupils clearly are in the majority, even though this school was founded on a Turkish initiative.

The total number of pupils at the Islamic primary schools listed in table 2 is 2,092. The total number of them at all the Islamic primary schools in the Netherlands can be estimated at 2,612, yielding an average of 130 for the schools not listed in the table. Of these pupils 850 (32.5%) are Turks, 1,047 (41.1%) are Moroccans. Moreover, from tables 1 and 2 the conclusion may be drawn that only 3.7% of all the Muslim children in Dutch primary schools attend Islamic schools. From among the Turkish pupils 2.5%, whereas from among the Moroccan pupils 3.1% attend these schools.

At present, there are no non-Muslim children among the pupils at the Islamic schools. The headmasters of the autonomous schools are of the opinion that their schools are in principle open to all pupils, Muslims and

non-Muslims alike, on the condition that their parents respect the Sunnitic-Islamic founding principles of the school and that these pupils attend the lessons in Islamic religious education. The ISNO-board of governors have argued that non-Muslim children may be exempted, if so desired, of the obligation to attend Islamic religious education, while possibly special facilities for religious education based on their own beliefs could be created for them.

Ethnic and Religious Backgrounds of the Teachers

The ethnic and religious backgrounds of the teachers of these schools show a completely different picture, which is mainly caused by the lack of sufficiently qualified Islamic teachers in The Netherlands.

*Table 3. Ethnic Origins and Religious Beliefs of the Teachers**

	Tur.	Mor.	Sur/ Ant.	Mol/ Ind.	Du.	Tot	Of whom muslim
Alphen - An Noer	-	1	3	1	3	8	2
Amersfoort - Bilal	-	2	-	-	9	11	2
Amsterdam - As-Siddiq	3	3	14	1	17	38	14
Amsterdam - M. Sinan	-	-	2	-	7	9	-
Amsterdam - El F.O.	1	2	11	-	1	15	10
Arnhem - Ibn-I Sina	1	1	1	-	4	7	-
Bergen op Z. - El Feth	-	-	1	-	3	4	1
Ede - El Inkade	-	-	-	-	6	6	-
Einhoven - Tariq I.Z.	1	2	2	-	10	15	4
Enschede - El Ummah	1	-	1	-	4	6	1
Helmond - S. Ayoubi	-	-	1	-	6	7	-
Leiden - Er Riseleh	-	1	1	-	9	11	2
Roosendaal - Assalaam	-	-	-	-	6	6	1
Rotterdam - Al Ghazali	2	1	10	-	10	23	9
Rotterdam - Ibni Sina	1	-	5	-	2	8	5
The Hague - Y. Emre1)	-	-	4	-	4	8	1
Total	10	13	56	02	101	182	52

* No data available for the following schools: Almere - Al Imam, 's-Hertogenbosch - Imam Elbogari, Nijmegen - Abibakar, Schiedam - El Furkan. Teachers of the so-called "languages and cultures of their onwn" are not included.

1) Data for 1988/1989

From these data it appears that the vast majority of the staff members of these schools have non-Islamic backgrounds (71.4 v 28.6%). It is worth mentioning that the percentage of Turkish and Moroccan teachers at these schools is very low, 5.5% and 7.1% respectively, and at four fo the schools Muslim teachers are even completely lacking. Furthermore, the relatively high number of Surinam-Antillian teachers (30.8%) is striking.

The reasons for this situation are: (1) a deliberate policy of Islamic schools to prefer non-native teachers, as they are better able to cope with the problems arising in educating non-native children; (2) a greater readiness on the part of these teachers, as compared to native Dutch teachers, to work in these schools; (3) a smaller chance for these teachers to find a position at a Dutch primary school.

The fact that most teachers are not Muslims and consequently know little or nothing about Islam is admitted to be a handicap. Several schemes offer a solution. In the ISNO-schools one day in every two months is devoted to discussions beween the teachers and the headmasters of the schools on Islam and on the problems arising between teachers, on the one hand, and pupils and their parents, on the other hand. Apart from this teachers are stimulated to study Islam. In some of the other schools special in-service training-courses in Islam for non-Islamic teachers are being organised.

One problem which deserves special attention is finding adequately qualified Islamic teachers to teach religious instruction. The law presupposes that in denominational schools class-tutors are responsible for religious education. Special teachers of religious instruction are not being subsidized, which is different from the policy of many of the local authorities with respect to religious education in non-denominational primary schools.

As has been pointed out before by far most of the class-tutors at these schools are non-Muslims. Until these schools have at least a majority of staff members of an Islamic background at their disposal, it will only be possible to solve this problem if the Government, at least temporarily, should be prepared to subsidize the appointment of special teachers or Islamic religious education. We recommend that the Government should take positive steps here.

School Boards

There are a number of differences in the ways the three ISNO-schools, on the one hand, and the thirteen autonomous schools interviewed, on the other, are governed. The ISNO coordinates and supports local initiatives to found schools and during a trial-period its central governing body also functions as governing body for the newly founded schools. At present this is still the case. In the near future local governing boards are however meant to be created, in concurrence with the statutes of local foundations.

A close link between the local schools and the ISNO will however be maintained in these statutes. Thus, the first local governing board has been appointed entirely by the ISNO (for a period of four years) and, just like any other of the future boards, cannot conclude any financial transactions without the approval of the ISNO.

The other schools, on the contrary, are the result of local initiatives without the interference of any national coordinating organ, and they, consequently, are autonomous. Nevertheless, the group of schools qualified by us, on the basis of their statutes, as being "oriented towards the countries of origin", mention a religious authority which has decisive power in cases there are theological disputes. In the statutes of the other schools no such organ is mentioned. Although at present by far most of the boards are of a multi-ethnical composition, one can still deduce from which (ethnic) community the initiative has mainly come. The multi-ethnical composition of these boards seems to reveal pragmatical rather than ideological motives, viz. the desire to increase the possibilities for recruiting pupils. This is illustrated in the table below:

Table 4. Ethnic Backgrounds of the school boards[1)]

	Tur.	Mor.	Others	Tot.
Alphen - An Noer	-	7	-	7
Amersfoort - Bilal	3	3	1	7
Amsterdam - As-Siddiqschool	2	-	2	4
Amsterdam - Mimar Sinan	3	-	2	5
Amsterdam - El F.O.	-	3	1	4
Arnhem - Ibn-I Sina	2	1	-	3
Bergen op Zoom - El Feth	-	5	-	5
Ede - El Inkade	2	5	-	7
Eindhoven - Tariq I. Ziyad	1	3	1	5
Enschede - El Ummah	3	1	1	5
Helmond - S. Ayoubi	-	5	2	7
Leiden - Er Riseleh	-	2	1	3
Roosendaal - Assalaam	1	5	-	6
Rotterdam - Al Ghazali	3	1	1	5
Rotterdam - Ibni Sinaschool	4	-	1	5
The Hague - Y. Emre[2)]	2	-	5	7

[1)] No data available for the following schools: Almere - Al Imam, 's-Hertogenbosch - Imam Elbogari, Nijmegen - Abibakar, Schiedam - El Furkan.

[2)] Data for 1988/1989

Umbrella Organizations

The Law on Primary Education (WBO) requires, in Article 40, that the proper authorities of a denominational school, particularly with respect to the legal protection of the teaching staff, should be associated with a Committee of Appeal. Article 42 stipulates that the work of the Committee of Appeal should extend to at least 50 denominational schools. Apart from this, denominational schools are obliged, by virtue of the Resolution of Payment, to deposit a sum as security before the authorities will agree to bear the costs for founding and managing the school.

For these and similar matters there exist, for denominational schools, so-called umbrella organisations. Until recently the Islamic primary schools had been associated temporarily with one of the existing native umbrella organisations, as they had been unable to fulfil the minimum requirement of 50 schools necessary to establish their own umbrella organization.[4]

The former State Secretary of Education reduced the required number of 50 schools laid down in Article 42, of the WBO, to a minimum of 10 schools.[5] Consequently, the six schools existing in 1989, in cooperation with the schools which were then in the course of being set up, together founded the Islamitische Scholen Besturen Organisatie (ISBO) as their umbrella organisation from 27 February, 1990, onwards. They assumed that the total number of Islamic schools in operation in the schoolyear 1990/1991 would be 14 (6 existing + 8 newly to be opened schools).[6]

Considering the widely divergent character of the schools united in the ISBO conflicts were likely to occur. In fact, the three ISNO-schools were expelled from ISBO in 1991 a decision which is disputed by ISNO. At the same time ISNO approached the national umbrella-organization for Catholic primary schools in order to study the possibility of an eventual affiliation. Whether it will be possible to keep the two remaining types of orthodox-conservative Islamic schools permanently united in one umbrella-organization remains to be seen. After all, in particular in the case of labour conflicts the (diverging) standards and values of these schools will be put to the test. It cannot be denied that it is not unlikely that once one of the other of the two orthodox groups has reached the required minimum of ten schools it will decide to establish its own umbrella-organization.

The Special Character of Islamic Primary Schools

Religious Education and OETC

One or two hours of religious instruction per week are taught at all the schools mentioned above. At the same time two hours of OETC per week are taught as part of the curriculum. With respect to the language in which religious education is provided we can say that this normally happens in the language of the children's parents. Where there are significant numbers of children from different Islamic groups religious education is provided at different hours in the language of each of the groups. So, at one and the same school religious instruction is taught in Turkish, Arabic and Urdu. A remarkable exception is constituted by the two largest schools of all, the Al-Ghazali school in Rotterdam and the As Siddieq school in Amsterdam, where significant numbers of Turkish and Moroccan pupils attend the classes and which provide religious eduction in Dutch with occasional references to quotations from Qoran and Hadith in Arabic. This confirms the above-mentioned attitude of these schools towards Dutch society. Both schools are in the process of developing their own methods and materials for Islamic religious education, in contrast to the schools of type 2 and of the ISNO, which mainly use materials from the countries of origin.

In the ISNO-schools Turkish, and sometimes also Moroccan imams, are in charge of (religious) education. In the other schools instruction is provided by imams, volunteers, OETC-teachers or Islamic class-tutors. Experience has shown that, for the sake of the continuity of religious education, volunteers will have to be replaced by better structured provisions.

In the mean time initiatives are being taken to establish an Islamic Pedagogical Study Centre which, among others, aims at preparing the necessary educational materials to be used in the classes in religious education, in the Dutch language. Recently, a group of Muslims of various ethnic origins has prepared a report containing elements for a teaching plan, "Islamic religious education at primary schools", published with state subsidies (*Aanzetten*, 1991). After a theoretical discussion of the problems to be solved in developing a teaching plan for Islamic Religious Education (IRE), the report discusses the Islamic image of man, the pedagogical concept to be adopted in IRE, the general goals of IRE, its didactical goals and approaches and the spreading out of the subject-matter over the various stages of the primary schools. The actual introduction of these and of comparable materials to be produced by an Islamic Pedagogical Study Centre in the near future may considerably change the practices existing in IRE as described above.

The Carrying out of Islamic Rules

Apart from religious education the denominational character of a school can also be revealed in all sorts of aspects having to do with the contents of education itself, and in the observation of various other Islamic rules of

behaviour. With respect to the contents of the educational material, particularly at the autonomous schools, the books to be used, such as books on biology and history, are tested whether or not they are compatible with Islamic standards. Thus in one of these schools, for example, a story in which a youthful pangs of love occurred was removed from the book to be used.

At all of the schools boys and girls of groups 1 through 4 sit in separate rows in the class-room. At some of the schools this pattern is continued in the remaining groups. Only at two of the schools boys and girls are placed in separate classroomms from groups 5 onwards (so from the age of 9 or 10). Three factors seem to determine these patterns, viz. the degree of orthodoxy of the school board, the number of pupils and the number of class rooms available. The same pattern holds true for physicial education. In many cases there are no swimming lessons, because the municipal authorities do not make their swimming pools available for such lessons, which last twice as long as those of mixed classes. Occasionally, at an ISNO-school, the higher groups take part in mixed physical education or swimming (depending on the parents' permission), on the occasion of which the parents are free to determine their children's outfits. Furthermore, at the orthodox schools girls are strongly advised to wear a scarf, which, in fact, they almost always do.

Halls of Prayer, or not

With respect to performing the salat (prayer) there is also a clear difference to be perceived between the autonomous schools, on the one hand, and the ISNO-schools, on the other. In the former schools prayers are normally held at lunch-time by the older children (from group 5 onwards). In these schools the necessary arrangements have been made to this purpose, such as a prayer-hall and facilities for the ritual ablutions (wudu). In the ISNO-schools only within the framework of religious education are instruction given in how to perform the salat, while the central board of governors has up till now rejected all the requests from the parents' council to have a room set aside permanently, to be used as a prayer-hall. This way the ISNO-board of governors thinks it will lend the school as much a lay character as possible, which is in keeping with the current situation at schools in Turkey.

Festivals of their own

Instead of celebrating Christian festivals and anniversaries, all Islamic primary schools pay special attention to the Islamic festivals, Id al-Adha ('Festival of Sacrifice') and Id al-Fitr ('Festival of the breaking of the fast', at the end of the month of Ramadan). During and around these two festivals these schools are closed for a few days. To decide about the exact time of the daily prayer and of Id al-Fitr the autonomous schools are mainly guided by the information obtained from the Islamic World League in Saudi-Arabia.

The ISNO-schools, on the other hand, get their information on the Islamic calender via the official guidelines from Turkey. Moreover, these schools together, with some of the autonomous schools also have one day off per year on the occasion of the birthdayfestival of the Prophet. In most of the autonomous schools the Wednesday afternoon off has been replaced by the Friday afternoon, as a consequence of which the special significance of the Friday for Muslims as a day for the weekly joint prayerservice is emphasized.

The headmaster of an ISNO-school, on the other hand, argued that they had deliberately chosen to have Wednesday afternoons off, so that their children would have the same afternoon off as the Dutch children of the district. In the Islamic primary schools information about the meaning of non-Islamic festivals such as, for example, St. Nicholas is transmitted though, but they are not celebrated.

Dress of the Teachers

With respect to clothing and conduct of the teachers the rules in the autonomous schools are stricter than those in the ISNO-schools. Thus, women teachers are expected to wear loose-fitting clothes and some kinds of headcovering. Furthermore, no physical contact between teachers and older pupils of the opposite sex is allowed. In some schools it is also not allowed for teachers to be together with pupils or parents of the opposite sex in a separate room or without others present.

Contacts with the Government

Although the Constitution, in principle, allows the foundation of Islamic primary schools it appears, in practice, that the local governments have to overcome much resistance to this process, in the municipal councils as well as in educational circles. The resistance within the municipal councils has been commented upon by us elsewhere.[7]

As an example of the feelings of resistance existing within educational circles we can mention the letter of protest, sent by fourteen primary schools to the Councilcommittee of Education in Rotterdam on 12 February, 1990, to react against the decision to incorporate an Islamic school in the district of Crooswijk in the Educational Planning Scheme for 1990-1993. The undersigned expressed their fear that the educational aspects, such as fluency in Dutch in a group with a concentration of non-native Dutch pupils, should not be underestimated. The coming into being in the recent past of so-called "black" and "white" schools has already led to such a concentration, along with the related educational problems. The setting-up of an Islamic school would only exacerbate the problems, the undersigned, claimed. It is significant that, even though a considerable number of those having signed belong to

denominational schools, not a single word was said about the positive aspects of the initiative to set up an Islamic school.

Moreover, some of the protesting schools are already predominantly populated by pupils from the non-native groups and so the feared concentration with its accompanying educational problems is already a matter of fact there. It is difficult not to get the feeling that this is a case of selective indignation, a phenomenon which has also been detected by us elsewhere in denominational schools with a high percentage of Islamic pupils.[8]

Two Case Histories

Serious administrative disputes about the setting up of Islamic primary schools have taken place in two cases so far. First of all in Utrecht, where the local authority refused to cooperate because the school concerned would not only have a religious but also a purely national (Turkish) basis, for which reason it would be incompatible with the Primary Education Law. This case is now to be decided upon in the final instance by the Council of State.[9]

In 's Hertogenbosch the ISNO appealed to the Provincial Executive of Noord-Brabant against the decision of the local authorities not to accept an ISNO-school in the Scheme of new primary schools for 1990-1993. The argument of the Local Authorities was that in the scheme mentioned a denominational school of general Islamic character had already been included and that it, moreover, had not become evident that the school the ISNO had applied for was of a different character. By the ISNO it was argued that, as a matter of fact, they were applying for a school of a different character within Islam. When asked, the ISNO pointed out that the school they were applying for would be guided by the Hanafite School, while the other school, already included in the scheme, would be guided by the Malikite School. The difference between the two law schools could be compared with the difference between 'liberal' and 'conservative'. This difference would manifest itself in the manner of teaching, the manner of approaching pupils and parents, and particularly in the instructions on how to dress at school. The Provincial Executive decided in the ISNO's favour.[10], but its decision was annulled by the Council of State on February 22, 1991.

The decision taken by the Provincial Executive is to be considered correct, but the grounds on which the decision was based are not sound. Between the two schools there indeed exists a difference in 'persuasion'. As it appears from her statutes, the 'Stichting Islamitische Basisscholen in 's-Hertogenbosch en Omgeving' does aim at promoting Sunnite education, but does not expressly want to be associated with any movement or law school within Islam. These statutes also require women teachers - pupils are not mentioned - to wear scarfs and long and wide clothes.[11]

As has been pointed out before the ISNO, on the contrary, is guided by a particular movement within Sunnite Islam, namely the one supported by the Turkish Government. It is, however, incorrect to explain this difference in 'persuasion' on the basis of the Hanafite and Malikite schools of law. Among the adherents to both persuasions one finds liberally, respectively conservatively, orientated Muslims. So it is not so much the Hanafite or the Malikite school of law, but rather the desire whether or not to be guided by one particular movement within Islam, which determines the real difference in 'persuasion' between the two schools.

Schools Advisory Service and Inspection

Apparently, the schools' advisory services have assisted the schools in getting started. The assistance above all entailed advice on the acquisition of methods and material for the teaching of Dutch, which, especially in these schools is of crucial importance. Some people argue that to improve the linguistic skills of the pupils an individual approach would be preferable to class or group education. In the present set-up this is however impossible.

Remedial educationalists of the schools' advisory services concerned appeared to have been consulted by a relatively high number of children from Islamic primary schools. The explanation given, also by the inspectors, was the non-selective admission by the Islamic primary schools, in particular during the starting period. Consequently, a relatively high number of 'problem-children' were admitted to these schools.

The second reason has to do with the different standards between the various schools from which the first few generations of new pupils of the Islamic primary schools had come. Consequently great differences in development and level of knowledge within one form could occur there where groups of pupils were formed with age as the only criterium. Both phenomena mentioned before were characterised by inspectors as well as school advisers as the 'growing pains' of Islamic primary schools.

Participation of Parents

Those in favour of Islamic schools have repeatedly argued that these schools would be more accessible to non-native parents. This is only partly true. From the involvement of the parents in the parents' associations it is evident that they are indeed more involved in what is going on at school than is often the case elsewhere. At the same time the schools' advisory services have pointed out that the participation of the parents leaves much to be desired. This could also have to do with the fact that in most schools the form teachers are predominantly Dutch-speaking.

The critical question was raised by the schools advisors and inspectors to what extent some of these schools really succeed in transferring an Islamic

identity to the pupils. The school governors sometimes fail to issue clear guidelines about which aspects of Islam should be taught and which rules should be observed, which, particularly for non-Islamic teachers, could raise problems. But even if they did, it would still remain doubtful whether one would be able to create an Islamic atmosphere at a school where the majority of the teaching staff are not familiar with Islam from within. As long as this situation prevails tension will continue to exist between the expectations of the parents, on the one hand, and the pedagogic-didactic perceptions of the teachers, on the other.

High Expectations

The schools inspectorate issued two official reports on the functioning of Islamic primary schools, on July 3, 1989, and February 28, 1990, respectively. The second report concluded that education in these schools hardly differed from that in other Dutch primary schools. The inspectors had high expectations of the performance of the Islamic primary schools in terms of a higher number of pupils moving on to a higher education in future. They however also mentioned the strong prejudices against Islamic primary schools. Even Dutch primary schools harbour such prejudice. They often consider Islamic primary schools to be competitors and have little or no contact with them.

Notes

*This chapter is an updated version of the authors' initial research paper on the Islamic schools in The Netherlands, published in *Samenwijs*, September 1990, pp.19-23. Other publications on this topic are Wagtendonk, in: Shadid-Van Koningsveld (eds.), 1991; Theunissen, 1990.

[1] Tweede Kamer 1988-1989, 21 110, nr 1

[2] Account of the 157th meeting of the CCOO, Zoetermeer December 19 1988, 16-28.

[3] Cf. Shadid-van Koningsveld: 1990, 24, 36.

[4] Cf. Shadid-van Koningsveld: 1990, 125-6.

[5] Letter of 13/10/1989 no. BSG/SP-89017631

[6] Letter ISBO to the State Secretary of Education d.d. 19/3/1990

[7] "Bijzondere scholen voor etnische groepen in de lokale politiek" SAMENWIJS, januari (1989), 155-157.

[8] "Een numerus clausus voor islamitische leerlingen op p.c.-basisscholen?" SAMENWIJS 10 (1990), 303-304.

[9] See also: Shadid en van Koningsveld, Moslims in Nederland (1990), 127.

[10] Letter of the Provincie Noord-Brabant No. 94965/111684 d.d. 29 January 1990.

[11] Statutes d.d. 15 February 1989 passed by notary T.F.J.C. van Lotringen in 's-Hertogenbosch and appendix of the same date.

PART III

Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands

9

The History of Muslim Umbrella Organizations

A. van Bommel

In his monograph "Islam and The Netherlands" - the English translation (1957) of his acceptance speech on the occasion of his inauguration as senior professor of Arabic, comparative Semitic linguistics, and Syriac at the University of Amsterdam on October 17, 1955 - Pijper stated, "Dutch Islamic policy has now become history. The number of Muslims under the Dutch crown has dropped from the seventy million mark to about sixty six thousand spread over New Guinea and Surinam." Pijper referred to the independence of Indonesia, discussing it more realistically than many of his colleagues and journalists thirty years later: "The Muslims have, in their battle for freedom, reminded each other of this maxim from the Koran, 'Allah does not change what is in a people before (the people) change what is in themselves'(3:11). The change has indeed now taken place and we should take account of the altered attitudes of the Muslims. That means, among other things, that we shall have to revise thoroughly our current and so thoughtlessly re-iterated conceptions of the contrasts between East and West."

However, Pijper could not know that a number of those 'Muslims under the Dutch crown' would settle in The Netherlands in the following period and that, as such, they would constitute only a small portion of the over-all Muslim population in The Netherlands. Dutch society may, however, still take courage from his concluding remark, "A Rector Magnificus of Amsterdam University, Allard Pierson, scrutinised, almost seventy years ago now, with a prophetic eye, relations between East and West, declaring that the West can bring the East four treasures: method of inquiry - discipline of thought - independent morality - political freedom. What, to reverse matters, the Muslim East can give us in the way of spiritual wares does not permit of being summarised in a few aphorisms, but it is established beyond doubt that a knowledge of the Muslim, of his religion, law, mysticism, philosophy and art can only enrich

our culture. And I hope that perhaps my teaching may serve to bring my students to this realization: that Asia once was, 'the continent of holy civilizations that bloomed and flourished when the West was hid in night'."[1]

In most of the historical accounts of the development of Muslim organizations in The Netherlands, the construction of new mosques is regarded as representing the main milestones in this development. However, the initiatives in renting or buying of existing premises and the founding of corporate bodies - as necessary under Dutch law - to organise and manage activities inside or outside those premises, are far more characteristic of Muslim religious organizations in Holland. The meetings which preceded the founding of such organizations, the nature of the decision making process, and the simple and direct method of promoting a common interest, not only characterise the "imported culture" in these matters, but, in a way, also have introduced the organizers to new social and civic skills. No doubt, the primary moves were often made with the guidance of functionaries belonging to welfare organizations subsidised by the Ministry of Social and Cultural Affairs (at that time known as C.R.M.; presently as W.V.C.), but it was the initiative of the Muslim group, having a set goal and limited means, to seek contact with Dutch society. In many cases a notary was the first person who was approached to help formulate the necessary statutes and regulations; next the municipality was contacted for permission to build premises or alter existing ones. Sometimes churches were approached with expectations of help and support.

By now, the citizens of Holland, both Muslims and non-Muslims, have a shared history of at least thirty years (in numerically significant proportions), the last twenty of which were spent in, what may be termed, "the emancipation of the Muslim population in The Netherlands in matters of structured organization." Those who organise themselves, know their own problems. The question is whether the past thirty years show any evidence of this.

Contacts between Dutch society and the world of Islam date from the time of the Crusades. Devout pilgrims travelled to Jerusalem to visit the holy places sites in the city which is sacred to both Christians and Muslims. In those days Jerusalem was under Muslim control. At one stage, there were Flemish, Dutch, and Frisian participants among the crusaders. What sort of impressions of the confrontation with Muslim culture these warriors of the Cross took back with them can only be guessed. In a book entitled "Koffie, kaffer en katoen" (Coffee, Caffre, and Cotton), Marlies Philippa gives an impression of such early cultural influences on the Dutch language.

As a trading nation, Holland has amply proved its pragmatic stance vis a vis the world of Islam. When in 1572 the Dutch Protestants started a war of independence against the Catholic king of Spain, they decorated themselves

with a silver crescent bearing the inscription, "Better Muslim than Catholic." It is not surprising, therefore, that the independent state which emerged from this struggle would show little concern about the pangs of conscience which were felt in many European capitals regarding relations with those Muslim countries which had, for centuries, been the target of a Christian Holy War. In fact, since the sixteenth century, The Netherlands have maintained diplomatic and trading relations with both Turkey and Morocco.

Following the political decline of the Muslim nations, the Dutch kept in contact with the Muslim world - mainly Indonesia - directly or indirectly, using the knowledge gathered by their experts in the course of earlier connections in the service of the economic, military and political interest of the Dutch State. The prompt application of relevant information about Islam for political purposes, together with the conviction that Islam was a formidable competitor on the religious market, lead to a rather conservative attitude among Dutch orientalists, changing only in the second half of the twentieth century. During the early thirties, the first contacts between Dutch people and Muslims living in Holland occurred. This is where the history of Muslim organizations in The Netherlands begins.

In 1932 the Islamic Indonesian Association was founded in The Hague. Formally this association still exists, but its members have never succeeded in founding their own place of prayer. Most of its members have been very well adjusted Indonesian Muslims who lived in Holland - mostly temporarily - for the sake of study or trade.

Since long it has been a tradition among Indonesian Muslims to gather for Friday prayers in the hall of the Indonesian Embassy. So do the members of the Young Muslim Association in Europe which was founded in 1971 with its head quarters in The Hague.

1950 - 1975

In 1951, 12.500 *Moluccans*, members of the Royal Dutch East-Indian army (KNIL), sought safety in The Netherlands. According to the contemporary estimate, there were between 500 and 600 Muslims among them. In December 1954, the first few Muslim families settled in Wyldemerk near Balk in the province of Friesland. A mosque which had been entirely funded by a department of the Ministry of Social and Cultural Affairs called *Ambonezenzorg* (i.e.: Care for the Ambonese) was opened in 1956. Sixty-six families, consisting of a total of 327 persons, were housed in this camp; in the mean time twenty-one families had returned to Indonesia. Fifteen years on, camp Wyldemerk was to be closed since a number of the inhabitants had remigrated to Ambon or Java, while the remainder had moved to Waalwijk or

Ridderkerk where presently mosques have been constructed for both these Muslim communities.

The first Muslim association for *Turkish* Muslim migrants in Holland was founded in 1971. It was registered as *Vereniging ter behartiging van de belangen van moslims in Nederland* (Association for the promotion of the interests of Muslims in The Netherlands), while the *Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland* (Foundation Islamic Centre in The Netherlands) followed in 1972. Both of these unsubsidized initiatives aimed at arranging and managing religious facilities for prayer meetings and Quran lessons for children.

The year 1974 saw the founding of the first *Moroccan* Muslim organizations. In line with the Turkish organizations, the function of this Moroccan initiative was to provide facilities for prayer meetings and Quran lessons. In their case the basement of the Church of St. Willibrordus in Amsterdam was used.

During this period, as we will see, the outlines were set for later umbrella structures, based on one nationality, or even on a given political or sectarian ideology within a particular nationality. The only exception to this pattern at that time was the founding of the "Federation of Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands" (FOMON), in 1975, which constituted the first serious move to unite all existing Muslim organizations.

Inter-ethnic initiatives

One of the first attempts at co-ordination in which Muslims crossed the delineations of their respective nationalities was the *Werkgroep de Moskee* (Working group The Mosque) in Utrecht. With the help and cooperation of a few Dutch social workers from the liberal *Nederlandse Protestantenbond* (Dutch League of Protestants) and two board members of the Foundation Islamic Centre in The Netherlands, some young Moroccans took the initiative to make a start with the ground work for an envisaged supranational mosque in Utrecht. The first fruit of their activities was a collective celebration of the Birthday of the prophet Muhammad - *Milad-un-Nabi* - in April of 1973.

Representatives of Moroccan, Turkish, Tunisian, Kuwaiti and Indonesian diplomatic missions in Holland attended. On behalf of Dutch society, representatives of the Council of Churches, religiously based social organizations, welfare organizations, the press, and others were present. In spite of the large number of visitors, approximately 1700, and the positive atmosphere - the discussions with the VIPs after the meeting and the promises made - the expected break-through to enable the establishment of a first large supra-national mosque, did not occur. Apparently, most of the organizations

which were approached felt somewhat overwhelmed. The representatives of the "oil states" and those of local secular or religious authorities, as yet shelved requests for moral and financial support.

There were, as appeared later, some doubts and objections in the minds of the people who were approached: (a) The apparent link between the social problems of Muslim migrants and Islam as universal world religion confused the issue. Also, Arab embassies wondered if the migrant communities were able to give a true representation of Islam. (b) During a meeting with the local Council of Churches the question arose - perhaps a valid one - what kind of reactions would be expected if foreign Christians proposed to build a monumental church in Morocco or Saudi Arabia. (c) During the late sixties, having initially made a plot of land available for the construction of a large mosque and shopping mall, the Utrecht municipality set as a precondition that the entire project should be financed from abroad. This was in accordance with the original Muslim initiative which fully relied on support from the rich oil states. As mentioned under point a, they, in turn, had some objections of their own.

Nevertheless this meeting has had an inspiring effect on the developments in Amsterdam where the *Nederlandse Islamitische Sociëteit* (Dutch Islamic Society) was founded in 1973 with the express purpose of uniting all Muslims, regardless of nationality. This association organised large collective celebrations of the Prophet's Birthday for many successive years, at first at Bijlmer, later at RAI congress centre in Amsterdam. Also at Utrecht, meetings open to all Muslims were repeatedly set up at the Geertekerk (Church of Geerte) in 1974 and the following year at the Leeuwenbergkerk (Church of Leeuwenberg).

The celebration of the Prophet's birthday as started in Utrecht by Turkish and Moroccan organizations, offered specific opportunities. Because it is not an official Islamic festival, such as the feast after Ramadan or the festival of sacrifice, the activities of the day may be freely selected by the Muslim community. Surinamese Muslims have attempted to make this occasion even a national holiday on the Surinam calendar and those living in Holland consider it a major religious celebration.

During these years the concept of a common mosque remained alive, but the negotiations with the municipal authorities, church boards, the Council of Churches, and several other organizations gradually stagnated. Although the municipality offered a glimpse of hope to set up a collective Islamic service organization, the realization of this was undermined by the appearance of the Amicales in The Netherlands, which corrupted the spiritual and social climate amongst the Moroccans.

Although from within the working group "de Moskee" further contacts were made with the Council of Migrants (*Migrantenraad*)[2] and the permanent Lower Chamber Committee of Social and Cultural Affairs[3], in course of time the most active members of this working group had to quit. Meanwhile, from the same working group a foundation had grown, bearing the same title, but active only on behalf of the Moroccan community.

The year 1973 witnessed another important meeting. On November 18, two deputies of the "*Rabitat Al-Alam al-Islami*" (Muslim World League), namely Dr. Ali Kittani, then lecturer at the petrochemical university at Dhahran, and Dr. Inamullah Khan, secretary general of the "Motamar al-Alam al-Islami" (World Muslim Congress) visited The Netherlands. Occasionally the Muslim World League employs the services of people who have built a good international reputation with some achievement to their credit, to get reliable assessments of the situation of a given Muslim community. On an individual level these "representatives" may hold ideas which differ from the official guide lines of the League. For instance, Dr. Inamullah Khan was in favour of a dialogue with representatives of other religions, while the League tended to be more reserved in this matter, although later their policy has changed somewhat in favour of such a dialogue.

On the occasion of this visit, there was a meeting with representatives of a number of Muslim organizations and persons who, individually, had been involved in affairs of the Muslim world. For the first time such topics as the universality of Islam and the brotherhood of all Muslims were discussed, subjects which had not received sufficient attention at previous meetings due to the customary identification of Muslim issues with the problems of foreign workers. Although part of the deliberation got bogged down on the chicken-or-egg question regarding the priority of having an inspiring spiritual leader for the Muslims in The Netherlands over a large central mosque, or vice versa, all participants agreed on the point that it was necessary to try and forge unity among the Muslims in Holland. At a later stage it was rumoured that the Muslim World League had played an active roll in the formation of the Federation of Muslim Organizations, but in fact at that time their contribution consisted solely of just this one discussion during which they participated in a little brain storming. Until 1977 no material or immaterial help or link existed with this organization.

In reality, cooperation between this kind of world organizations and national or local initiatives involves much more complicated negotiations. For instance, in 1974 a small delegation from Utrecht visited the Islamic Centre in Brussels, at that time still the outpost of the Muslim World League in the Benelux. The primary purpose was to invite one or more speakers for a collective celebration of the Prophet's birthday. It soon became clear that the

imam-director of the centre assumed that all Muslims in Holland were under the influence and control of the Ahmadiyya Movement. Even though the delegation explained all about the true composition of the Muslim population in The Netherlands, both the centre in Brussels and the head office in Mecca remained blind to the needs of Muslims in Holland for several years more.

Even though the delegation explained all about the true composition of the Muslim population in The Netherlands, the advice given by the Centre in Brussels caused the head office in Mecca to remain passive to the needs of Muslims in Holland for several years more.

In 1974, the cooperation of Turkish, Moroccan, Indonesian, Dutch, and Surinamese Muslims in Utrecht, Amsterdam, and The Hague lead to the formation of a country-wide working group consisting of representatives of thirteen different organizations, among which an organization for young Indonesians and a group of Ugandan Muslim refugees. The first activity of this working group was the announcement of the start of Ramadan (the month of fasting), and the 'Id-ul-Fitr, the festival of sacrifice.

In April 1975, the working group formed the *Federation of Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands* (FOMON). Its range of activity included negotiations to establish mosques, obtaining permission for the slaughter of animals for consumption in accordance with Islamic regulations, gaining suitable facilities for Islamic burial, and introducing Islamic religious education within the established educational framework. In cooperation with the Dutch Missionary Council (*Nederlandse Zendingsraad*), the Federation took part in the three-day workshop of the Contact Commission Muslims - Christians to elaborate on such themes as "Room for believers" and "The place of religion in education."

To start with, the Federation received a fairly positive reception among the Dutch authorities and organizations concerned, such as the Ministry of Social and Cultural Affairs (CRM), the *Nederlands Centrum Buitenlanders* (Dutch Centre for Foreigners, NCB), the Council of Churches and similar organizations. The response by the press, however, was guarded. The daily newspapers *De Volkskrant* and *Het Algemeen Dagblad* carried the report from the general press office ANP regarding the inauguration ceremony on April 26, 1975. The main theme of the news item was a perceived complaint about less than complete freedom of religion. One article reduced the issue to, "they (the Muslims) are not given the necessary off time in the course of their work period to recite their prayers, and their children become estranged from the parents as a result of the education they receive in Holland." In its issue of April 29, the daily *Trouw* reacted with some more details. "At present some one hundred thousand Muslims reside in Holland. They experience almost daily that Holland offers a degree of religious freedom, but that our society and

our culture - the environment in which this freedom of religion is expected to flourish - is still strongly characterised as being Christian in spite of a considerable degree of secularization. Consequently, the religious freedom of the Muslims occasionally hits on problems. Freedom in the nineteenth century sense of the word, in which a person is neither hindered in his religious conviction, nor receives any encouragement, is no real freedom. According to that old concept, freedom would equal indifference and is therefore a negative concept; yet, freedom (just like tolerance) is a positive concept which needs to be made materially possible. This is true for freedom of education, freedom of the press, and also for freedom of religion".

"Regarding foreign workers (who constitute the majority of the Muslims in Holland) another factor comes into play. We, the Dutch, have brought these people here primarily to serve our interests. It is therefore no more than our duty to protect their interests to the best of our ability; their material and their spiritual interests. One of the foremost conditions is to provide positive information about the religious convictions of foreigners to employers who have foreigners working for them. The government may certainly leave the execution of this information drive to private organizations, but must facilitate the material circumstances for this task, for instance by registration of all firms and enterprises, and by introducing the information giving organizations. A consequence of the current system of social subsidy is the broadening of this help, by which spiritual ministers and social workers are made available to these people. There is no need for the government to get directly involved in the actual spiritual care, since such matters (and the appointment of spiritual ministers) will be left to special organizations. This is again a question of enabling freedom to be experienced as a positive concept."

While much more may be said about such issues as freedom, tolerance, and indifference - living, as we do in a country which is inhabited by far more "unbelievers" than this article would suggest, and "believers" have always presumed that religious belief must be treated with respect, but neither Christians, nor Muslims show much consideration in their social lives for the opposite opinion, - this commentary was an early indication of the three areas in which the emancipation of Muslims would require further effort: religion, education, and media communication.

As a result of the enormous growth of Muslim organizations, the Federation took the initiative to call a nation-wide meeting of Muslim organizations in June 1980, with the purpose of attaining a more representative umbrella organization. The following year, after a period with an interim committee consisting of several Muslim Ambassadors, a new umbrella organization was founded under the name of Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands (MON). For some time this organization lead a marginal existence and presently it

exists only on paper. Some of the council members of the former Federation established the Muslim Information Centre in The Hague which concentrates on providing information on Islam in Dutch, and provides guidance to Dutch speaking Muslims.

There was as almost explosive growth of Turkish and Moroccan mosque organizations and an obvious division among Turkish Muslim organizations along three lines: Diyanet (official Turkish Islam), Suleymanli (Quran schools), and Milli Görus (original followers of political parties set up over and again by prof. Erbakan). Considering these facts, the Federation, as it was at that time, concluded that it no longer proportionately represented the composition of the Muslims living in The Netherlands.

Government Reports

Soon after the founding of the Federation, the Ministry of Social and Cultural Affairs instituted an inquiry into the needs of the Muslim community (*Behoefte-onderzoek Moslims*, published in 1976) in order to formulate criteria for future subsidies for mosques, since the Ministry recognised this specific need. The authors of the report, Samuels and Gransbergen received their information from scholars specialising in Islam or Cultural Anthropology (Baljon, Theunis, Speckmann, and Peters). The report concluded with a positive advise regarding subsidy provisions for mosques, and especially Theunis proved himself well informed. Nevertheless, a peculiar contradiction was contained in the wording of the report. To the question, "Is it desirable to subsidise Muslim organizations and help them make arrangements for mosques locally, regionally, or nation-wide?" Dr. Theunis replied that primarily local initiatives for the building of mosques should be supported, adding at once that the present move towards the formation of umbrella organizations in Holland was basically alien to the Muslim world. Islam did not have an upper structure comparable to the Roman Catholic Church. A federative co-operation would be the only practical possibility, he said.

Later, these phrases were copied, almost literally, by the authors of the report in their conclusion and recommendation. However, they contradicted themselves in saying that "...this means that we foresee a minor, advisory roll for the nation-wide umbrella organization. In the first place, because of its recent date of origin; secondly, because the co-ordination within this organization is based on the work of volunteers; and lastly, because such an umbrella structure may be alien to Islam."[4]

It is obvious that voluntary co-ordination, which was the basis of the Federation, cannot coexist with an authoritarian super-structure like the one implied in the comparison with the structure of the Roman-Catholic Church.

All this shows that an oblique answer to a meaningful question strangely developed a life of its own. During the period that the founders of the Federation operated as a working group, they never presented themselves as an authoritarian body with an inherent hierarchy; in fact, the authors of the report could have deducted from the name itself that a clear-cut federative structure was all that was aimed for. There was no reason to, firstly, suggest something outside of the facts, and subsequently claim that what had been suggested is alien to Islam. Thus, at an early stage the painful absence of unity among the Muslims in Holland had become evident.

Another report by a working group of the Ministry of Social and Cultural Affairs (WVC), entitled "Religious facilities for Ethnic Minorities in The Netherlands" offers another example of information provided by specialists regarding Muslim initiatives such as the already-mentioned "Federation of Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands" (FOMON) of 1975 and the Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands (MON) of 1981. The report referred to here is well known and was introduced on December 31, 1982 by Waardenburg and Coutier to the Ministry of Social and Cultural Affairs (WVC).[5]

Naturally, it is easy to criticise from the side lines; people who do not write reports do not make mistakes. But a certain kind of information acts to distort the truth. For instance, a sentence like: "In 1981 a new 'international' umbrella organization was founded, entitled 'Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands' (MON). Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Pakistani organizations joined this federation." This statement is contradicted by the facts of history; only Turkish organizations joined this federation, and a few Pakistanis and one Surinamese were at some time council members. On the same page the working group stated not to have found any confirmation that the Union of Moroccan Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands (UMMON) really represented forty-two local Moroccan organizations. In view of the statements and written texts which the members of this working group published since the time of the above mentioned report, it seems that the Moroccan community has been largely disregarded, perhaps because researching them was considered too laborious, or because they presented a far less assimilated character than the Turkish community; perhaps also because researchers who collect scientific or political data, found it difficult to obtain the information *they* wanted.

The report also contributed in stigmatizing once more FOMON which, in the media already had acquired the image of an organization existing in total separation from the actual Muslims. Under the heading, "Support from Abroad," it stated the following. "In the past there have been attempts from abroad to interfere in this organising process. In this context, 'abroad' stands

for certain Arab oil-states. The Muslims in The Netherlands have been promised a large sum of money for a costly mosque project on the condition that they would support unconditionally the donor's opinion about Islam in their management. Similar financial proposals with strict conditions attached have been made in the past. The above mentioned Federation of Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands is largely financed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Rabita. It strongly appears that the acceptance of this support has contributed to the failure of this federating initiative. It must be said that such kind of support from abroad, now discussed, is mainly offered to organizations operating at a national level through which the donor country attempts to establish a grip on the Muslim community in The Netherlands. More incidental financial donations which are made from abroad for the sake of founding a prayer-hall by local Muslim organizations appear to be motivated rather by the desire to help fellow Muslims in The Netherlands" (p. 17).

To this a remark by J. Slomp may be added, suggesting the general lack of support for the Federation among Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin: "...on several occasions during the first five years, an appeal for help had to be made to Dutch Muslims, including those of Surinamese origin... This last mentioned group was called upon for support in the founding of the FOMON on April 26, 1975 at The Hague." In the same line this author stated: "It was to the disadvantage of the first Federation that they depended too much on the Muslim World League, commonly known as Rabita, which has a reputation of conservatism, and that Dutch people took the lead...."[6]

It thus seems inevitable for Muslim organizations in Holland to be governed by the maxim, "Het is nooit goed of het deugt niet," (there is no way to get it right). When the Muslims do not offer representation to the Government, they are asked why they do not organise themselves collectively. For years, the oft repeated question was, "With which Muslim organization can we go into discussion?" When subsequently, after extensive preparations, a Federation is founded, the response is that such form of organization is "alien to Islam, and authoritarian."

When various government bodies were approached with requests for subsidies, the response was often, "Why don't you get help from those rich oil states?" When in reality any of these countries sends help, this is regarded as some kind of conspiracy "to establish a grip on the Muslim community." Moreover, such help would have "contributed to the failure of this federating initiative." Also, while for thirty years the issue of language problems remained at the top of the list of priorities for minority policies, the involvement of Dutch persons in the management and administration is taken wrong. Moreover, it is totally ignored that the Federation maintained relations with international Muslim organizations, such as the World Assembly of

Muslim Youth in Riyadh, the Muslim World Congress in Karachi, and the Islamic Council of Europe in London.

The five years during which the supra-national Federation of Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands existed (1975 - 1980) showed that, due to linguistic and cultural divergence, Muslims of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese origin preferred to organise themselves on the basis of national, sectarian, or political preference. The following ten years (1979 - 1989) show the development of country-wide organizations on these lines.

The Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation (TICF) which was founded in 1979, is the largest umbrella organization representing more than a hundred mosque organizations, but it is not the only Turkish Muslim organization. The year 1982 saw the founding of the "Islamitische Stichting Nederland," the Islamic Foundation in The Netherlands (ISN) which is strongly influenced by the Turkish Presidium for Religious Affairs in Ankara, which in turn also maintains good relations with the Turkish Federation. Both these organizations in Holland have come to a division of tasks, in which the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation specialises on religious, social and cultural activities, while the management of the mosques is mainly left to the Islamic Foundation. More than one hundred buildings used as mosques are being looked after. In parallel, a foundation has been created for the purpose of organising Islamic education in Holland, the ISNOO which is directed by the said Presidium in Ankara. This country-wide organization has founded Islamic primary schools at Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam.

Since 1923, Turkey is a republic with an internal policy which strongly favours complete secularization. Presently, the Turkish State has a virtual monopoly on the training of Muslim theologians in that country, and expects those theologians to promote the concept of secularization.

Just as in Turkey where, years ahead of the "official" Islam, the Quran schools pioneered among the Muslim community more on ideological than political grounds, similar educational groups organised themselves in The Netherlands, starting from 1972.

According to their own records, the Islamic Centre established at Utrecht since 1972 (Islamitisch Centrum Nederland) has twenty-five subdivisions, concentrating mainly on Quran education. They also teach classical Arabic at a modest level. This educational centre was founded by Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan who taught not only religious law and dogmas, but also the stages of the inner path, being a spiritual guide of the Naqshibandi order. He did not regard himself as a reformer, but followed the existing principles towards which his followers adopt a rather strict attitude. In their adaptation of education and dress, however, they are regarded as fairly modern.

Former members of the Milli Selamet Parti, the National Salvation Party of Turkey which is known since 1983 as the Refah Parti (Welfare Party), have set up the Milli Görus (National Vision) organization in Europe. This group uses the word "milli" more or less in a Quranic sense, meaning "constituent of the international Muslim community." The mosques of this association are locally organised under the umbrella of the "Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie," the Dutch Islamic Federation which was formed in 1981. A section from within their ranks reorganised themselves under the leadership of a Turkish RE teacher, Cemalettin Kaplan, who attracted the somewhat ironic nickname of the 'Turkish Khomeini'. He operates from his base in Germany, but has some influence in Holland, too. Provided one defines 'fundamentalism' as: the rigid and militant interpretation of Islamic principles, this group of people may be labeled as fundamentalists.

The followers of Said Nursi, who is also known as Nurcular in Turkish, have their own mosque and study centre in Rotterdam. They maintain good relations with the church of St.Paul (Pauluskerk) where they participate regularly in meetings for dialogue and sometimes provide speakers from their own ranks. Their study material consists mainly of the *Risale-i-Nur*, a limited Quran exegesis with elaborated examples aimed at strengthening the certainty of belief.

The Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation, the Islamic Centre in The Netherlands, the Dutch Islamic Federation (NIF), the Turkish Sports Federation, the Turkish Labour Union in The Netherlands (HTIB), the Union of Turkish Women in The Netherlands (H.T.K.B.), and the Federation of Democratic Social Associations in The Netherlands (DSDF) are all represented in the advisory council for Turks which may advise the Dutch Government, on request or on their own initiative.

The Union of Moroccan Muslim Organizations (UMMON), active since 1977 as a working group and since 1982 as an official statutory organization, probably represents more than eighty mosques. They maintain close relations with the Moroccan Government, a fact which is indicated by their frequent consultations with the Moroccan Embassy in The Hague. Nevertheless, the UMMON may be regarded as fairly representative of the Moroccan community, reflecting as they do the opinion of a broad middle section of their community, the so called silent majority.

Leftist Moroccan Labour Organizations such as the Committee of Moroccan Labourers in The Netherlands (KMAN) are mostly active on the social field and are often distinctly anti-religious in their approach to the problems of Muslims. As yet, the UMMON is not associated with the advisory council for Moroccans which has been set up in co-operation with several Tunisian representatives, the Moroccan Tunisian Cooperative

(Samenwerkingsverband Marokkanen - Tunesiërs). It would be beneficial for the legal position of the Moroccan Muslim community if they voiced their views in such collective representations.

Although for a long time the UMMON seemed to be the only representative body for Moroccan organizations in Holland, there is an increasing number of critical voices regarding the way this organization functions. Contrary to the local Turkish organizations, the Moroccans have not developed a tradition of mutual consultation, they do not hold country-wide elections, nor do they have a clear-cut and written programme of activities. This was one of the reasons why a second umbrella for Moroccan Muslim organizations has been founded, to which mainly so called "free mosques" have subscribed. Perhaps the most important distinguishing characteristic is the stance taken by their leaders that the Muslim community in Holland is here to stay and that the mosques need to take a greater interest in the society and culture of Holland. This recent umbrella organization was founded in 1990 and bears the name "*Nederlandse Federatie van Maghribijnse Islamitische Organisaties*," the Dutch Federation of Maghribi Islamic Organizations (NFMIO). According to their records, they represent twenty-one mosque associations.

Among the local Surinamese Hindustani Muslim organizations, some of the larger ones present themselves as national platforms for their members. Some of these are, the Foundation for Welfare of Muslims in The Netherlands (*Stichting Welzijn Moslims in Nederland*) with the Taibah Mosque at Amsterdam as their head quarters - the same mosque housing the local branch of the World Islamic Mission (WIM) -, the *International Muslim Organization* (IMO) with its head office at the "*Noeroel Islam Moskee*" (Nur-ul-Islam Mosque) in The Hague; the *World Islamic Mission The Hague Holland Branch*; and the *World Islamic Mission Rotterdam The Hague Branch* with its head office and mosque at Herschelstraat, The Hague. The choice of names among these organizations causes confusion. In addition to those listed above, the Qadri Centre at The Hague has some wider influence in the country.

Generally speaking, these organizations whose range and following are difficult to confirm, would characterise themselves as Urdu speaking, Sunnite Muslim organizations with a majority of Surinamese members. Most of the Surinamese Hindustani Muslims and their spiritual leaders in India, Pakistan belong to the Bareilvi school of thought (originating in North Western India) which places great importance on devotion to the prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and the celebration of the anniversary of his birth.

Another feature of these groups, one which is often reflected in the names they choose for their organization, is their alignment with the Hanafi school of orthodoxy (after Abu Hanifa, d.150 AH /767 AD) and, what they name as *Ahl-*

i-Sunnat wa-l Jama'at. The latter implies a traditional attitude towards the method of following the Prophet's example, and could be described as "followers of an established school of orthopraxy."

Another common feature of the organised Surinamese Muslims is that they tend to group themselves around a declared spiritual leader. For instance, Shah Ahmad Nurani is the guide of the WIM in Amsterdam, Pir Ma'ruf heads the WIM at The Hague, Abdul Wahab Siddiqui is the leader of the IMO at The Hague, and the Qadri Centre is named after its leader.

The fact that the Urdu language is specifically used as a characteristic of these groups finds its cause in the desire of Surinamese Muslims to strengthen their ancestral culture. While their Hindu compatriots identify themselves with India, these Muslims obtain their inspiration from Pakistan. They use Urdu, which is akin to their own speech, sometimes in their devotions beside the purely ritual Arabic.

The Surinamese Muslims of Javanese origin have three mosques of their own in different parts of the country. They have so far remained independent without joining any of the larger Hindustani organizations.

The Pakistani Muslims in Holland have founded at least four mosques in different towns, each a private and local initiative. Pakistanis maintain close relations with their home country, also in matters of religion and have not shown any inclination to join local umbrella organizations.

Amongst the Turks and Pakistanis there are some Shi'ite Muslims who have arranged their own facilities. The Turkish Shi'ites have a small mosque in The Hague.

In line with the continuation of activities in 1980 under the title of Muslim Information Centre in The Netherlands, rooted on the statutory basis of FOMON, there have been a number of initiatives attempting to cross the boundaries of ethnicity. Examples of this trend are the Foundation of Dutch Muslim Women al-Nisa in May 1982, the Islamic Foundation for the Promotion of Integration (ISBI) in June 1990, the umbrella organization for Islamic School Boards (ISBO) in February 1990, the eventual admission of the Surinamese umbrella organization WIM and the UMMON to the board of directors of the Islamic Broadcasting Foundation (IOS), and the endeavour to set up a broadly representative Islamic Council in The Netherlands. Such initiatives will be of particular importance to the coming generations of young Muslims growing up in Holland whose development would obviously be hampered if ethnic rigidity among Muslim organizations is maintained.

Organizations of Muslim women must be mentioned. After some earlier initiatives failed to mature, the women's group of the Muslim Information Centre at The Hague, and the Foundation of Muslim Women in The Netherlands, *al-Nisa*, with head-quarters first in Amsterdam but presently at

Almere, developed useful programmes for women. They arrange monthly lecture meetings, organise instruction classes for Arabic and ritual prayer, and fulfil a social need for dealing with specific problems of Muslim women. Their membership consists largely of Dutch-speaking Muslim women. *Al-Nisa* has supported the setting up of similar groups in Zwolle, Venlo, Haarlem and Arnhem.

The 1980s saw the appearance of Islamic schools created on the initiative of Muslim parents who were concerned about the perceived alienation of their children from traditional Islamic values as a result of their education at Dutch public and denominational schools. Most of these primary schools for Muslims attract children of one nationality or another. An attempt at some co-ordination between the various school boards was made by establishing the Islamic School Board Organization (ISBO) aiming at all (future) levels of primary and secondary education.

In 1989, the need for supra-national co-operation among Muslims sharply increased as a result of the world-wide media war around the Rushdie case. This matter focused public opinion not only on Rushdie, freedom of religion and freedom of expression, but also threatened to become the keystone in the discussion about the presence of foreign Muslims in Europe. The sharpening atmosphere necessitated the setting up of an Islamic National Committee (ILC). By this action it became possible to show that a majority among the Muslims in Holland did not agree with the Iranian clergy, or with Khomeiny in particular.

In connection with the Rushdie case, and later during the Gulf crisis, the Muslim community in Holland has sufficiently proved to be a real "Ummatan Wasatan," a community of the Middle. However, what is equally obvious, is that this same community finds it extremely difficult to muster a similar unity and moderation when having to stand up for their collective interests within their situation in this country. The necessary position of the Middle, the balance which is needed to organise themselves properly and project their requirements in an acceptable manner to the society and government of Holland has not yet been achieved. It seems always easier to deal with a crisis than to cope with the drudgery of everyday life. The world was prepared to spend millions on the Gulf war, but hardly a penny for a day of peace.

Anyway, after the Islamic National Committee had presented themselves to the relevant bodies as representing at least 90% of all Muslim organizations in Holland, the next logical step was to prepare a co-operative which could act as a corporate body within the local legislative framework. The result was the initiative to establish what was provisionally called the "*Islamitische Raad Nederland*", the Islamic Council in The Netherlands.

Meanwhile, the State Commission Hirsch Ballin in their final report entitled "Government, Religion, and Philosophy of Life" had advised in favour of arranging facilities for religious ministration to benefit Muslims in the Dutch army and in penal institutions, and also to establish a Central Bureau for Religious Facilities for Minorities (*landelijk bureau geestelijke verzorging*). In this connection it is relevant to know that mosques are supported by a larger membership than non-religious organizations. For this, if for no other reason, it is of crucial importance that an Islamic Council (ICN) should take shape.

Yet, the Muslims in Holland seem to be plagued by a surprising blindness for their own best interest. Or could it be some kind of self-interest which prevents certain ethno-centric organizations supporting a collective representation in the Islamic Council (ICN)? We do not know. All we can say with certainty is that, after two years of meetings and consultations, many capable and well-minded people have given up and as yet no effective supra-national cooperative council has been realised. It is sadly evident that the poor level of emancipation and integration of Muslims into the Dutch society is associated with the limited degree of organization and the resulting lack of political influence.

In June 1990, a supra-national Islamic foundation for the promotion of integration, the *Islamitische Stichting Bevordering Integratie* (ISBI) was set up with a view to utilise locally existing channels to help the Muslim community in its development and integration. During a congress organised by them in January 1991 at the campus of Rotterdam University, a six point plan was formulated for the improvement of the situation of Muslims regarding social participation, education, welfare, and representation.

The need for political and social control which is experienced by Muslims in Holland must be fulfilled, not by internal rivalry, but by duly applying their energy to achieve a position of healthy self-confidence within the Dutch society.

Internal and external factors which have obstructed the formation of supra-national Muslim organizations in The Netherlands

A review of the period 1974-1991 regarding initiatives to form a supra-national umbrella organization for The Netherlands shows that certain internal and external factors have contributed to a long delay - if not a total obstruction - of the democratic process in forming a unified Muslim representation. In Islamic tradition such a representative body is known as the "shura."

Internal factors

1.Problems related to the lack of command over a common language, terminology, and procedural efficiency in consultation and negotiation.
2.Mutual ignorance, and sometimes disrespect, regarding each other's religious, cultural and ethnic background. For instance, the differing interpretations of the various schools of doctrine may interfere with a common definition of the beginning and the end of Ramadan, the month of fasting.
3.The defence of national or sectarian interests obstructs the commitment to a common Muslim-cause.
4.Among Muslim organizations of one particular nationality umbrella organizations have been formed based on specific political, sectarian, or other ideological grounds. When among the resulting nation-wide umbrella organizations only quantitative representation applies, small organizations get no chance to make themselves heard. Examples of this problem are the selection process of a directorate for the Islamic Broadcasting Foundation (Islamitische Omroep Stichting) and, more recently, the founding process of the Islamic Council for The Netherlands (Islamitische Raad Nederland).
5.Influences from various levels;
(a) From the international Muslim community. This influence is usually positive in relation to supra-national umbrella formation, using pan-Islamic concepts and terminology.
(b) From the various home countries. Through embassies, foreign religious leaders and the ideology of specific religious or political parties, local Muslim organizations are influenced to conform to certain approved ideas.
(c) Within Europe, umbrella organizations in several countries join European umbrella structures which, in some cases, overwhelm the local departments, forcing them to conform.
(d) Within The Netherlands, there is a steady exchange of ideas amongst Muslims organizations, and between these organizations and the Dutch authorities, nationally and locally, in order to arrange special facilities for Muslims. For instance, in providing religious support for Muslims in hospitals, penitentiary institutions, and the army, not every patient or client is pleased with just any visiting religious minister or imam.
6.Poor availability of skilled leadership. The Muslims who have migrated to Holland did not bring their own spiritual leaders with them. Those religious ministers who were later appointed from abroad to fill the vacancies, are not sufficiently informed about the situation in Holland, for instance, the experience of having to live amidst the tension between two cultures as it is felt by all young Muslims in this country.

External factors

During the first decades of Muslim presence in The Netherlands, the Dutch government has approached this group of people with a different belief purely on the basis of their economic usefulness. They were defined as "guest workers", foreign labourers, perhaps as ethnic or cultural minorities, but rarely as Muslims.

Not only do the Dutch authorities fail to really name the Muslim community within the Dutch borders; they never wish to discuss organizations based on religion. Similarly, social workers in government employment (Stichting Welzijn Buitenlandse Werknemers), in dealing with ethnic minorities have reflected an attitude of disregard towards the values of Islam. In response to the request for help in finding facilities for prayer meetings - at first only during Ramadan, and later for permanent use - they obviously held the conviction that such requests merely represented the last remnants of a passing problem, the solution for which was seen as the total assimilation of the Turkish and Moroccan communities in the Dutch society.

Meanwhile, history has proved that to the Muslims religion is the main common ground for the founding of organizations. However, the Government does not accept this as a fact. Therefore, specifically religious organizations are not referred to by name, which creates the impression that ignoring them is characteristic of the policies regarding minorities.

This policy has resulted in the Government's ignorance about Muslim organizations and their umbrella structures. This proves to be a great handicap in case of a crisis, as was shown at the time of the Rushdie-affaire when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set out to organise a meeting with Muslim representatives in Holland.

In the course of these negotiations, as well as during later encounters, the Dutch authorities appeared to find it difficult to accept any of the existing organizations as official representative of the Muslims in Holland. The Islamic Council was reproached for not representing every single Muslim organization; that at a particular time the committee was not available by telephone; and that the same committee had not registered itself officially as a corporate body, foundation, or association. Subsequently, two government founded organizations for minorities, the Consultative Body of Turks (Inspraak Orgaan Turken) and the Moroccan - Tunisian Co-operative (Samenwerkingsverband Marokkanen-Tunesiers), were asked to form a separate Islamic Council.

In dealing with religious communities the Government's attitude is ambiguous: incomplete representation is not accepted from Muslims, but tolerated from Christians, since the Inter-Church Contact in Governmental Affairs (Interkerkelijk Contact in Overheidszaken) does not represent every

single church community or church organization. It seems that the Dutch government originally had hoped to avoid dealing with the issue of Muslims in Holland by simply ignoring their religious identity. Since that strategy did not work, the Government is now in search of a way to bundle the persistent Muslims into one manageable body.

What is at stake at this moment, is not only the recognition and integration of the Muslim community, but also the welfare and harmony within the Dutch society as a whole. All that can be hoped for is that the "divide and rule" policy which most of the parties concerned seem to apply, will be overcome by an increase of good will and mutual trust.

Notes

[1]G.F.Pijper, Islam and The Netherlands, E.J.Brill, Leiden 1957.

[2]From 1973 to October 1, 1978, the Council for Migrants has functioned, just in Utrecht, as an advisory platform of immigrants mainly for welfare policies. The main topics which were discussed and on which advice was given to the Municipal Council, police and government ministries were: education to immigrant children, housing, information, relations with labour unions and town committees, religious activities, and health care. Within the context of this last point, attention was given to prayer facilities for Moroccans.

[3]On April 29, 1974 members of the working group De Moskee handed a petition to the Special Second Chamber Commission for Foreign Workers. In this petition six points were listed and five persons mentioned, followed by a brief conclusion. The full text was published in News Letter nr 5 of the ministry of C.R.M., as well as in Sj.Theunis' book "Ze zien liever mijn handen dan mijn gezicht" (They rather see my hands than my face).

On November 5, 1975 a discussion was held with the Permanent Second Chamber Commission for C.R.M., council members of the Federation of Muslim Organizations, and a Dutch member of the working group De Moskee who assisted in preparing for the discussion.

[4]*Behoefte-onderzoek Moslims*, Ministry of C.R.M., Rijswijk 1976, p.27/ 5, 6, and p. 34.

[5]Report of the Ministry of W.V.C., "Religious Facilities for Ethnic Minorities in The Netherlands." Rijswijk 1982, p. 14 and 17.

[6]J.Slomp, Islam, Norm, ideaal en werkelijkheid: Islam in Nederland, 1984; J.Slomp, Spiegel Historiael: De Islam in Nederland, 1983.

[7]Summarizing, we can comment on the five-year history of the Federation that it is perhaps characteristically Dutch to have all sorts of people ventilate their "own opinion" about this organization on the one hand, researchers often complain about the closed character of the Muslim community, but at the same time organizations with an open policy are reviled.

10

Islam and Ethnicity among Turks
The Changing Role of Islam and Muslim Organizations

Th. Sunier

Introduction

This article is the preliminary result of a research project which I am carrying out among young Turkish Muslims in The Netherlands. The main subject of the research is the changing role and significance of Islam among Turkish Muslim migrants and the role which Muslim organizations play in this process. Thus the focus of the research is the dynamic aspects of Islam. In many publications on Muslim migrants in Europe Islam is generally considered to be merely a part of the cultural background of migrants and a constant factor at least as far as the first and to a lesser extent the second generation is concerned. Main attention is being paid to the continuative aspects of Islamic tradition. As such Islam is treated as an explanatory phenomenon rather than a phenomenon which has to be `explained'.

It is certainly true that because Islam has been `imported' by Muslim migrants, there is much continuity in religious ideas and practices. Muslim migrants in general perform their religious duties in much the same way as they did in their homelands. Islam functions as an important point of reference in their attitude towards the host society. This is especially the case for the first generation of migrants. Most of the Muslim organizations have been set up by the first generation and have their counterparts in the homelands. As such these organizations play an important role in maintaining the ties between migrants and the countries of origin. By stressing these ties with the homelands and the cultural background, parents try to transmit their Islamic values to their children and thus safeguard the continuity of the Islamic traditions.

One of the reasons, however, why continuity prevails above dynamics is that Islam is often considered to be essentially unchangeable. Islam or Islamic

tradition and modernization are supposed to be irreconcilable (Nasr, 1987: 14). In his outstanding study on Islam and capitalism Maxime Rodinson has put it as follows: "All these views [of adversaries and defenders of Islam], however they may contradict each other, are based, it should be observed, upon the same implicit presupposition. They assume that the men of a given epoch and a given region, that whole societies give strict obedience to a previously formed doctrine, which has taken shape independently of them; that they follow its precepts (and soak themselves in its spirit) without these undergoing any essential transformation, and without these men adapting them to their conditions of life and the attendant modes of thought" (Rodinson, 1966: 3).

Culture and thus religion is, however, not a static phenomenon. It is constantly reshaped and reproduced by human practice under the actual situation in which people live. Changing circumstances and new experiences affect the attitude towards Islam and the way in which Islam is reproduced and articulated by adherents. Migration can be considered as a major break, a rupture in the life and experiences of Muslims coming from their homelands. This break causes a change in the significance of Islam. As far as change is included in the analysis on Muslims under the new situation, it is done with a rather static view on religion. Muslims, it is claimed, either cling totally to their cultural and religious background or assimilate into the host society and thus eventually loose this background.

The widely held view that change is only discernable after the third or fourth generation of migrants is somewhat strange as it implies that there must be some sort of `cultural standstil' among the first and second generation. As Stuart Hall put it: "I view this [(re)shaping of religious ideology] as a constant process of breaks, interruptions and reorganization, in which the religious formation is reordered, rearranged, dislocated and repositioned, so as to provide new religious languages and practices within which to articulate new historical realities" (Hall, 1985: 272). It is this aspect of cultural or religious change which is in general neglected or underestimated with respect to the situation of Muslim migrants in Europe.

A reader edited by William Roff contains some interesting contributions on the specific manifestations of Islam in different countries of the Islamic world. The central issue of the reader is not the obvious similarities between these manifestations due to the central concepts of Islam, but the existing differences. The authors do not stress the formal, normative aspects of Islam, which of course play an important role, but rather the way in which "real or supposed imperatives of `being Muslim' [are] understood, and in what terms and by whom, and with what social implications are they expressed, conveyed, urged, argued, and acted upon" (Roff, 1987: 1).

Roff c.s. admit that there is an obvious continuity of Islamic tradition, but argue that social scientists simply ought to be concerned with other subjects than islamologists. They must find out in what way actors fill in and interpret these normative rules. Social context is as much an `objective' condition which determines specific religious articulation as `prescribed' Islam. (Roff, 1987: 4). In the same reader Eickelmann proposes to develop what he calls a "political economy of meaning". According to Eickelmann: "a political economy of meaning contrives to achieve a balance between concern with the communication and development of complex belief systems and how these systems shape and in turn are shaped by configurations of political domination and economic relations among groups and classes in societies of different levels of complexity" (Eickelman, 1987: 16).

Both on the basis of some central theological principles of Islam, on which I, due to lack of space, will not elaborate here[1] , and on the basis of more general considerations about the relation between religion and societal context, we must conclude that the view that Islam is essentially unchangeable is untenable. Besides, whether the Islamic tradition itself changes or not is, although an interesting question, however not my focus of concern. The main issue at stake is how these traditions and central values are viewed and interpreted by actors in specific social circumstances.

Islam and migration

Islam in Western Europe has thus mainly been observed as part of the cultural background of migrants from Muslim countries. The apparent increase of Muslim organizations - especially mosques - has generally been regarded as a consequence of the increase of the Muslim population and family reunion. Besides, it is said, the growing unemployment among Muslim migrants enhanced the opportunity to fulfil the duties and obligations imposed by Islam. Thus mosques and other Islamic organizations are treated as the visible results of the `transmission' of cultural, religious and political values from the countries of origin to the host countries.

In this `cultural explanation' `being Muslim' is generally defined as the observance of religious duties and obligations. Belonging to the community of believers is considered as a derivation of religious praxis. Integration into Dutch society is related to the extent to which people from Muslim countries loosen the ties with their cultural and religious background. If religious praxis decreases, the internal cohesion of a certain Muslim community will in due course accordingly wane. The cultural explanation also presumes that there is a direct relation between the extent to which a certain ethnic or religious group clings to its cultural background and the attitude towards the host society.

Therefore the bigger the cultural distance, the more detached their attitudes towards the host society and vice versa. From this point of view the ambivalence of policymakers towards organizations of migrants and phenomena such as Islamic schools is understandable. On the one hand there is the right to organize, on the other hand, however, these organizations are seen as an inhibition to full-scale integration. In short, the cultural explanation is too ascriptive (Vermeulen, 1984: 12) as it considers behaviour, attitudes and images of a certain migrant group solely as a derivative of their cultural background. "Cultural attributes are thought to be objectively observable and passed down from generation to generation, so that the difference in values, mores and symbols which form the social boundaries between insiders and outsiders can persist over long periods of time" (Enloe, 1980: 4).

Although much of this `cultural explanation' can be useful to a certain extent, too little attention is paid to the significance and meaning of Islam as an ideological, collective system of reference and identification and to the role religious organizations play in this respect. Of course in many studies on Islam the collective implications of the religion have been emphasized and applied to the situation in the host countries. If we take the concept of *umma*[2] for example, it becomes clear that within Islam the idea of belonging to a collectivity is very important. The fact, however, that these collective aspects are essential to Islam doesn't imply an innate urge of Muslims to organize on the basis of the concept of the *umma*. This again I would call a `cultural or ascriptive explanation'. Islamic history shows that the concept of *umma* has been mainly a theoretical construction.[3] In fact historically, centrifugal forces proved to be much stronger than centripetal ones. This does not mean that the *umma* as a principle is not important at all. What I want to emphasize is that the fact that Muslims organize themselves here or in the Islamic world cannot be explained simply by referring to the concept of the *umma* alone.

In my view it is useful to follow Stuart Hall's line of thought and to study Islam as an ideological field.[4] Islam is then a point of reference which structures experiences, but *in turn* is structured by actual socio-political, socio-economic and historical junctures. In his study of the role of religion on Jamaica, Hall analyzes the way in which religion is being articulated under the influence of specific social circumstances. "I therefore treat religion as one of the many kinds of discourses (language and practices) through which social groups or classes represent relationships between the secular and spiritual world and which provide systems of meaning, frameworks of interpretation or intelligibility, through which they `make sense of' or `give meaning to' their social existence and justify or legitimate particular interests and actions." (Hall, 1985: 272).

Islam and societal change

If we want to analyze the change in the meaning of Islam under a migratory situation, there are in my view two relevant processes which have to be taken into consideration. First there is the changing meaning of Islam against the background of societal modernization. Second, and this is especially relevant for the situation in Western Europe or The Netherlands, is the changing meaning of Islam against the background of the functional differentiation of the social system in the host society. What is important in the latter case is an analysis of the position and the specific experiences as a minority in the host society of people from Muslim countries.

Almost all large migration waves, albeit national or international, which took place in this century have one thing in common: they have always been movements from a periphery to a centre of economic activity. Migration must be considered as an important cause for economic and societal modernization. Among other things migration resulted in large scale urbanization. One of the consequences was the breakdown of the traditionally sharp dividing line between rural and urban areas. Around the big cities vast areas of village-like squatter settlements arose in which new rural immigrants settled. In the course of time these settlements became part of the urban structure. In the case of Turkey this urbanization process and several aspects of socio-political change has been described among others by the Turkish-American sociologist Karpat (1976).[5]

Several aspects of modernization, such as industrialization, scale increase, rationalization and the increase in the means of communication have been described extensively. What is at stake here is how this transformation process influenced religion, in casu Islam. Some claim that modernization causes a gradual decrease of the influence and significance of religion. In a rational and individualized society there is supposed to be no place for something as `irrational' as religious belief. Others, however, show that it is more a matter of a *changing* significance rather than a decrease.

The American historian Voll also relates the recent growing significance of Islam in the urban areas of the Islamic world, the so-called `fundamentalism', to societal modernization. Fundamentalism is not an attempt to bring back the traditional Islamic society, but rather an "attempt to build a postmodern society by utilizing traditions that are deeply rooted within society" (Voll, 1982:277). An important aspect of this transformation process lies within the role of Islam. Islam is not anymore just a sanctioning principle within a relatively closed community. It developed into a model, a paradigm for a better society. The British anthropologist Ernest Gellner developed a general framework in which he made a distinction between a `tribal' and an `urban' pole of Islam, the

latter being characterized by its emphasis on the formal and scriptural aspects of the Islamic tradition. According to Gellner, this scripturalist version of Islam becomes the most salient and most appropriate in an modern urban setting as it fits into the formal large scale structure of the modern society. Islamic principles such as the *shari'a* then can easily be presented as a national ideology (Gellner, 1981: 58).

The change in significance of religion has been elaborated on a more theoretical level by the Canadian theologist Peter Beyer. According to Beyer, who in an article on religion and globalization elaborates on the theories of Luhmann, modernization alters the way in which religion seeks public influence. To grasp his argument we have to know more about the Luhmannian ideas on secularization and modernization. In Luhmann's view secularization is a consequence of the relative independence of societal subsystems. These subsystems are a product of the differentiation in modern society on the basis of function. Economics, politics and religion are some of the many subsystems. In the traditional communal society these subsystems did not exist independently, as society was not divided on the basis of function but on status.

Religion thus becomes a relatively independent subsystem. Professionals of each subsystem have to develop strategies in order to reach their `clients' in a modern individualized, privatised society. In Luhmann's view these clients perform complementary roles as receivers of services from specific subsystems. An individual can perform several complementary roles at once. He or she can be a voter and at the same time a member of a religious group or customer in a shop. Just like the politician or the trader, the religious leader has to `go to the market place to find clients' because religion is not tied to `natural groups' anymore. As James Beckford puts it: "In all cases, however, it is apparent that the *use* of religious symbols is likely to be controversial and contested because they are no longer necessarily tied to age-old communities or other so-called natural groupings... Religion has come adrift from its former points of anchorage but is no less potentially powerful as a result. It remains a potent cultural resource or form which may act as the vehicle of change, challenge or conservation. Consequently religion has become less predictable....The deregulation is one of the hidden ironies of secularization" (Beckford, 1989: 171). Nobody would claim that politics in modern society has lost its meaning; why then should this be the case for religion? In other words: although secularization, privatization and individualization alter the relation between religion and society, they are not neccessary conditions for the disappearance of religion (Beyer, 1990: 374).

The main problem of the influence of religion in modern society is not one of religious function, but one of religious performance (Beyer, 1990: 380).

Religious function relates the religious subsystem to the society as a whole and refers to the strictly religious, sacred sphere, the purely religious communication. Religious performance on the other hand relates the religious subsystem to other subsystems and occurs when religion is applied to other spheres, such as economics, politics etcetera (Beyer 1990: 379).

According to Beyer, there will be two options for religion in modern society, a liberal one and a conservative one. In the liberal option religious performance becomes the main way of seeking public influence. Keywords are pluralism, openness, inclusiveness and orientation towards this world. The liberal option responds to privatization of religion by seeking a revitalization of the religious function in religious performance, particulary in the political realm (Beyer, 1990: 388). Activities of religious groups for peace in the world, against oppression and poverty, against racism etc. are good examples of the way in which, according to the liberal option, the problem of public influence and public mobilization should be solved. The problem, however, is that by stressing performance religion becomes in a way invisible as a separate subsystem. In due course the clear distinction between, for instance, economic or political activity and religious activity will wane.

The conservative option on the other hand, which Beyer describes as the reassertion of tradition, tries to make religion more visible in modern society. It is a normative response to a society that is seemingly heading in a different and evil direction. It is, however, an aspect of modernization and certainly not a negation of it as is sometimes claimed. "If the necessary definition of the trancendent means applying the religious correlates of bygone social structures to the very different divisions of today, then this only indicates that contemporary structures do not offer a self-evident alternative" (Beyer, 1990: 392). Keywords are exclusiveness and distinctiveness. According to Beyer, this option is often applied in conflict situations in the Third World in which Western cultural patterns are still dominant. "It dichotomizes the world into the religiously pure and impure, into us and them" (Beyer, 1990: 391).

Emphasis is laid on religious function rather than on performance. Followers of this conservative option try to `de-differentiate' the separate functional areas as they exist in modern society, by emphasizing individual personal holism in the face of differentiated (and hence impersonal) social structures (Beyer, 1990: 389). Although very different in outlook, both the liberal and the conservative option can be described as different ways to seek religious public influence in modern society and are thus reflections of it.

Beyer's analytical distinction between liberal and conservative seems somewhat artificial in that one might also find combinations of both options in certain religious groups or movements. In my view the amount of possible options is limitless, as religious discourse and ideology is a reflection of

everchanging social structures. Besides, the term `conservative' suggests a negative attitude towards change. If we conceive Beyer's dichtomy as a kind of continuum, it offers, however, a relevant starting-point for an analysis of the significance of Islam among Muslim migrants in Europe.

Among Muslims in The Netherlands there is a tendency into both directions. This is observable on an organizational, as well as on an individual level.

Turkish Muslim organizations and societal change

The problem of public influence itself is thus a typical consequence of societal change and societal modernization. As such it is not typical of western society alone. In the urban areas of the Third World and thus also in the homelands of migrants, this societal transformation and secularization is taking place. The situation in Turkey clearly illustrates this transformation. The immense socio-political changes, processes of modernization and political emancipation which took place especially after the Second World War heavily affected Islam. Islam has been constantly redefined and reinterpreted against the background of new developments. Virtually none of the Turkish migrants in Europe have never been confronted with the effects of modernization in Turkey before migration.

The Turkish sociologist Atacan carried out research among religious organizations in Turkey. According to her, modern Islamic movements direct their activities to society as a whole. They developed from small-scale, local and inward-oriented organizations into large-scale political movements. They operate in a competitive relation with other political organizations in the political arena. They make use of modern means of communication to promote their views and they face the task of building up their rank and file without direct personal face-to-face contact. They now have to `prove' that their views and alternatives are more valuable than those of other political organizations.[6]

Moreover, in Turkey, as in many other countries of the Islamic world, Islam has got an oppositional political meaning. Islamic organizations are almost principally oppositional organizations. Turkey was the first Islamic country which officially declared itself secular. In practice this meant a firm control by the state over religious activity. In Turkey there are, generally speaking, two `types' of Islam. One which is carried out by the `Directorate of Religious Affairs', the *Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi*, and one which objects this state control. The Diyanet regulates and controls all official religious services and employs imams and other religious officials.[7] Dumont describes these two versions respectively as `official' and `parallel' Islam (Dumont, 1984: 354). The differences between these two versions thus have to do with differences in

opinion about the role of Islam in society and the means to achieve political goals. Purely religious doctrinarian differences are of secondary importance. Islamic organizations which developed in particular during the last forty years are clearly a product of societal change. Precisely these kinds of organizations or religio-political factions became active among Turks in Europe.

Individual religiosity and societal change

What is the influence of modernization on the religiosity of individual Muslims? An interesting analysis is offered by the German scholar Schiffauer. Schiffauer carried out research among Muslims in a Turkish village and compared his results with empirical data which he collected among Muslims in Germany. He tries to analyze the change in religious practice before and after the migration to Europe. According to Schiffauer, change in religiousness after migration in fact means a "restructuring of the religious community within a secular society" (Schiffauer, 1988: 146). As a result of migration from a relatively closed community in the country of origin to the urban centres in Europe or in Turkey, religiosity tends to become more individualized. In the rural community religion and society are intertwined. Belief is part of the day-to-day practice. Religious rituals do have an explicit function for the community as a whole. In the urban setting, however, religion becomes a separate and relatively independent sphere of life. The religious community is not complementary to other social spheres anymore, but rather contrary. Because of this, the individual moment of choice becomes relevant. "(...) one no longer encounters the person with whom one has societal exchange relationships but a person of similar mind" (Schiffauer, 1988: 150). Religion becomes part of leisure time, and religious practices and organizations become almost by definition a deliberate choice. Concepts such as `conviction' and `conversion' are becoming more central themes. Religion, according to Schiffauer, changes its meaning in that it starts functioning as an ethical system (Schiffauer, 1988: 152).

One could object to Schiffauer's statement about the individualization of choice that especially where so-called chain-migration prevails, the community within which one lives still plays a very important role in the choices one makes. The relatively closed character of many migrant communities enhances social control, which can be a very important factor in regulating one's behaviour. In general, Schiffauer's model lacks an analysis of the specific situation of Muslims in Europe and the special function religion may have if the people in question live in a minority situation. In my view this minority situation is not just an emphasis of the process which already started in the country of origin, as Schiffauer states. As socio-economic and cultural

dividing lines tend to correspond in the host societies we can conceive this as a new situation which, in a way, differs fundamentally from the one in the country of origin. The relevance of his model, however, mainly lies in the way in which he describes the dynamics of religiosity under the relatively new urban circumstances, which is especially important for a better understanding of, in Beyer's terms, the complementary roles of the religious subsystem.

Turkish Muslim organizations under migratory situation

In the second half of the seventies and in the eighties we experienced a sharp increase in number and size of Islamic institutions in Western Europe, the mosque organizations being the most important among them. In The Netherlands especially Turkish immigrants have been fairly active in this respect. According to the Dutch researcher Landman, institutionalization of Islam in The Netherlands has developed in three major phases. In the first half of the seventies the establishment of mosques was mainly initiated by Dutch volunteers who took care for the wellbeing of migrants. In the second half of the seventies it were mostly migrants themselves who organised room for prayer. In both cases those prayer halls were rather improvised backroom type mosques. In the second case, however, prayer halls were organised along ethnic lines mainly because of language and organizational problems. In the eighties the establishment of mosques was mainly accomplished by already existing Islamic organizations (Landman, 1989).

At the present moment there are more than 300 officially registered mosques in The Netherlands, of which 140 are Turkish (Landman, 1989). Besides that there are several non-registered prayer halls. We have little information about their seize and number. There are also several Islamic organizations, mainly for youths, which do not employ a room for prayer. They organize meetings and other activities related to Islam.[8] Apart from these more or less formal organizations, several Sufi orders are also said to be active among Turkish Muslims. Their influence and size is, however, not as big as is the case with Surinamese Muslims.[9]

The greater majority of the 210 Turkish Islamic organizations in The Netherlands is part of one of four so-called umbrella organizations. The remaining organizations are independent, although some of them consider themselves followers of certain Islamic movements in Turkey. The oldest of the four umbrella organizations is the *Foundation of Islamic Centres in The Netherlands* (SICN), founded in 1972 and presently based in the city of Utrecht. The organization has about 16 mosques and three so-called boarding schools in The Netherlands. The amount of adherents is estimated to be 5,000 people. The SICN is better known as the *Süleymanci-movement*, adherents of

the religious teacher Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (d. 1959), although they themselves usually don't use this description.

Atacan describes the Süleymanci-movement as an "ideology-based Sufi order", because of their aim to change society and their missionary activities, something which is fairly non-existent in traditional Sufi orders. They propagate an alternative model for society as a whole. Most of the adherents in Turkey belong to the lower urban middle-class. Imams for mosques in Europe are recruited from and paid by their own rank and file. Until the second half of the seventies the Süleymancis had a disproportionate influence among Turkish Muslims, because they were among the first Turkish Muslim organizations which founded mosques in The Netherlands.

In 1979 the *Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation* was founded, mainly as a reaction to the activities of the Süleymancis. At the present moment some 90 mosques belong to the Federation. The Federation is backed strategically and financially by the Turkish state, through the `Diyanet' and promotes the official version of Islam in Turkey. During Friday sermons Islam is merely presented as a moral code for personal behaviour. This moral code, it is said, runs parallel to love for the Turkish motherland, mutual solidarity among Turks and, as a consequence, loyalty to the Turkish state and the constitution.

Imams are sent and paid by the Diyanet, and since the beginning of 1988 members do not have to contribute to the exploitation of the mosque. The Federation claims to represent 60% of the Turkish Muslim population in The Netherlands, which is about 105,000 people. According to other organizations, this is a very strong over-estimation. At least a part of their members join them not out of ideological, but rather out of practical, financial and strategic reasons. It still bears some risks to be identified with organizations which question the marginal role of Islam in Turkish society. Compared to other Turkish Muslim organizations only a very small part of the rank and file belongs to the second generation youth.

In 1981 the *Federation of Islamic Foundations and Communities* was founded. The federation was renamed in 1987 as *'Dutch Islamic Federation'*. This organization is better known as the *Milli Görüs Teskilatlari*. Adherents of this umbrella organization, which claims to have some 15 mosques and several other organizations in The Netherlands, sympathise with the only legal Islamic party in Turkey, the *Milli Selamet Partisi*, which was renamed as *Refah Partisi* after the 1980 coup-d'etat. The rank and file of the Refah partisi is urban-based lower middle class.

The support for the Milli Görüs in The Netherlands is estimated to be about 8,000 people. It is one of the fastest growing Turkish Islamic organizations in Europe, especially among youth. Adherents are stimulated to obtain

knowledge about Islam themselves, so as not to be too dependent on leaders who say what is right and what is wrong.

The most radical among Turkish Islamic organizations are the ones resorting under the *Federation of Islamic Taw'hid Movements*. This organization is founded by the Cologne-based imam Cemalettin Kaplan, a former member of Milli Görüs. In The Netherlands they have some 8 mosques and an estimated support of 3 to 4,000 people. According to some observers the Taw'hid movement is rapidly decreasing after a short period of success. To others, however, their influence is clearly growing. The organization is most critical about the secular system in Turkey and accuses other organizations of accepting this system in principle by participating in it. The aim of the Taw'hid Movement is to establish an Islamic community irrespective of national boundaries. Their political activities and mass-meetings bear a strong resemblance to the ones organised by left-wing groups in the seventies.

Finally, there are some mosques in The Netherlands, run by adherents of the *Nurcu-sect*, an organization founded by religious teacher Said Nursi, who died in 1960. The Nurcu-movement can be described as a school of thought, although some scholars consider them as a Sufi order. Central is not Said Nursi as a person, but the books and articles he wrote. A main inner group activity is discussing and studying Nursis writings. The Nurcu-movement has 2 mosques in The Netherlands, but there might be more. Both in Turkey as well as in The Netherlands the Nurcu movement is especially attractive to somewhat higher educated young people.

Although Turkish political discourse plays an important role in Islamic organizations in The Netherlands, they are not just copies of the ones in Turkey. There are several reasons as to why the situation in Turkey differs from the one in Europe. Firstly, although the socio-economic background of adherents of Muslim organizations is still a matter of debate in Turkey, we cannot just use the data of the Turkish situation as a mould for the situation in Europe. Turkish immigrants are definitly not a cross-section of the Turkish population. Turkish data can only serve as a vague indication for the situation here. Secondly, we must realise that the formal structure of this type of organization simply does not exist in the homelands. Mosque organizations are structured according to the Dutch legal system. But more important is that mosque organizations do not only manage prayer halls. Although founding a mosque is in general the starting-point and their official *raison d'être*, they have developed into typical migrant associations. As such many of them emphasize religious performance. They do not only offer religious services, but also other ones such as education, shops, social and financial help. Leaders act as spokesmen towards Dutch society and promote certain views and opinions as to the position of their rank and file in Dutch society. As such they

are organizations which initially provided private goods (i.e. religious services) only, but which developed into organizations which seek to obtain public goods (related to the position of group members in society) (Hechter c.s., 1982: 422), this latter aim being their *raison d'être* in Turkey.

Turkish Islamic organizations here become focus points of religious and other activities. This in turn leads to an even sharper separation between the religious sphere and everything outside this sphere, and an increased interaction between organization and adherents.

Turkish Muslims in Dutch society

If we look at the way in which institutionalization of Turkish Islam in Europe took place, we can, to a certain extent, see a constant process of branching off and reformation. In The Netherlands many of the anti-secularist Turkish organizations developed as a reaction to the ever growing dominance of the Diyanet-backed *Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation*. In addition, we can see a constant waxing and waning as to the number of adherents to these organizations. This is certainly not a matter of leadership alone. The constant organizational restructuring within the Turkish community is in my view an indication of a process of ideological innovation. One of the important developments is that young Turkish Muslims tend to disengage themselves from the belief systems and values imported by their parents. This doesn't mean that they dissociate themselves from Islam, but they rather try to match their belief in accordance to the actual situation in which they live. One of my informants put it as follows: When my parents came here I was very young, only eight years old. My father always tried to raise me according to his values. For more than twenty years he worked here in The Netherlands and two years ago he went back to Turkey definitely. I stayed here. He didn't leave anything concrete for me. I will never go back I think. I don't mean that I don't love Turkey, but I must learn to be a Turk here, to be a Muslim in this new country. I have to find this out myself.

Contrary to this rather positive attitude towards Dutch society, another informant put is as follows: Most of the older Turkish Muslims here are too naive about Dutch society. In a way they accept their position as second rate citizens. In the mosque where I go to [a Diyanet mosque] the imam told us to be patient and to fit in with Dutch society. Well, during the Rushdie affair we could witness how they think about Islam in this country.

It might be illustrative to note that the first informant is a member of the Milli Görüs organization, which is generally stigmatized as `fundamentalist', whereas the latter participated in a Diyanet mosque.

It is this process which Beckford describes as the gradual dissociation of Islam from its former "points of anchorage" (Beckford, 1989: 171). So if we look at the ideological differences between Islamic organizations, there is still a third argument in my view why we cannot conceive these organizations as mere copies of the existing movements in Turkey. In general there is a tendency to consider adherence to certain religious organizations as a gauge for the extent to which somebody is integrated or assimilated into Dutch society. According to this presumption, adherents of the *Diyanet* organizations are the most integrated whereas for instance adherents of the Süleymanci's are *not yet so far*, thereby refering to the common sense and often stereotypical image of these organizations and their position in the Turkish society. Thus it is for instance often assumed that migrants from more secularized urban areas are less religious than people from rural areas. This pattern is supposed to reflect the relative strength of the different organizations. The relative strength of the different Turkish religious organizations is supposed to be indicative of the attitudes of Turkish Muslims towards the host society. In my view this is a typical example of the ascriptive approach.

If we analyze views of individual organizations and experiences of individual members or participants, the picture becomes much more complex and less unilinear. Firstly, individual opinions of members of a specific organization do not always concur with the ideological contents of the organization. Although these organizations influence and shape the views of adherents once they have joined, it does not mean that these views will not change in the course of time. The reasons why especially younger people join a certain organization can be manifold. It may be a matter of parental preference, but it also may be a deliberate choice. We can list a whole range of activities these organizations perform to attract people, some of which haven't much to do with religion itself. Some observers even claim that adherence has more to do with practical motives than principle ones. The location of a mosque, for example, is supposed to be more important than the ideological content. Although this might be true for part of the rank and file, I strongly doubt whether the ideological content of a specific organization is only relevant at the level of leadership, which doesn't mean that we must not be very precise as to how we define `adherence'. If people just join because of, let us say, the snooker facilities, then why don't they choose one of the `neutral' clubs and organizations to meet their needs? In other words, they must at least have some notion as to the religious and political identity of the organization in question. It is, however, possible that one changes one's opinion about the ideological content of the organization one initially has chosen. This sometimes implies that one eventually may choose for another organization which is more in accordance with one's views. In the rather big city where I

am carrying out my research, the opportunities to `switch' are big enough to make this possible.

Secondly, I witnessed sometimes considerable differences in attitude towards Dutch society between organizations with the same ideological background, or an attitude which was not in accordance with the streotypical image as to the ideological content of a certain organization. In some cases an organization belonging to the `closed' Süleymanci-movement can be more open-minded and cooperative than a `liberal' Diyanet-organization. In one case, for example, members of a Süleymanci-mosque took the initiative in organizing a kind of dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims in a certain part of the city where I am doing my research.

Thirdly, adherence to a certain Islamic organization has little or nothing to do with one's origin or socio-economic background in Turkey.

Fourthly, the choice for an organization with a more `anti-western' ideology has very little to do with a low level of structural integration. In a considerable number of cases it is rather the opposite: migrants who are more experienced and more acquainted with Dutch society see through the (presumed or real) mechanisms of exclusion and consequently take up a more negative or more radical attitude. A judgement of the host society requires a certain level of knowledge about that society, and this in turn shapes and structures one's image of Islam.

To analyze this rather complex pattern we must take situational factors into account. The cultural background of migrants and the ideological patterns as they exist in Turkey are only two of the many relevant factors. If we look at it from the point of view of individual Turkish Muslims, there are enough reasons to assume that the changing significance of Islam has much to do with the changing attitude of at least a part of the migrants towards their cultural background, which is a result of their experiences in Dutch society. As these experiences are shaped by a complex of factors, these attitudes can take many different forms.

The Dutch researcher Vermeulen mentions, apart from cultural factors, three other clusters of factors by which experience is structured and ethnic or religious identity and conciousness is condintioned (Vermeulen, 1984: 19). Firstly, the actual socio-economic position of migrants in the host society. The migrants who originated from Muslim countries in general occupy the lowest strata of the social and economic system. In this respect it is, however, essential to analyze how somebody defines his or her own position in society. Some respondents in an earlier research I carried out among Turkish youths had a rather positive image about Dutch society, although their objective socio-economic position was very bad. They blamed this to their recent arrival in The Netherlands and their slight knowledge of the Dutch language and

Dutch society. Their attitude towards Dutch society was rather positive, open-minded and expectant. Others, however, whose position was much better and who had been living in The Netherlands for quite a long time, experienced structural barriers to full scale participation in Dutch society only after a considerable period (Sunier, 1985: 93-150). So it is wrong to assume that people with the weakest socio-economic position automatically express more radical views, or vice versa.

Secondly, experiences with racism and discrimination. As a result of the negative image Islam has in Dutch society, many of the Muslim migrants face a negative attitude towards their cultural and religious background.

Thirdly, migratory factors such as age on arrival, educational level, duration of stay and socio-economic position in the country of origin are important in this respect. Besides, specific aspects of the Turkish community in which one lives have a certain influence in shaping one's identity. In this respect experiences not only with Dutch society, but also with other members of the Turkish community can influence religious identity.

All these factors interact and structure experiences in such a way that it is hard to predict the outcome, or to give a simple uni-causal explanation. What is important is how they perceive their position. As a result of their experiences in the host society, some Turkish migrants might come to the conclusion that the main reason for one's marginal position is related with one's being Muslim. This might imply that somebody defines his or her position solely along Islamic lines. `Being a Muslim' can be defined not only by `objective' cultural or religious factors, as cultural or ascriptive approaches tend to do, but also by the extent to which a group of people consider themselves as a separate group, or are considered by others as such (Barth, 1969: 9-38). Islam is becoming a more important means for some migrants from Muslim countries and sometimes even the most important means by which they define the boundaries between the host society and themselves. What is important in this respect is that Islamic principles are reconstructed into a kind of political, religious, or ethnic ideology. Islamic ideology may function as a means to explain past, present and future in relation to one's position in Dutch society.

Some of my respondents claim that their experiences as a member of a religious minority has given them also a clearer view on the situation in Turkey. To them the solution to all problems lies in the shari'a. Why is Turkey facing so many problems? Because the shari'a is abolished. Of course every convinced Muslim would say that the shari'a is an essential Islamic principle. The difference, however, is that the way in which the significance of the shari'a is formulated by my respondents is the expression of a problematized reality. The shari'a gets an ideological significance.[10]

For some people this really may mean embracing Islam for the first time, whereas for others it may mean a reassertion or redefinition of already existing feelings. In some cases this changing conciousness takes the form of a kind of (re)conversion to Islam. One of my respondents put is as follows:

"Here in The Netherlands I learned what Islam is really all about. In the beginning I tried to live like you people do. I went to bars and night clubs. I spent all my money on fun. I thought that by learning Dutch and participating in Dutch society I gradually would be accepted as a member of this society, but I was wrong. After so many years I still have not been accepted. One year ago by chance I met somebody who is member of Milli Görüs. He offered me a tape with a sermon of a famous imam in Germany. I gradually started to attend meetings and a love for Islam developed inside me."

"As a matter of fact the situation for Muslims in Turkey is not better than it is here. I think that we, as Muslims in Europe, will in the end bring real Islam to Turkey. Only we as migrants have experienced into what kind of society the present leaders of Turkey are trying to change our homeland."

It turned out that this (re)conversion and the motives which led to this do not exist in the single minds of people. It is part of a kind of group ideology. So the more a person was involved in and influenced by the host society the more profound this (re)conversion can be supposed to be. In order to elucidate this, let me give an example from a collective interview I had with some youths who recently defected from a Diyanet organization and went to the `Kaplan-movement'. They told me that they in fact reconverted to Islam after their (bad) experiences in Dutch society. (Re)conversion functioned as a kind of ideology. Now they more clearly saw the (perceived) differences between them and Dutch society. Although the case is somewhat extreme, it nevertheless offers a clear illustration of my argument:

There are of course Turks who adopt Dutch habits and customs, like keeping dogs in the house, wearing shoes inside the house, making love at the street and drinking alcohol. By doing that the process of assimilation and becoming Dutch starts. By eating pork you will become a Christian, but real Muslims, people who believe in God, will never do this....As Muslims we are being discriminated by the Dutch. They think we are dirty, but we have the strength of our religion, of the Qur'an and the shari'a. We are not afraid except for Allah. We have the greatest religion. One Muslim can confront 50.000 Dutch. We have the religion of purity. Islam is pure, Christianity is not.

Many of the Muslim organizations go along with this sense of `minorityness' in offering an alternative for the future. Joining a Muslim organization can then be considered as a consequence of the changing meaning of Islam as a result of their specific experiences in Dutch society. At least part of the younger rank and file, especially of parallel Islam

organizations, such as the Milli Görüs, Nurcu and Taw'hid, only joined after having been several years in The Netherlands.

If we take into consideration Beyer's distinction between the liberal and conservative option, we may conclude that the above-mentioned strengthening of religious consciousness is a clear example of the latter option. Self definition and definition of the situation becomes more unequivocal. Islam explains everything. It tends moreover towards exclusiveness and distinctiveness. Some of my informants were even convinced that a real conversion is only possible for "real Turks", thus emphasizing exclusiveness on the basis of ethnicity. In this case Islam functions as a source of ethnic consciousness and reassertion.

On the other hand there are clear indications that some organizations and Turkish Muslims tend towards a direction which Beyer would call the liberal option. They consider Islam, although of principle importance to them, as only *one* of the existing religions in The Netherlands. The future of Islam in this country lies in "turning your face to Dutch society without being totally absorbed by it" as one of my informants formulated this attitude. Apart from this, the definition of position in Dutch society tends to be explained by more than just Islam. An example from my field work may clarify this. A group of young Muslims of different ethnic background recently went to Great Britain to be informed about the way in which Muslims organize their religion there. As the Muslim community in Britain is older than the one in The Netherlands, they hoped to learn from their experiences:

Europe will be one within a short time. Muslims in Europe must learn from each other and support each other. Islam must become a fully accepted religion in Europe, as many of us will never go back to our homelands. We must show to Dutch society that Muslims can become as succesful as non-Muslims.

It will not come as a surprise that most of them define their position and future in Dutch society in more positive terms, although they sense a feeling of `being a minority' too.

Conclusion

It is important to mention here again that to a certain extent these different options may cut through the original political dividing lines of Turkish Muslims organizations as they were set up in the beginning. Nevertheless, we have to be careful not to neglect the fact that for most Turkish migrants Islam is still part of their cultural `bagage' imported from Turkey. So motives to join an Islamic organization also have to do with this cultural background. What I want to stress, however, is that for a growing part of the adherents their choice for a particular organization, or the way in which a specific organization takes

up a position, can only be understood if we take into account their experience as a member of a minority in Dutch society. Islamic organizations in turn to a certain extent reflect the developments which take place within the Turkish community. In my view this tendency will become stronger in the near future.

Until now, many of the Dutch policy-makers, social workers and other functionaries working with Muslim migrants, still tend to have a very stereotypical and static view on the position of Muslim migrants and the role Islam plays in their lives. For the sake of `handling and controlling the situation' they don't want to consider the existing ideological differences. In most of the municipalities Islam and Islamic organizations are even being totally avoided and stigmatized as `extremism' and `right-wing radicalism'. It would be wise if policy-makers started to realize that Islam in The Netherlands is here to stay, and that policy must not be made on behalf of Muslims, but *together with* them.

Notes

[1]For a discussion on Islam and modernity see the outstanding study of John Obert Voll, 1982.

[2]Van Koningsveld describes the concept of umma as follows: a community of believers whose personal religious life, family life, mutual relations in the broadest sense of the word, in short whose total societal life is dominated, that is to say should be dominated by Islam" (van Koningsveld, 1988: 43).

[3]See for example Ruthven, 1984: 179 and Enayat, 1982: 1

[4]At the risk of getting involved in a discussion on the concept of ideology, I would describe it in accordance with Hall, not as a structured system of codified messages as such, but rather as a way of codifying messages. Societal interest groups or forces may be involved in an ideological struggle about the meaning of a certain message. They try to de-articulate the dominant meaning, and rearticulate it within a different chain of connotations (Hall, 1982: 83). See also Laclau (1977).

[5]See also Özbüdün (1976) and Szyliowicz (1966).

[6]Fulya Atacan in a lecture on Islam and societal change during a summer course in Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, july 1990. See also: Atacan, F. 1990.

[7]For a profound description of the functions and activities of the Diyanet see Den Exter, 1990.

[8]The total amount of Turkish Muslim organizations is a topic of controversy. These organizations themselves tend to exagerate the figures. According to Landman, who did research on Muslim organizations in The Netherlands, the total amount must be estimated at 210 of which two-third has a mosque. The figures presented below are taken from him.

[9]See the article of Landman elswhere in this book.

[10]See also Schiffauer (1988).

11

Religion and Emancipation

A Study of the Development of Moroccan Islamic Organizations in a Dutch Town

H. van Ooijen

"Oh God, we are not allowed to be Moroccan", sighed a leader of a Moroccan mosque after an extremely difficult and tense discussion with the social-democratic mayor of the town. The Moroccan Islamic organizations had originally asked for this meeting to discuss the unfortunate way in which a local service was functioning. However, the attending Moroccans, whose command of the Dutch language was excellent, were given an unwanted lecture during which their representativeness was questioned. Beside the point and in a superior fashion they were given to understand that they should appreciate the necessity of integration, the adherence to national norms and values, the ability to speak Dutch fluently, the acceptance of the democratic rules of the game and that they should denounce the Moroccan government. A rather embarrassing event. However, according to a Moroccan proverb: "Maynkr aslu gir lbgl", or "Only a mule denies his origin".[1]

In this article I intend to concentrate on the ways in which concepts such as 'religion' and 'emancipation' tend to be used in the social and scientific discussions regarding Muslim minorities in The Netherlands. This will be illustrated by means of a survey of the development of the functions of the Islamic faith amongst Moroccans in The Netherlands, and aided by data from a current investigation into the functioning of Moroccan Islamic organizations in a Dutch town. In doing so I shall address what appears to many people to be the vexing question :

"To what extent are Islamic organizations promoting emancipation or isolation?"[2]

It is striking that in the early nineties in circles of the so-called Dutch minorities policy (politicians, civil servants, scientists, social workers and spokesmen for interest groups) the question is being asked with increasingly regularity to what extent Islam in general, and Islamic organizations in particular, are promoting emancipation or isolation. This simple, seemingly important and innocent question is sufficiently interesting to deserve close examination.

The question, however, is being asked relatively late. Already for a couple of decades practically every Dutch town and polder inhabited by a population of Muslims has included a mosque.[3] Not until recently did they attract relatively little attention and flourish in the shadows of a society which was becoming increasingly secular. The political and bureaucratic institutions dealing with the minorities policy for their part paid little attention to these 'houses of prayer'. Did they not deal solely with religion and what did that have to do with the solution to the problem of the minorities ? Since the end of the eighties, however, it has been generally recognized that the minorities policy has contributed little to the improvement of the bad social position of Muslim minorities in The Netherlands and may therefore be regarded as a failure. Expectations were shown to be illusory and goals out of reach. In such a mentally confusing climate, when one is sensitive to alternatives and talks about the necessity of 'a necessary unorthodox approach', everything is potentially up for discussion and doors are beginning to be opened. And thus 'the' Islam may enter, albeit timid and dragging its feet, into the secular arena of 'the minorities industry' with its numerous meetings. The question whether Islamic organizations have an isolating or emancipatory function is therefore a typical policy question and not free from subjectivity: "Are these organizations useful or not?" and "Do they or do they not play a role in the process of emancipation of Islamic minorities ?" Also 'the scientific study of minorities', which in The Netherlands is more or less intricately connected with the official policy[4] and therefore lagging behind of actual developments, is beginning, albeit slowly and hesitantly, to unleash its concepts and methods of investigation on 'Muslims and the Islam in The Netherlands'.

Scientific research

The widespread underestimation of the role of culture, in particular of religion, in the social development of groups, as well as the dependency of the social sciences and their flirtation with official policy, are important factors in explaining why the majority share of the enormous amount of the so-called 'minorities research' tends to concentrate on what is called 'the hard social sectors', such as education, labour market and housing. As a consequence

research on Islam in The Netherlands is sparse. Islam, its importance to Muslim immigrants and its social functions, are from a scientific point of view underdeveloped territories.

However, that does not mean that no research has been carried out. So far as early as 1983, for example, a report of an advisory committee to the Government led by Islam specialist Waardenburg,[5] pointed out the large and important part played by Islam in the daily lives of Turks and Moroccans in The Netherlands. The report suggests that more serious attention should be paid to Islamic organizations, which are described as authentic types of self-help organizations. However, the zeitgeist was not in its favour. Its voice was 'a cry in the wilderness'. It is remarkable what little use has been made of this, for those days, impressive document. Later, in 1988, a similar advisory committee led by Hirsch Ballin produced a report[6] with similar conclusions. Although the climate seems more favourable, with regard to this report, it is remarkable how slowly and laboriously Islam and Islamic organizations manage to penetrate into the thinking processes of the policy makers.

In order to present a survey of the inquiry into Islam it is essential to first ascertain what types of research are available and useful. Research on religious matters can roughly be divided into four approaches (Waardenburg, 1990):

1. The historical approach, which views religion as a historical entity. It investigates the history of religious facts and places them within the framework of historical reality and processes.
2. The comparative approach, which aims at comparing religious data, largely free from context, and portrays religion as a separate world of very diverse religious phenomena.
3. The contextual approach, which shows how within a given context under specific conditions religious behaviour and spiritual thinking develop and are passed on. Above all, religions and religious manifestations are analysed as contextually influenced or determined.
4. The hermeneutic approach which investigates the meaning of religious data and concepts and their relevance and significance for special situations, persons and groups.

I agree with Waardenburg that all of these approaches are of value and I would like to recommend a 'multi-perspective' approach and 'interdisciplinary' collaboration.

If, however, we put Islamic research in The Netherlands under the microscope, we find that the historical approach and, to a lesser extent, the comparative approach dominate.[7] These two approaches tend to be used by the religious studies which, as a consequence, have advanced enormously in their knowledge of Islam. The social sciences, social anthropology in particular,

seem to be suited par excellence for contextual and hermeneutic research. However, they do seem to be lagging somewhat behind. Sociological and anthropological investigations into the role, function and meaning of religion within Muslim communities are few and far between.[8] Many social scientists doing research on (Muslim) migrants may inadvertently have started off on the wrong foot by following the lead of the prestigious Islamic studies in The Netherlands causing them to be fixated on 'the' one and only Islam. This especially concerns the alleged nature of Islam itself: a general religious system of norms, values and rules of behaviour, which penetrates into practically all aspects of life. Such a religion and its followers, according to many social scientists, cannot be investigated without a thorough knowledge and analysis of the written word. Consequently, in religious sciences as well as in social scientific studies with regard to Islam there is a tendency to concentrate on the Islamic scripture and to dwell too long on 'the unalterable word'. Uncomplicated social scientific reports about the daily religious ups and downs of Moroccans and Turks are practically non-existent in The Netherlands.[9]

Most of the scientific and semi-scientific studies regarding 'Islam' and 'Muslims in The Netherlands' is general, informative and descriptive in nature. Mostly one begins with an exposition of Islam as a system of belief and a way of life. There are numerous versions of the generally mutually copied accounts of the 'Five Pillars of the Faith', the four law schools, the Islamic feasts, etc. Above all they inform the reader about the Islam of 'the Book', they treat Islam as a religious system of values, norms, rules and prescriptions. So far so good. But little research is being carried out and little information is given about the Islam of daily life, the Islam of individuals and of groups, the Islam of flesh and blood. In most approaches Islam is more or less regarded as something rather static, as an unalterable system of writings, principles and prescriptions. In short, Islam is portrayed as a religious, social and cultural system which to a large extent determines the behaviour and the ways of life of Muslim minorities. This type of Islam is, as it were, stuck onto the Muslim people (like a label). From this point of view being a Muslim is regarded as more or less synonymous with the extent to which one abides by the official norms, habits, instructions and prohibitions of Islam. This is incorrect. A Moroccan youth, whose day was largely filled with alcohol, drugs, stealing and keeping his head above water, once said to me: "Of course I am and always will be a Muslim. One is Muslim with one's heart".

The formation of ethnic groups and the foundation of mosques, for example, are explained uni-dimensionally from the intrinsic wish and natural need of the migrants from Islamic countries to hold on to their own culture and religion. In other words, one could say that this point of view tends to see the

original culture of Muslim migrants, in particular their religion, as a constant and explanatory factor. Little attention is paid to factors related to the immigration and to factors which may be due to the constantly changing social context within which these migrants operate. In short, there is a shortage of research data with respect to the analysis of and the attention to be paid to the (for anthropologists unavoidable) changes in the psychological, social and cultural meaning of Islam. It is just all too easy and misleading to talk about 'l'Islam transplanté'[10] (transplanted or imported Islam). I am of the opinion that Islam in general and Islam in The Netherlands in particular are by definition 'on the move' and social scientists concerned with Muslims must be more aware of and make inquiries into the changing nature, role and meaning of Islam. Such an approach will take into account the social context in which Muslims live and will have an eye for the social and cultural developments within the various Islamic groups. However, as long as 'academia' from its ivory tower persists in hanging on to the concepts developed within it, staring itself blind at 'the' Islam, its writings and visual manifestations, and refusing to take the cultural jump into the deep end to 'immerse itself' in a supposedly Islamic migrant community, a decent answer to the vexing question of whether this religion and its organizations promote emancipation or isolation, will only be hesitant and speculative. This article will not be able to give any ultimate answer, but will attempt to indicate a type of approach and investigation that will make a more thoughtful answer to this question possible.

Moroccan Islamic organizations in The Netherlands

The already mentioned lack of empirical material about Muslims and Islamic organizations in The Netherlands is especially evident in the case of Moroccans. This lack of empirical data often corresponds with misconceptions and all kinds of journalistic stories about the purpose, functions and activities of their organizations. The idea of static, isolationist organizations is widespread. But, above all, it appears that Moroccan Islamic organizations are difficult to investigate. Several Dutch publications touching upon the subject suggest an image of Moroccan 'hornet's nests'. In other words, a closed, isolated and reserved community full of conflicts, contradictions, mistrust and caution. An ethnic group with organizations in which many processes, some of which can not bear the light of day, are hidden from sight.[11]

Meaning of Islam in transition

For all Moroccan migrants in The Netherlands the meaning of their Islamic faith has changed.[12] In Morocco practically everybody is supposed to be a

Muslim and the whole community is saturated with Islam. Islam in Morocco is taken for granted and is a relatively self-evident part of everyday life. In The Netherlands Islam is a minority religion in a secular, in the eyes of many Moroccans, Christian or heathen, community. This Islam draws a line between Moroccans and 'the others'. This changing meaning of Islam is taking place at the level of the individual, the family, the ethnic group and the organization. 'Being a Muslim' manifests itself in numerous gradations and variations. Being confronted with another society and culture causes a change in the thinking of many Moroccans about their own culture and religion with resulting individual alterations in their behaviour. 'The foreign land' does not only nibble away at the relative obviousness of Islam but also offers more possibilities and choices. From the situation in which the Moroccan migrants find themselves vis a vis Islam new questions arise which necessitate new answers. In other words, one could say that for many Moroccans the taken-for-granted and collective Islam is becoming, through migration, a more conscious and individualized Islam. To an important part of the Moroccan migrants life 'in a new world' means that one concentrates on that which is seen as the heart of Islam: the sources, The Book, The Word.

Hasan, a 45-year old Moroccan living in Amsterdam, is a simple, religious man. He used to work in a factory in which pork was transformed into greasy sausages. After a while Hasan began to suffer from serious mental and physical problems. He began to wonder wether in the eyes of Islam he was allowed to earn his daily bread with pork. This was made worse by the criticism from his fellow countrymen who said that he was not 'a real Muslim'. Hasan became afraid of 'the wrath of Allah'. This led to an extensive investigation: self-analysis and deciphering of the Qur'an, discussions with imams and other experts of 'the Word'. He even wrote letters to the Ulema of the Al Azhar University in Egypt. Fortunately for him, it was allowed and he recovered. Since that time being a Muslim has been more important than ever to him and all his free time is spent helping to organise the local mosque.

This story is an example of how migration to a non-Islamic society throws up new and unusual dilemmas. Dilemmas for which the 'authentic' Islam has no answers, which may result in a deeper orientation on the written or orthodox Islam.[13]

Form of Islam in transition

Migration has changed not only the meaning of Islam, but also its expression. Approximately sixty to seventy percent of the one hundred and fifty thousand of the Moroccans living in The Netherlands originate from the Rif-area in the

north eastern part of Morocco. An area where, according to the writings of some anthropologists, formal Islam played and continues to play a less important, sometimes marginal, role; an area where popular Islam is widespread and where visiting the mosque is less important (Geertz, 1968; Eickelman, 1976).[14] Here in The Netherlands the situation seems to be quite different in that the expression of Islam is more formal. There are approximately one hundred Moroccan mosques in The Netherlands. Mosque attendance is especially widespread amongst first generation men. It appears that the phenomenon of the mosque promotes a stronger concentration on the scripturalist Islam thus causing popular Islam to be less evident.[15]

There are also some mystical fraternities both inside and outside these mosques. These organizations focus mainly on religious activities. Not many Moroccans belong to these movements and those that do are largely members of the first generation.

In addition there are various networks surrounding certain well-known people, who are respected for their knowledge of Islam and their spiritual powers.

The 'Féderation des Amicales des Travailleurs Marocains' is also active within the Moroccan community. This royalist and Islamic organization is linked to the Moroccan Government and is largely concerned with social and cultural activities. Often the organization functions as an intermediary between the consulates and Moroccans in The Netherlands. The organization runs criss-cross through the various Moroccan communities and has representatives among the leaders of many Moroccan mosques. Although the Amicales is structurally speaking extremely fragile, does not advocate a strict political or religious ideology and does not place itself much in the foreground, I am under the impression that it has many followers and hangers-on. The reasons for this are complex and differ for each individual: love of the fatherland, royalism, thoughts of re-migration, but especially pragmatical reasons (you never know when it could be useful) and need of help (eg. passports, marriage documents, etc.). Amongst the Dutch the organization has a very bad name and is seen as 'the long arm of King Hasan'. The lack of information about this organization and the ease with which it is deemed responsible for all kinds of spurious undesirable, anti-democratic and anti-emancipatory practices suggests that the organization functions largely as a myth and serves as a handy and ready-made explanation for processes which are not understood.[16]

Finally, there is an umbrella organization of Moroccan mosques, the UMMON (the Union of Moroccan Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands). However, it is not very powerful and its influence and activities are limited.

The majority of Moroccan mosques are locally organised, relatively independent and autonomous. A comparison between the ways in which Moroccans and Turks have organised themselves reveals that the Moroccan organizations are much weaker, more diffuse and less evident. Personal, political, religious or regional differences do not easily (as in the case of the Turks) lead to open and clear schisms and segments within the ethnic group itself with separate identities and organizational infrastructures. This is one of the reasons why the Moroccan community and its organizations convey the impression to outsiders of an impenetrable and intricate jumble of contrasts, differences and conflicts. A lack of insight and knowledge (usually coupled with hearsay) only too often lead to Moroccan Islamic organizations being regarded one-sidedly as conflict-prone concentrations of isolation-promoting, and thus (!?) anti-emancipatory, forces. It seems likely that 'lifting a corner of the veil' of a local Moroccan community may throw some light upon the matter.

Moroccan Islamic organizations in Greenfields

The town of Greenfields[17] has sixty thousand inhabitants, four thousand of which possess the Moroccan nationality. The story of the Moroccans in Greenfields differs little from the story of the migration of Moroccans to The Netherlands in general, which has been described in many different ways.[18] In the sixties and early seventies Moroccan men came to Greenfields via recruitment and word of mouth to earn money as unskilled labourers. Everybody had a job, nearly everybody lived in very basic boarding houses, saved money and planned to return home soon, relatively rich. The seventies and eighties were the years of family reunion. However, for most Moroccans this did not mean that they gave up the idea of returning back home.

From the moment of their entry into Dutch society the Moroccans have lived as a group in isolation and have attempted to surround their families by high walls to protect their wives and children against threatening outside influences.

The majority of them came from the Rif-area in the north eastern part of Morocco. This is a non-industrialised region, where traditional values, norms and mores have remained more prominent than in other areas (Van Der Meer, 1984). It is an area with a rich history of resistance against bureaucracy and centralised authority and where modern methods of government have never really taken root.

The contacts made in 'the foreign land' tend to be largely based on existing group norms. Consequently, the formation of groups tends to be based on links between families, people from the same village or area and/or shared interests.

In this context the Moroccan writer Bel Ghazi (1986) talks about 'micro-organizations'. These partially overlapping networks have an unofficial structure, and, depending on the situation, the leaders and members either cooperate or feud against one another. Members of the most important networks meet on the boards of mosques and Amicales. This complicated system of invisible networks is (in part) the cement which holds these organizations together. Many conflicts in and among these organizations may be partially explained that way. Likewise in Greenfields. Towards the end of the seventies, the period of family reunion, representatives of the Moroccan community decided to rent some old industrial premises in order to provide a place for prayer and Islamic instruction for children. The need for a mosque of their own grew gradually and in 1980 a former garage was purchased. In the course of the following years the mosque flourished and functioned not only as a centre for prayer and Islamic instruction, but also provided a meeting place where one could exchange information and help, and discuss issues of shared interest and take action as and when required. Towards the end of the eighties, after years of internal strife, a schism occurred, and after many internal and organizational difficulties a resulting separate group successfully started its own mosque. The group comprised a variety of people who, for various reasons, nursed a grievance against the 'old' mosque: such as personal conflicts or political, regional and religious factors. Looking at the underlying networks, however, we discover that these largely run right through both of the organizations and the occasionally emerging local branch of Amicales.

In order to better understand the general atmosphere of conflict both within and among Moroccan Islamic organizations, it is essential to make a closer study of the social position of many Moroccans as well as their worldview, expectations and perceptions of life, norms and values. In the early nineties one can, without exaggeration, speak of an impoverished underclass. There is an accumulation of interconnected problems, such as unemployment, the disintegration of nuclear families and dejection. In the past few years there appears to be a process of embitterment going on in the Moroccan community, due to the collapse of hopes for the future, the seemingly ever receding possibility of returning and the threat of children growing up without 'real' values'. As a result people become disappointed and disillusioned, do not feel part of the social mainstream and feel relatively powerless to change this situation. Developments in the outside world tend to be seen as increasingly negative. Through negative experiences and the collapse of expectations the way of thinking of many Moroccans has become (in part) a vicious circle with mistrust at its centre; mistrust with regard to society, but also towards each other. Various scholars point out a deep-rooted mistrust of the Riffian not only towards the outside world, such as the governing bureaucracy, but also

towards other groups, tribes and regions (Van der Meer, 1984; Bel Ghazi, 1986). Thus pre-migratory mistrust is further developed. Because of their mistrust and embitterment many Moroccans look for help and support towards each other and tend to become introverted, but also develop a 'culture of contrasts'. This process of 'implosion' in a closed community, where social control and gossip flourish, co-exists, seemingly paradoxically, with the growth and flowering of mosques.

The mosques are the visible symbols of the presence of Islam within Dutch public space. They are the symbols of communal identity and the centres of crystallization of the religious and socio-cultural activities of a large part of the Moroccan community. Apart from the children between six and twelve who attend the mosque for lessons in Islam, Qur'an and Arabic, the majority of visitors comprises first generation men. However, several members of the second generation (re)turn towards the mosque after they have sown their wild oats and settle down. Whether they will do this to the same extent as their fathers only time will tell. Relations between the local Moroccan youth centre in Greenfields and the mosque are very friendly. With a Qur'an tucked under his arm one of the imams regularly visits the youth-centre. Also, since a few years ago, both mosques have had the use of a more or less separate space with its own entrance for the women. More and more women make use of this facility, enabling them to practice the salat together and listen, via a public address system, to the khutba (sermon) of the imam.

The impression exists that most Moroccan mosques are rather closed and insular (Sijtsma, 1989: 153), and that people want to retain their identity and experience Islam in all its richness. Thus the mosque functions as a haven, a safe and trusted place in strange and sometimes hostile surroundings. This isolation and insularity is usually linked to a strong orientation towards and revaluation of the land and culture of origin. Often this goes together with an orientation towards the Arab Islamic world. The two mosques in Greenfields are no exception. However, looking at these mosques it is clear that their function is not only that of a haven but also that of 'a Moroccan seedbed on Dutch soil': a centre of orientation towards Dutch society. Dutch is taught, information is exchanged, discussions are held, advice is given regarding issues concerning Dutch society (for instance problems with institutions, education for children, relations with Dutch neighbours, drug abuse, AIDS prevention), material as well as pastoral help is given and attempts are made to represent the interests of the Moroccans at Dutch organizations and institutions. In other words, the simultaneous fleeing from and necessary orientation towards the surrounding society is typical of the 'socially schizophrenic' situation within which many Moroccans find themselves. Thus the mosque functions as a collective and social 'psycho-analyst's couch' with a

therapeutic function.[19] On the one hand it is possible to share experiences in an atmosphere of safety and belonging (with or without feelings of mistrust and bitterness), and on the other hand there is the opportunity to view, interpret and approach the surrounding society. These are relatively new, slowly developing functions of the mosque. The common idea that 'one wants as little contact or confrontation with the outside world as possible',[20] is therefore only half of the story. The often 'dilly-dallying' position towards the outside world and the hesitant way in which interests are represented by the mosques, are largely due to a lack of leaders 'who know what's what' and the above-mentioned contrasts, mistrust and ambivalent orientation.

For their part the Dutch political and social institutions are generally-speaking equally aloof and reserved towards the Moroccan mosques. The in The Netherlands frequently observed principle of a separation between Church and State is often used as an excuse. In Greenfields the few contacts that do exist between the mosques and the local government and other relevant institutions are extremely tense. From 1980 onwards the official policy of the local council has aimed at integration, participation and emancipation of the Moroccans in Greenfield society. The mosques and Amicales were not taken into account as they were regarded as primarily religious or negative in orientation and diametrically opposed to the main objects of official policy. For years the council has attempted to get 'the Moroccans' to participate in (the sanctioning of) official policy without involving the mosques.

At first this was done by an advisory committee which was supposed to function as an intermediary between the council and the Moroccan community. This committee, which was dominated by representatives from the council and social institutions, was regarded by most Moroccans as a 'talking shop' and did not appear to be very effective. In addition, when the few Moroccan members on the committee wanted to discuss a particular problem, they were often harassed by accusations of alleged involvement with Amicales or their representativeness was questioned.

When this committee broke up the council aided by local social workers attempted to set up so-called 'self-help organizations' of Moroccans. There was an implicit, incorrect assumption that the majority of the Moroccan community would join such non-religious organizations, the rationale of which was the improvement of the social position and emancipation of the Moroccans; organizations which, with financial and professional support, would be able to develop into representative organizations of the Moroccans and play an important role in the realization of the official policy's goals. This policy of 'artificial fertilization' has failed. Despite, or maybe because of, the many subsidies and available social workers these organizations consisted of a few, largely 'Dutchified', unrepresentative Moroccans. After a few years of

strenuous attempts at satisfying high expectations and at developing (from a Dutch point of view) 'progressive' activities, being inundated by requests from all kinds of committees and meetings, thus keeping up the pretence of 'representatives from the Moroccan community', the bubble burst. As has been previously stated, the mosque was not regarded as a self-help organization but as a purely religious institution. The mosque was kept at a distance with the argument: "The council cannot and must not be involved in religious matters". The mosque was regarded as right winged, conservative, against integration and an obstacle to 'genuine' self-help organization and the emancipation of the Moroccans. Thus, in council and social work circles the failure of the advisory committee, as well as the attempt to create 'real' self-help organizations, was lazily and without proof blamed on 'negative, isolating and destructive forces within the mosque and Amicales'. Furthermore, the orientation of many Moroccans and of the mosque towards Morocco fed rumours and thoughts of 'negative influences of the Moroccan Government'. It goes without saying that this reserved, disrespectful and negative stance of the Dutch institutions towards the mosques threatens to reinforce the 'wariness of the Moroccan' and 'his insularity': "They won't listen to us anyway".

The reserved and cautious relations between the local government and institutions on the one hand, and the mosques on the other still exist, although it appears that the number of individual contacts is on the increase. However, the mosques are mainly used to reach the Moroccans (eg. advice regarding council policies and activities of institutions). However, structural contacts are still non-existent. Despite timid attempts most bureaucratic doors are still closed and the mosques lack the power to compete with, for example, the subsidised social work institutions.

Moroccan Islamic organizations in a Dutch environment

The case of Greenfield illustrates that one should beware of expressions such as 'the' developments of Moroccan mosques. However, there is every indication that, in general, the Government and social institutions take a reserved attitude towards these organizations.[21] On the whole few contacts exist of any importance. The above discussion illustrates that Moroccan mosques are largely regarded as attempts by conservative elements (possibly supported by the Moroccan Government) to copy a piece of Morocco and to create a Moroccan island in Dutch waters. Generally speaking they are not thought to play a part in the so-called essential processes of emancipation, participation and integration. Occasionally, as in the town of Greenfield, they are suspected of conscious and active sabotage of these processes. This is a one-sided view and brings the danger with it of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The

functions of Moroccan mosques have become much more varied than those in Morocco. They are the visible symbols of Islam in Dutch public life, centres of identification for the Moroccan community and places of orientation regarding Moroccan and Arabic as well as Dutch society. First and foremost Moroccan mosques in The Netherlands are ethnic organizations. Their orientation towards the Dutch society is by definition ambivalent. The degree and manner of ambivalence may vary. In any case they have developed, sometimes despite many set-backs, into the largest, independent self-help organizations of Moroccans. They appear to go their own way. This is a relatively new, somewhat puzzling, reality for both sides. Officialdom has not seen or has refused to see this development and is now more and more forced to wonder what to do with these organizations. In doing so it is wrestling with its concepts of emancipation, participation and integration. All the more reason to provide some clarity in the last part of this chapter.

Islamic organizations: to emancipate or to isolate, is that the question?

The concept 'emancipation' is widespread in The Netherlands and generally accepted with respect to the more prominent minority groups. Emancipation is also high on the agenda of the so-called 'minority-policy'. However, most official minutes and reports lack a definition of the concept. It is assumed implicitly that everybody understands the meaning of emancipation and why it is essential. The impression exists that the concept emancipation has not only become fashionable but also functions as a holy and unassailable ideal. In a modern version of the ten commandments one would undoubtedly include: 'Thou shalt emancipate'. All in all, and reading between the lines, emancipation usually means: aiming at equality with other more dominant groups, without much concession on their part.[22] This implies not only an actual process but also a desirable development. The concept emancipation is by definition normative and it is regarded as a priori essential and useful, especially as far as ethnic minorities are concerned. In addition, one usually adds the magic words 'participation' and 'integration' (in society). Organizations of which it is assumed that they are active in this field are regarded favorably and may count on active and financial support.

The concept of 'isolation' is largely seen as an undesirable antithesis of emancipation. In this view the actual isolation of some ethnic minorities is 'socially unacceptable'. Various official reports and programmes aim therefore at rescuing these groups from their isolation, from babies to the elderly. It is assumed implicitly that the participation of minority groups in the institutional infra-structure of society will automatically assure a change in their circumstances for the better. Organizations of minority groups of which it is

thought that they promote their own isolation are guaranteed little sympathy and attention.

Islamic organizations fare no differently. Currently, however, it is becoming clear that Islam is the most important basis for self-help organizations. Dutch society has not yet got used to this fact. This is because, as opposed to the situation in the past, in The Netherlands of the nineties religion hardly ever plays such an important part in life and in the development (and perhaps the emancipation) of groups. So in a way the Muslim migrants have missed the boat; they have come to The Netherlands 'too late'. Dutch society was undergoing a rapid process of secularization and its people said goodbye to the famous 'pillar system' (zuilenstelsel). This typically Dutch form of institutionalised pluralism did facilitate the emancipation of religious minority groups. However, by the time the Turks and Moroccans came to this country religion, and especially organised religion, was no longer popular. The roads to society via the gates of religion were blocked. Since then the process of 'depillarization' and secularization have continued unabated. And, as is often the case with a crumbling cultural system, this process was accompanied in some sectors of society by an absolute aversion to everything that smacked of religion and its organization. Especially in those circles active in the creation and implementation of the minorities policy religion was totally 'out of date' and thus Islam was seen as an obstacle or padding, an unimportant factor which would either wear off of its own accord or be confined to people's living rooms. Organizations based on the Islamic creed tended therefore to be regarded as irrelevant or obstacles to the development and emancipation of migrants. Consequently, they were barely tolerated, largely ignored, avoided and sometimes even opposed. Therefore, it may be said that Dutch society and representatives of its institutions have contributed towards the isolated development of many mosque organizations. The few contacts that did exist with the outside world were usually difficult and tense.

Instead of cooperating with mosques, the national Government and local councils have spent much money and manpower on special social services for migrants, as well as on the development of so-called non-religious self-help organizations. Both types of organization were thought to play an active and stimulating part in the process of emancipation of migrants.[23] The migrants were in a way expected to fit in with a pre-existent artificial model of emancipation. It is becoming clear that despite all subsidies and professional support this policy has failed. The majority of these organizations has been shown to be unable to fulfill these expectations, excelling in a lack of members and dependency on professional supporters.[24] The majority of the Turkish and Moroccan Muslims did not want to be squeezed into a government controlled

and subsidised emancipation pattern and appeared to prefer to set up and take part in the activities of organizations based on Islam.

Without wishing to question the noble ideal of emancipation, it is my contention that the actual role played by this concept in the social discussion about Islamic minorities in The Netherlands has clouded the vision of actual developments in these communities. In The Netherlands the inherently subjective concept of emancipation appears to be at odds with religion. At the same time most Turks and Moroccans in The Netherlands use their religion as a starting point for the development of their identity. My advice to 'Islamologists', policy makers and everyone who wants to avoid falling into the trap of subjectivity and moralism is to take into account the inherently neutral concept of 'ethnicity'. The concept of ethnicity or ethnic identity is taken to mean: "a social identity which differs from other social identities through the conviction that one has a common origin, history and cultural legacy, such as language and religion" (Vermeulen, 1984: 15). The concept specifically refers to the extent to which members of a group regard themselves as being different and are seen by others as a separate group. Elements in the formation of an ethnic identity and the consequent definition and strengthening of ethnic boundaries are, according to Vermeulen, cultural and socio-economic factors, factors related to the migration process and the labeling of outsiders. Ethnic identity or ethnicity is a dynamic concept: it is concerned with the processes involved in change and pays attention to factors concerning one's own group as well as to influences from the surrounding society. The concept above all has an eye for context. It provides a picture in which culture and thus also religion are not so much regarded as unchanging, static, frozen or a web in which one is caught, but rather as a collective system of meaning that is for ever changing and influenced by situational and contextual factors. Subjective consciousness and the use of culture are especially important to ethnicity. In this approach 'the' culture, or the cultural baggage of migrants, serves as a kind of reservoir from which elements may be obtained which are useful for the formation and development of the ethnic identity of the group. Thus, religion as a part and function of culture appears to be an almost inexhaustible source from which everyone may freely take according to need and relevance. Or according to Beckford (1989: 170): "Religion has come adrift from its former points of anchorage but is no less potentially powerful as a result. It remains a potent cultural resource or form which may act as the vehicle of change, challenge, or conservation".

For many Turkish and Moroccan migrants in The Netherlands Islam appears to provide useful elements for the formation of their own ethnic group. It draws and legitimises clear boundaries between one's own group and 'the others in the outside world'. It may provide a positive self-image, an anchor, an

organizational array of instruments, symbols and an ideology. From this point of view Islam provides a framework of identification and reference and appears therefore suited par excellence to play an important, perhaps even the most important, part in the process of forming the ethnic identity of Turkish and Moroccan migrants.[25] Thus, we may say that for migrants from Islamic countries Islam, albeit differentiated according to nationality, appears to be the centre of their ethnic identity.

Furthermore, there are two versions of the development of ethnicity, both of which presuppose an increasing stress on one's own identity and thus on ethnic differences. Ethnicity may coincide with a retreat into one's own group and a separation from the surrounding society, or alternatively, it may focus on the surrounding society, which may be expressed in a defence of one's own group and culture with regard to the dominant society. Ethnicity is inherently ambivalent in nature. Ethnic groups usually show both tendencies, either consecutively or concurrently.[26] In my opinion too little attention is being paid to the inherently ambiguous nature of ethnicity and thus, in this case, to the changing meaning of Islam. Islam may function not only as an instrument and symbol of isolation, but also of emancipation. It may be both, and that at the same time. It is therefore meaningless and unscientific to oppose isolation and emancipation in a Shakespearean manner of 'to be or not to be', which is reminiscent of 'the bad' versus 'the good'. Such a subjective approach inhibits an insight into the possibility that isolation and emancipation may be excellent bedfellows and presuppose one another. In addition, such an approach neglects the essence and power of religion: the fact that it may contain both elements and thus may be able to function for the good of its adherents.

The development of Moroccan Islamic organizations as described in this chapter does not, however, say anything about how these ethnic organizations will develop within Dutch society in the future. "Only God knows", they would probably say. All kinds of variations are possible. I hope, however, to have made clear that in The Netherlands, on the whole, too little and incorrect attention is being paid to the changing and varied meaning of Islam and to the developing of novel functions of the Moroccan mosque. In order to become more aware of the above-mentioned, sometimes complex, processes Islam researchers and policy makers need to develop an unprejudiced eye for the way in which Islam manifests itself, is used, lived, interpreted, redefined and given form. In other words, one should beware of using one's emancipation tinted glasses inappropriately. Not only do they not look well, but they also cloud the vision.

Notes

[1]Ernest T. Abdel-Massik, An Introduction to Moroccan Arabic, Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies, University of Michigan, 1973, pp 199.

[2]This was one of the central issues at the Leiden congress (13 september 1990). This article is a further development of a paper given at that conference.

[3]In political and academic jargon the term 'Muslims' has not been in general usage, but, depending on what is fashionable at the time, the following terms are used: guest workers, foreigners, Mediterraneans, cultural minorities, ethnic groups and allochtones.

[4]See W.Tinnemans, Minderhedenonderzoek; meer politiek dan wetenschap. In: *Intermediair* 29-3-1991 (27, nr 13), pp 45-53. One of the assertions made by the author is: Dutch research on minorities accepts and further develops the official point of view. This generates a view of a policy regarding minority groups rather than a view of the experiences of people within those groups and the way they live their everyday lives. According to the author there is, in the Netherlands, a lack of independent research with a sound theoretical base.

[5]See Waardenburg, J., 1983.

[6]See Hirsch-Ballin, E.M.H., 1988

[7]The comparative approach is especially used in the church and in Christian circles, usually in 'the dialogue between Muslims and Christians'.

[8]The poverty of anthropological studies on Islam in the Netherlands (and in Western Europe) is in sharp contrast to the contributions of anthropology to the study of Islam in general. Examples which immediately come to mind include: Ernest Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas* (London and Chicago, 1969); idem, *Muslim Society* (Cambridge, 1981; Clifford Geertz, *Islam observed: Religious development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven and London, 1968).

[9]A noticeable and refreshing exception is the book *De moskee om de hoek. Ontmoetingen met islamitische jongeren* by T. Andree, A. van Dijk and K. de Jonge, Boekencentrum BV, 's-Gravenhage, 1990. In this book the authors give an honest account of their intellectual search for Islam and discussions with Muslim youngsters.

[10]Freely rendered from Dassetto, F. en A. Bastenier, 1984.

[11]See, for instance, Bel Ghazi, H., 1985.

[12]Various interesting articles have been written on this subject by W.Schiffauer (1984, 1988), based on research amongst Turkish migrants in Germany.

[13]I should like to point out that I am not stating that there is a movement amongst Moroccans in the Netherlands towards scripturalism and orthodoxy. As the Moroccan migrant's experience of being a Muslim is so varied and our knowledge so limited, it is not possible to make any general statements on the subject. However, I do have some ideas regarding a part of the Moroccans.

[14]Since the sixties and seventies, when the Berber migrants left the Rif area to go abroad, the area has seen a movement towards a 'formal Islam', with the mosque becoming increasingly important.

[15]This does not, however, mean, as is suggested by some authors (Sijtsma, 1989) that popular Islam is no longer important to Moroccans. Popular Islam has largely retreated into the private lives of people, which is especially evident amongst women and during holidays in Morocco. However, in general, one does not like to admit this as it is not in accordance with 'real', formal Islam. This is an uncharted territory for the social sciences.

[16]It is striking how one-sided and suggestive the available information regarding the Amicales is in the Netherlands. See, for example, the report *Marokkaanse organisatie Amicales* by Nederlands Centrum Buitenlanders, Utrecht 1987.

[17]For reasons of methodology and confidentiality the name 'Greenfields' is fictitious.

[18]See Heinemijer, 1976; Van Den Berg-Eldering, 1979; Van Der Meer, 1984.

[19]In order to avoid misconceptions the use of this metaphore does not imply that I regard 'the' Moroccan mosque visitor as 'mad' and that the mosques function as lunatic asylums. Insofar as it is possible to express it into words my aim is to get close to their 'ambivalent situation'. Other, more usual ways of expressing the situation of migrants in the Netherlands are : 'He has fallen between quay and ship' and the gymnastically extra-ordinary: 'The body is here, the spirit is there'.

[20]See Sijtsma, 1989: 153

[21]There are exceptions such as Rotterdam. Careful attempts at establishing contacts and cooperation are being made.

[22]This is my definition based on the study and observation of the general use of the term. For a more theoretical explanation of the concept see: J.Hendriks (1981)

[23]For instance, Minderhedennota, Ministerie Binnenlandse Zaken, SDU, Den Haag, 1983, pp 121

[24]See De Graaf, 1986

[25]It has to be pointed out here that Islam as such is not an all determining factor in the formation of ethnic identity, because within the various ethnic groups the national and sometimes regional differences are strongly accentuated.

[26]Nairn (1981) and others have pointed out this inherently ambiguous nature of ethnicity (and of nationalism)

12

Religious Institutionalization among Moluccans

A. van der Hoek

The history of the Moluccan religious communities in The Netherlands cannot be understood properly without its politico-historical context. In contrast to other ethnic minorities, such as the Moroccans and Turks, Moluccans did not migrate for economic, but for political reasons.[1] Their reasons for migration can, to a great extent, be compared to those of the group of "Indo-Europeans", who left Indonesia in the decade following the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, and opted for a new existence in The Netherlands. As descendants of Europeans who, in the nineteenth century, intermingled with native women, their loyalty to the Dutch crown made them suspect in the eyes of the new regime.[2] An analogy between the Dutch Moluccan minority and those people in The Netherlands coming from the other former Dutch colony, Surinam, arises from the fact that both share a colonial background; their historical experiences and reasons for departure, however, are profoundly different.

The arrival, in 1951, of a group of 12.500 ex-KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, i.e. the former Dutch colonial army) Moluccan soldiers and their families was the direct outcome of the decolonization process, which changed the former Dutch East Indies into the present "Republik Indonesia (RI)." As former soldiers of the colonial army, used as instruments to maintain "law and order" in the Archipelago, there was no room for them in the new republic. Their ideal, an independent "Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS)" as proclaimed on the 24th of April 1950 - could not be realised. Their departure, compelled by necessity, for the former "mother country" and their dismissal from the army brought about a traumatic experience. Their privileged status as "belanda hitam" (black Dutchmen), which they had enjoyed within the colonial system, had suddenly disappeared. In this respect Wittermans and Gist spoke of "status deprivation".[3]

During the first few years, their stay in The Netherlands was considered temporary. Several attempts were made to prove the juridical legitimacy of the

South Moluccan Republic. Gradually the Moluccan people and the Dutch Government realised that, unfortunately, their stay would, be of a more permanent character. The report of the State Commission, presided by the Social Democratic Politician Verwey-Jonker, which was published in 1959, marks a turning point: government policy from that time onwards was aimed towards integration into Dutch society.[4] The accommodation in camps resembling both the "tangsis" (military camps on Java and other Indonesian islands) and the "kampongs" (villages) on the Moluccan islands, was gradually replaced by residences in wards.

In the Dutch post war political spectrum support for an independent South Moluccan state was offered by the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP). The Social Democratic party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) considered the proclamation of the RMS to be an aftermath of colonial history, not to be supported. Extra-parliamentary support to the Moluccan struggle was given by the patriotic royalist organization, "Door de Eeuwen Trouw "(DDET), which held the view that Moluccans should be paid for their age-long loyalty towards the Dutch.[5] A common religion and a common colonial past, loyalty towards the house of Orange and a generally shared struggle for an independent, anti-communist Republic were the binding elements par excellence.[6]

Some geographic and demographic aspects

Geographically, Moluccans are concentrated in the economically weaker parts of The Netherlands. Camps and wards were always located outside the big cities. This, again, in contrast to members of other ethnic minorities who mainly live in the urbanized centers. In the fifties the population increased very rapidly from about 12,500 in 1951 to about 18,600 in 1959.[7] Veenman, who did some research on the unemployment among Moluccans, estimates the total number of the group to be approximately 35,000 for the year 1987. Because Moluccans cannot be identified properly within the official statistics, this is only an approximation.[8]

Religious and ethnic diversity

The majority of the Moluccan minority is of the Protestant faith (93%). A minority of roughly 4,5%, mostly southeastern Moluccans, are Roman-Catholics. The small Muslim minority consists of about 2.5% of the total.

Most of the emigrants are ethnic Ambonese (76.1%); 10.6% were born outside of the Moluccas, but are of Ambonese origin; 23.9% have their roots

on the Kei and Tanimbar islands, southeast from the Central-Moluccan Archipelago.[9]

The Geredja Indjili Maluku (GIM) is by far the largest Moluccan church. Recent calculations indicate a total amount of 11,000 members.[10] For a long time the "Noodgemeente Geredja Protestant Maluku di Belanda (NGPMB)" has been the second largest church. In 1969 75% belonged to the GIM and 12% to the NGPMB.[11] Today it is no longer clear whether the NGPMB or a later schismatic fraction thereof, the NGPMB 1953, include the highest number of congregation members.[12]

There are, altogether, 18 Protestant Moluccan churches in The Netherlands.[13] Several attempts have been made to advance oecumenical developments, but without any concrete results so far. Roman Catholic south-east Moluccans live concentrated in the south of Holland. This group did not establish an independent religious institution, because they were absorbed by the mother church.

I will not deal with this religious subminority, since its religious history differs in many respects from that of the Moluccans originating from the Central Moluccas.[14] As for the Muslims, after spending some time together in a common camp, they split up into two factions and chose their residences according to political preference. Some remarks will be made about them in the course of this paper.

Causes of religious schisms

The American anthropologist Bartels, specialized in Moluccan culture both on the Central Moluccas and in The Netherlands, explains the continuing schisms within the Moluccan religious community as resulting from:
(1) *political discord*; (2) *ethnic divisiveness*; (3) *age-old animosities along island, village and family-lines*.[15]

Political discord

Political issues had a disintegrating effect on the social structure of the Moluccan community in exile. In Lunetten, one of the largest camps, for example, several political groups were set up. In december 1952 tension increased to such an extent that it was deemed necessary to call the police and army in order to restore normal conditions. This political discord, which affected the entire community, pervaded the religious domain as well.

The first church schism, as a result of political dissension, occurred at the outset of their stay in The Netherlands. The Protestant-Christian Moluccans, who - by their religious leaders, the pendetas - had been temporarily organized

as a subdivision of the Geredja Protestan Maluku (GPM) in Ambon, established an independent church because the GPM openly sympathized with the unitary Republik Indonesia. They no longer called their church Geredja Protestan Maluku di Belanda, but in november 1952 changed its name into Geredja Indjili Maluku di Belanda and openly declared their explicit solidarity with the ideal of an independent Republik Maluku Selatan.

In order to join the World Council of Churches (WCC) the GIM di Belanda once again changed its name into Geredja Indjili Maluku. This was done because the Secretary General of this international organization of Christian churches at that time, Dr. W.A. Visser 't Hooft, was of the opinion that the status of the GIM di Belanda was unclear because of its temporary character, which was expressed by the addition "di Belanda" (i.e. in The Netherlands). This change in names, however, did not lead to the desired membership of the WCC. Subsequently the GIM affiliated itself to the International Council of Christian Churches (ICCC), an orthodox protestant-Christian alliance of churches. Already in the summer of 1950 the ICCC had recognized the South Moluccan right of self-determination. The relationship with the Dutch churches, especially with the Nederlands Hervormde Kerk (NHK), has until today, though be it to a lesser degree, been strained. This constitutes a central feature of the institutionalization of the Moluccan churches in The Netherlands: as a result of the political issues at stake relations with the Geredja Protestan Maluku as well as the Dutch churches became difficult.

The thin borderline between a commitment to the church and a political commitment became obvious in the "Assen affair" involving the influential clergyman, pendeta S. Metiary, in 1964. Although the Synodboard of the GIM, in 1956, had decided that ministers could not, at the same time, be political leaders, Metiary was chosen as chairman of a Moluccan political organization which had the task to bring together diverging political viewpoints. In his defence the minister claimed that he was not concerned with politics, but that he wanted to unite various factions from a more or less neutral standpoint. He moreover accused the GIM itself of intervening in the political sphere.

Another example of the interaction between church and politics is concerned with the controversy between the president of the RMS in exile, Ir. J.A. Manusama, and his former opponent, I. Tamaela. Both of them claimed to be authorized by one of the chief figures the RMS, Mr.Dr. Chr. Soumokil, to lead the Moluccan people in exile. In contrast to Manusama, Tamaela wanted to internationalize the RMS-matter at the United Nations and judged Manusama to be a puppet of the Dutch Government. Tamaela provided his adherents with identity cards as a ticket of admission to a free Moluccan Republic. This way he could prove to his opponent who was on his side.

Around Tamaela, who considered himself to be a general, a tiny church was founded, which once at its height consisted of thirty communities and six clergymen. After the death of Tamaela in 1978 the interest in this church waned.

In some wards a special service, the so-called "geredja tanah air", a service in which the return to Ambon is celebrated, with the specific purpose of asking God for deliverance, is held on the 24th of every month, the day of the proclamation of the RMS. This stresses the nationalistic exclusiveness, which is particularly strong in the Moluccan Evangelical church, the GIM.

In general, it is justifiable to conclude, with Bartels, that Moluccan Christianity in The Netherlands has persistently retained the features of an ethnic religion. Apart from the Dutch partners in the case of bi-cultural marriages, Moluccan Christian communities consist solely of people from a Moluccan background.

Politics also had a profound influence on the organizational developments among *Muslim Moluccans*. As mentioned above, between 1954 and the early sixties, Muslim Moluccans lived together in an independent camp. For about a decade the Muslims were kept united by their leader, imam Achmad Tan, on the basis of their common religion, which at that time transcended political and ethnic differences. The mono-religious organizational structure of this Islamic "kampong" was identical to the socio-religious model of either Islamic or Christian villages on the Central Moluccas. After this initial period the community split up along political lines: either pro-Republik Maluku Selatan or pro-Republik Indonesia. Bartels suggests that the political preference corresponded to a difference in religious orientation. Islamic traditionalists stressing the indigenous adat chose to live in Waalwijk and Islamic progressives, who put greater emphasis on religious purity and generally sympathized with the Republic of Indonesia, opted for a home in Ridderkerk.[16]

This distinction between traditionalists on the one hand, and progressives on the other, can be traced back to colonial times. After the lifting of the spice monopoly in 1863 Islamic influences from other parts of the Indonesian Archipelago entered the Central Moluccas. The inhabitants no longer being isolated from the source of their religious ideas, a process of re-Islamization started. This new influx was especially visible in urban centers.

In the years preceding the lifting of the spice monopoly the isolation from the Arab world had resulted in an intermingling of Islamic and adat practices. In Hatuhaha, the northern Islamic part of the island Saparua, for example, some religious observances developed local variations: during the month of Ramadan the inhabitants of this area fasted for three days only. A pilgrimage to Mecca was deemed unnecessary because it was thought that Mohammed himself had brought Islam to the area.[17]

Ethnic divisiveness

The second factor, mentioned by Bartels, responsible for the splitting up of the religious community into several groups is formed by the ethnic divisiveness. Upon arrival in Holland the Moluccans were temporarily lodged in about fifty camps. The Dutch Government paid no attention to ethnic and religious differences and conflicts were inevitable. Already at the very beginning, in August 1951, a fight took place between Ambonese and Keiese in the camp Lunetten.

Keiese people differed in several respects from their Central Moluccan neighbours: First of all, they did not, generally speaking, sympathize with the R.M.S.-ideal. Secondly, most of them were Roman-Catholics. Thirdly, they had not held, like the Central Moluccans, a privileged position in the former colonial army. They were of a lower military rank, just like the Muslim Moluccans. These three differences, the political, religious and military ones were, of course, interrelated. They evoked a severe confrontation and led to the removal of South-East Moluccans to special "Keiese camps", in which they had more chances to establish their own religious forms.

Age-old animosities among island, village and family lines

The dissension, in the political as well as in the religious field, cannot be understood with in mind the principles of Western organization. Very often people follow a leader not because of his political program or because of the dogmata he proclaims, but because he holds a dominant position in their social group. This idea of "corporate personality" is still very much alive among the exiles. Numerous examples could be given in which schisms took place along adat lines.[18]

This particularistic orientation can be illustrated as follows: in Zwolle, a small Dutch town, the South-East Molucccan Protestant community split up about twenty years ago for the reason that one part judged the other to be organized exclusively along family lines. This meant that a new, not family-related, church with a pendeta of its own came into existence. Only recently, after years, have the other two churches developed closer relations.

As far as research has been able to ascertain, dogmatic differences did not play a distinctive role in the development of schisms. Theology, Bartels argues, "was generally only of secondary importance".[19] However, I cannot agree with Bartels's assertion that Moluccan theological reflection was lacking

in depth. This statement sounds too much like a value-judgment. Differences in liturgical practice between the various churches are, as far as research has been able to register, small and not of any importance with regard to the development of schisms.

The three factors mentioned, the *political, ethnic and social factor*, are -directly or indirectly - the result of the process of decolonization itself and of the specific problems connected with the exile position in The Netherlands. In colonial times the church was closely linked to and controlled by the colonial apparatus. Because of this controlling influence, no major schisms could develop. The dividing principle of politics could only emerge within the realm of the church after the migration to Holland.

Although a comparison with the situation in the tangsis is a problematic one, because of a lack of data, it may be postulated that the ethnic divisiveness and its organizational consequences within the religious field, could only come about in the Dutch environment. There is also no evidence in the history of the Central Moluccas that age-old animosities based on island, village and family lines led to independent churches.

Institutionalization among Moluccans in The Netherlands: a comparison in the light of the colonial background

First of all, it should be noted that statistically speaking it is, of course, impossible to compare the 2.5 % Muslim Moluccans with their 93% Protestant-Christian compatriots. It is possible, however, to show in what way the process of religious institutionalization among Muslim and Protestant-Christian Moluccans respectively was influenced by their difference of religious, political and socio-economic position in the former Dutch East Indies. This can be illustrated in the following way.

In colonial times the church as an institution was intricately linked to the colonial government.[20] The Dutch trading association VOC (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) had the competence and obligation to deal with church affairs. The church in the former Dutch East Indies was, in many respects, engrafted onto the example of the mother church. The teachings and confession of the Moluccan church were, as in Holland, based on the Articles of Faith from the Synod of Dordrecht (which took place in 1618/1619), the Dutch Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism, which had been translated into Malay. Liturgical practices also were largely the same. Cooley mentions that even the hours of the church services in The Netherlands were copied.[21] There were, of course, divergences. In contrast to practices in the mother church two classes of Christians developed: those, who were baptized only and

those who, moreover, were confirmed and were, on the basis thereof, admitted to participate in the Lord's Supper.

In the organizational field a centralized model developed, which was not derived from the Dutch synodal-presbyterian pattern.[22] This meant that the centralized power of the church, just like the secular colonial power, was located in Batavia. In general, it may be stated that Christianity was a means of promoting the loyalty of the people to the Christian rulers.[23] In this respect education played a central part.

Already in the sixteenth century the Portuguese established schools in Christian kampongs for the transference of their religious ideas and values. Under Dutch rule religious teachers ("schoolmeesters" or "guru indjil") combined their educational task with the leadership of a Christian congregation. These schools were also of importance for the gradually supplanting of the use of local indigenous languages (bahasa tanah) by Malay.[24]

After the decline of the clove cultivation, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Christian Ambonese were recruited by the colonial army. There was an explicit preference for Christian Ambonese soldiers. From 1873 onwards the village head (raja) of a Christian kampong was paid for every recruit from his village. In this way a military "cast" of Christian Ambonese was created.[25]

From the story above it may be concluded that Dutch colonial rule influenced almost all aspects of Christian Ambonese life. The history of "Ambon's other half", on the contrary, shows quite a different picture.[26] Because of religious differences, Muslims were regarded as antagonists to be converted to the "Agama Belanda" (Dutch Religion). If efforts to convert them did not bear fruit, Muslim influences should be curtailed as much as possible. Educational opportunities were almost absent. Even in the twentieth century illiteracy was widespread among the Muslim population.

Understandably, local linguistic varieties (bahasa tanah) stood a better chance to survive in a Muslim environment, as compared to Christian areas. The differences in colonial relationships and experiences were also evident by the disapproval of Muslims to serve in the KNIL. Participation in this army was interpreted as being forbidden on religious grounds (haram) and Christian KNIL-soldiers were considered to be unbelievers (kafirs). Very few Muslims did enlist in the army until the late 1930s. This explains the fact that only a small percentage of the totality of the Moluccan community in exile, arriving in Holland in 1951, had an Islamic background. Islamic institutionalization was stimulated from the outside for the first time by the Japanese, who in 1943 established the first supra-local organization for Ambonese Muslims called Djamijah Islamijah Ceram.

In conclusion it can be said that the Protestant-Christian Moluccan institutionalization differed from the religious institutionalization among Muslim Moluccans in the sense that Protestant-Christians, through their religious ties with the former colonial masters, for political reasons had to dissociate themselves institutionally from the GPM in Ambon, as well as from the Dutch churches.

Muslims did not share this heritage and had to organize themselves in The Netherlands in a period in which this country had not yet become used to large numbers of Muslims within its boundaries. For the purpose of founding a mosque of their own in the Islamic "kampong", Wyldemerck, in Friesland, relations were established with the Achmadiyya movement, which already had a mosque in The Hague, the first mosque in The Netherlands.[27]

Today Muslim Moluccans are no longer religiously isolated. Muslims originating from several Muslim countries visit their mosques in Waalwijk and Ridderkerk.

Notes

[1]In this article the term "Moluccans" has been used, because it seems to be the most neutral. The term "Ambonese" was used in colonial times and in the first two decades in The Netherlands; it is either restricted to its historical context or used in order to designate the inhabitants (or former inhabitants) of Ambon. The term "South Moluccans" has a specific, political connotation.

[2]Willems, Cottaar, and van Aken, 1990: 34,35,38.

[3]Wittermans and van Gist, 1962:309-323.

[4]*Ambonezen in Nederland*, 1959.

[5]See: Bosscher en Waaldijk, 1985.

[6]In december 1950, these binding elements were joined by another one, derived from Moluccan adat. Through the initiative of P.Lokollo, one of the ministers of the RMS-cabinet, DDET became the pela of the Republik Maluku Selatan. In Moluccan adat pelabonds are lineages between two or more villages, which go back to different periods of Central Moluccan history. See for detailed information: Bartels, 1977.

[7]*Ambonezen in Nederland* 1959:13.

[8]*Migrantenstudies*, 5e jrg 1989, nr. 3, pp.36-47.

[9]Bartels, 1989:13.

[10]Personal communication. Boer suggests a total amount of about 18,000 members in 1980. In *Rondom het woord*, theologische etherleergang N.C.R.V., 1987, dec.; 29e jrg., nr.4:33. a total amount of some 20,000 members for 1987 is suggested.

It seems to me that these calculations are rough estimates, which lack a sound basis. It is therefore impossible to trace, on the basis thereof, secularist tendencies.

[11]Van Amersfoort, 1974:125,126. Smeets, 1977:14.

[12]Personal communication.

[13]Personal communication.

[14]See: Lasomer, 1985.

[15]Bartels, 1989:197.

[16]See: van der Hoek, 1987.
[17]Chauvel, 1990:161-163.
[18]Adat defined as: "customary usage, which has been handed down by the ancestors". Cooley, 1962:2.
[19]Bartels, 1989:193.
[20]See Locher, 1948:16-28.
[21]Cooley, 1961:351.
[22]Cooley, 1961:350-352.
[23]Knaap, 1987:85.
[24]Chauvel, 1990:26.
[25]See: Chauvel, 1990:39-70..
[26]In 1980 Chauvel wrote an article about Muslim Ambonese by this title.
[27]The Achmadiyya movement deviates from the mainstream of Islamic theology. The Achmadiyya movement was formally declared to be an non-Islamic organization in Pakistan in 1974. See Shadid/Van Koningsveld, 1990:20. They did not influence the Muslim Moluccans theologically.

Epilogue

Current Development and Future Prospects

13

Future Prospects of Muslims in The Netherlands

W.A. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld

The future prospects of the Islamic faith and rituals in The Netherlands may be approached from different angles. One can look at the dynamics existing within the groups concerned and at their religious and cultural life. Another approach is to consider the dynamics within the receiving society and their impact on the groups concerned. The former perspective has been discussed by us in an earlier publication (Shadid-van Koningsveld: 1991, 230ff). The two main factors related to faith and rituals analyzed there were the following.

1. The *partial transplantation of the cultural-religious heritage* of the minority-groups concerned. Some aspects of this heritage can hardly be taken along. This especially holds for religious practices and rituals connected with a local or regional religious infrastructure in their country of origin, as e.g. many aspects connected with the veneration of saints, the celebration of seasonal festivals and many other aspects of popular religion. This is of greater importance to women than to men, because many aspects of the social life of women are closely connected to its religious aspects, e.g. the visiting of grave-yards and the veneration of saints. *Landman* concludes in the present volume that whereas about 300 mosques have been established in The Netherlands so far, it may take quite some time before the first Sufi saint whose tomb could become the centre of religious activity will be buried in this country. Only then will popular Sufism be institutionalized in Holland.

2. The *partial blending of religious variants caused by contacts between groups* results in a certain relativization of the previously confessed unique value of one's own tradition and may lead to a blending of various forms of religious behaviour. This especially applies to various forms of religious ceremonies, such as ritual oblutions, prayers, mourning-practices, etcetera.

Hoffer shows that Muslim religious healers, who have been deprived of many aspects of the traditional infrastructure, are able to practice their art, even in an adjusted form. He also shows that patients of different ethnical backgrounds and religious denominations consult these healers frequently.

The second above-mentioned perspective of looking at the dynamics within the receiving society and their impact on the groups concerned, shows two important elements. First of all, under certain unfavourable socio-economic conditions, the more conspicuous religious minority-groups were within society at large, the more manifest also the processes of discrimination became. The authors' contribution on the ritual slaughtering of animals in The Netherlands clearly shows that certain rights acquired in the sphere of religious freedom can, in fact, easily become the subject of public debate and political strife, if the conditions referred to are fulfilled. There appears to be no reason to assume that the future will be any brighter than the past. We foresee that the rights acquired by minorities with respect to the publicly visible expression of their religion will, every now and then, will be challenged by some groups of the majority. In Holland, one observes a remarkable increase in the public arguments favouring the abolition of the pillarization-system, exactly at a time when minority-groups are making use of the opportunities provided by this characterically Dutch system to set up certain religious institutions.

As to the second generation of Muslims living in Holland, *Rooijackers* pleads for an adjustment of the prevailing image of this group as being lost between two cultures. The majority of them are able to deal with the integration dilemma at a psychological level by taking a bi-cultural stand. The majority feel at home in the new society while at the same time preserving their original identity, succeed in establishing a positive personal state of well-being and have an optimistic attitude as to their personal future. In some cases, however, discussed by *Brouwer*, there is a clash between the values of the Muslim girls and those of their parents. Islam binds them to their families and backgrounds, but at the same time Islam is a binding religion for them personally. Thus, whereas they themselves have accepted, to a certain extent, the Islamic norms and values, they also hold Islam responsible for the restrictions imposed upon them.

Van der Lans and *Rooijackers* mention in this regard that there is a striking correspondence between religious changes in progress among the second generation of Turkish migrants and changes observable among other religious groups of the same age. The more participation in the secular culture of rationalism increases, the more religious beliefs and practices decrease. As Islam is a vital resource of the cultural identity of the Turkish migrants, they assert that concern for the quality of the religious education of the second generation should be a prerequisite for the survival of their cultural identity. It seems necessary to create more provisions for the religious instruction of

Muslim children, not only in primary schools, but also in schools for secondary and vocational education.

In this respect it is interesting to focuss the attention on the conclusion drawn by *Van de Wetering*. According to her, the conflict of interest between the Dutch groups, on the one hand, and the Moroccan groups, on the other, will lead to the stagnation and even the expulsion of the Arabic Language and Culture Teaching Program (ALCT). In this case society will have to look for alternatives, such as multicultural education, in order to make the process of integrating Moroccan pupils into Dutch society as smooth as possible. Moroccan parents also have some alternatives for the ALCT, such as the mosque-schools, Islamic religious education in public schools, and Islamic primary schools.

In their discussion of the 20 Islamic primary schools in existence, the authors conclude that it is still too early to measure the effects of this type of education on the results of the pupils and on their chances to enter various types of secondary education. These schools still experience difficulties in finding a sufficient number of Muslim teachers, a situation which is expected to continue for some time. The rapid growth of these schools over the past four years seems to justify the expectation of their further expansion and of the foundation of a secondary Islamic school in one of Holland's larger urban centres in the near future.

As for the Muslim organizations in The Netherlands, *Van Bommel* has drawn the attention to a number of important internal and external factors hindering the development of interethnic umbrella organizations, especially a unified representative Muslim body which, among other things, could negotiate with the Government on behalf of the Muslims. Because of the failure of several attempts to form federative bodies in the past, he adopts a skeptical attitude towards the feasibility of similar initiatives in the near future. Among the external factors concerned special attention may be drawn to the ethnical, religious and political heterogeneity, influences from the governments of the home countries and a lack in skilled leadership. The external factors include: the lack of acknowledgement of the religious organizations by the Dutch Government, and the pressure exerted on these organizations to create one single body to represent all the Muslims regardless of their religious denominations.

The changing role of Islam and Muslim organizations is emphasized in the contribution by *Sunier*. On the one hand, he acknowledges that Islam has been "imported" into Holland and that there is much more continuity in religious ideas and practices here than in the countries of origin. Most of the organizations have been set up by the first generation and play an important role in maintaining the ties between the migrants and their countries of origin. On the other hand, however, it is not correct to consider Islam as a static

phenomenon, as it is being constantly reshaped and reproduced by human practice, depending on the actual situation people live in. Changing circumstances and new experiences affect the attitudes towards Islam and the ways in which Islam is reproduced and articulated by its adherents. He therefore argues that the choice to join a particular Muslim organization or the way in which such an organization takes up its position can only be understood if the experiences of such a minority within Dutch society are taken into account. Islamic organizations in The Netherlands no longer primarily reflect the situation in the countries of origin but the developments taking place within their respective ethnic communities in Holland itself. This tendency, the author argues, will become more pronounced in the near future.

Also *Van Ooijen* criticizes the view, found in many publications, of the static character of Islam. He argues that there exists a shortage of studies expounding on the changes in the psychological, social and cultural meaning of Islam. According to him it is all too easy to talk about "transplanted" or "imported" Islam because Islam, in general, and Islam in The Netherlands, in particular, are by definition "on the move". Islam is the most important basis for self-help organizations. He criticizes the policy of local and national government bodies to invest great sums of money in non-religious organizations for migrants, the Muslims refuse to be squeezed into a government controlled emancipation pattern.

Van der Hoek stresses the specific position of the Moluccan Muslims who came to Holland as a result of the decolonization process. Living in an independent camp for about a decade, they kept united on the basis of their common religion which, at that time, transcended political and ethnical differences. Their mono-religious organizational structure was identical to the socio-religious model of an Islamic village in the Central Moluccas. After this initial period the community split up along political lines. Also the Moluccan Muslims developed interethnical contacts with other Muslim groups in Holland for various common purposes. For the purpose of founding a mosque of their own relation were established with the Ahmadiyya movement, which already had a mosque in The Hague, the first mosque in The Netherlands.

In the light of these conclusions, what can be said about the feasibility of inter-ethnic Muslim umbrella organizations in the near future, which will be representative on a national level? We believe that their prospects are more promising than before. Various factors, such as the creation of mosques, Islamic schools, etcetera, have caused the Dutch Government to become increasingly aware of the important role played by religious organizations based on Islam. Also the report on the national Hirsch Ballin Committee, in which the improvement of the religious infrastructure is recommended, and which is to be discussed in the Lower Chamber in the near future, has enhanced this awareness. In order to be able to distribute new financial means

for the above-mentioned improvement of the religious infrastructure, the Government is urging the Muslim organizations to create one single representative body. A second factor is that the skilled leadership available among Muslims is rapidly increasing. Thirdly, there have been various initiatives to form multi-ethnic bodies, some of which still do exist, such as, for example, the Islamic Boardcasting Foundation (IOS). Instead of underlining the failure of some of these attempts, it is also possible to look upon them as symptoms of future long-term developments. Finally, the opposition against the interference from the national governments of the countries of origin in the affairs of their subjects abroad, has become much more evident, also on the level of the religious organizations, their views and activities. Taking into account the dynamic character of Islam and the fact that the organizations are adapting their policies to the views of their members, we indeed foresee a representative, interethnic body coming into existence in the near future.

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